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In the last weeks of 2001, Argentina experienced a financial collapse 
of catastrophic proportions.1 In one day alone, the Argentine peso lost 
40% of its value.2 As the peso collapsed, a run on the banks ensued. Ac-
cording to The Economist, throughout the collapse, “income per person 
in dollar terms…shrunk from around $7,000 to just $3,500” and “unem-
ployment [rose] to perhaps 25%.”3 This economic chaos meant that by 
late 2002, over half the Argentine population was living below the pov-
erty line.4 The crisis soon spread from the economic to the political 
sphere. In December 2001, one day of riots left 30 civilians dead and 
led to the resignation of President Fernando de la Rua and the collapse 
of the government. A “tragicomic spectacle of a succession of five pres-
idents taking office over a mere ten days” followed.5 
In response to the crisis, which has been likened to the Great Depres-
sion of the 1930s in the United States,6 Argentina adopted a number of 
measures to stabilize the economy and restore political confidence. 
Among these efforts was a significant devaluation of the peso through 
the termination of the currency board which had pegged the peso to the 
U.S. dollar, the pesification of all financial obligations,7 and the effec-
                                                          
1. See PAUL BLUSTEIN, AND THE MONEY KEPT ROLLING IN (AND OUT): WALL STREET, THE 
IMF AND THE BANKRUPTING OF ARGENTINA 1–2 (2005). For a discussion of the economic back-
ground to the collapse, see Mario Damill, Roberto Frenkel & Martin Rapetti, The Argentinean 
Debt: History, Default and Restructuring 2–18 (Apr. 2005, revised Aug. 2005) (unpublished 
CEDES working paper), available at http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/ 
ipd/pub/Frenkel_SDR_Eng.pdf. 
2. See Certificate Concerning the State of Necessity in Argentina, Guillermo Nielsen, Secre-
tary of Finance of Argentina, Jan. 2003, ¶ 11 [hereinafter Nielsen Declaration] (on file with au-
thors).  Certification was made by the Argentine government to the courts adjudicating the debt 
cases and the ICSID cases arising out of the economic crisis. 
3. Argentina’s Collapse: A Decline Without Parallel, ECONOMIST, Mar. 2–8, 2002, at 26, 26. 
4. Nielsen Declaration, supra note 2, ¶ 5; see also Slump Turns Jobless Argentines Into Scav-
engers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2002, at § 1, at 14.  Beginning in late November 2000, massive 
strikes swept Argentina. On November 23, 2000, “[m]illions of workers stayed off their jobs in 
the largest national strike in years as a union–led protest against government austerity measures 
virtually paralyzed the country.” Argentina: Strikes Against Austerity, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 
2000, at A6. 
5. BLUSTEIN, supra note 1, at 1. 
6. See, e.g., A Survey of Capitalism and Democracy: Liberty’s Great Advance, ECONOMIST, 
June 28, 2003, at 4, 6 (“Argentina has endured an economic collapse to match the Great Depres-
sion of the 1930s….”). 
7. See Law No. 25561, Jan. 7, 2002, 29810 B.O. 1, available at 
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=71477. 
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tive freezing of all bank accounts through a series of measures known 
collectively as the Corralito.8  
Though these measures offered a long-term prospect of restored eco-
nomic confidence and stability, they also imposed immediate and pain-
ful costs on all participants in the Argentine economy, including foreign 
investors. While Argentine citizens had little legal recourse, many for-
eign investors who were harmed by Argentina’s response to the crisis 
sought legal protection under the regime of bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) which Argentina had entered into during the 1980s and 1990s.9 
Such treaties offered investors guarantees including the internationaliza-
tion of contractual breaches, national treatment, and most-favored na-
tion protections.10 In addition, these treaties often provided investors the 
possibility of direct investor-state arbitration before the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).11 
For investors harmed by Argentina’s response to the economic crisis, 
the possibility of direct arbitration against the Argentine government for 
                                                          
8. See Decree No. 1570, Dec. 3, 2001, 29787 B.O. 1, available at 
http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/infolegInternet/verNorma.do?id=70355. For reference to the meas-
ures as the Corralito, see, for example, CARINA LOPEZ, STANDARD & POOR’S, THE ARGENTINE 
CRISIS: A CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AFTER THE SOVEREIGN DEFAULT (Apr. 12, 2002),  
http://www.standardandpoors.com/europe/francais/Fr_news/Argentine-Chronology-of-
Events_12-04-02.html. 
9. For a list of Argentinean BITs, see U.N. Conference on Int’l Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], 
Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959–1999, at 26–27, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (Dec. 2000) 
(prepared by Abraham Negash), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf. 
10. For a discussion of protections often found in BITs, see M. SORNARAJAH, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 233–58 (2004); Andrew Guzman, Book Note, 
The International Law on Foreign Investment, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 612, 613–14 (1995). 
11. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) has been created 
under the auspices of the World Bank to hear such cases. See Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 
1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention], available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm. For a discussion of ICSID, see The 
World Bank Group, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: About ICSID, 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/about.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2007). For investors in Lat-
in America, the possibility of direct arbitration against a government represented a significant 
change from the Calvo Doctrine, according to which a government’s liability toward foreigners 
can be no greater than that owed to nationals. As a result, disputes between foreigners and a host 
country could only be decided by the country’s own legal system. For brief explanations of the 
Calvo doctrine, see Bilateral Investment Treaties With Argentina, Treaty Doc. 103-2; Armenia, 
Treaty Doc. 103-11; Bulgaria, Treaty Doc. 103-3; Ecuador, Treaty Doc. 103-15; Kazakhstan, 
Treaty Doc. 103-12; Kyrgyzstan, Treaty Doc. 103-13; Moldova, Treaty Doc. 103-14; and Roma-
nia, Treaty Doc. 102-36: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103rd Cong. 31–32 
(1993) (responses of U.S. Department of State to questions asked by Senator Pell); 1 CARLOS 
CALVO, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL TEÓRICO Y PRÁCTICO DE EUROPA Y AMÉRICA 191 (Durand 
& Pedone–Lauriel eds., 1st ed. 1868). 
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breaches of BITs offered a potentially promising means to recoup losses 
suffered during the crisis. Claims framed as a violation of a BIT could 
be brought directly against Argentina through ICSID. Only limited 
means were available to challenge ICSID awards and such awards were 
generally perceived as enforceable in national courts. Not surprisingly, 
then, Argentina has become subject to no fewer than forty-three ICSID 
arbitrations brought by investors who assert that Argentina’s response to 
the crisis harmed investments protected by various BITs.12 Argentina’s 
potential liability from these cases alone could be greater than U.S. $8 
billion, more than the entire financial reserves of the Argentine govern-
ment in 2002.13 Some have speculated that the total value of potential 
claims against Argentina could reach U.S. $80 billion.14 
Argentina’s rhetorical response to this onslaught of cases has been to 
criticize the ICSID system and pressure for reforms.15 Argentina’s legal 
strategy, in contrast, has been to turn back to the very BITs under which 
investors have brought claims and to invoke a long-dormant treaty 
clause that appeared perfectly tailored to deal with just such a situa-
tion.16 Argentina’s BITs with the United States, Germany, and the Bel-
gian-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) each contain a non-
precluded measures (NPM) provision that limits the applicability of in-
vestor protections under the BIT in exceptional circumstances. These 
NPM clauses allow states to take actions otherwise inconsistent with the 
treaty when, for example, the actions are necessary for the protection of 
essential security, the maintenance of public order, or to respond to a 
public health emergency.17 NPM provisions effectively “permit host-
                                                          
12. For a listing of concluded and pending cases before ICSID, see The World Bank Group, 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes: ICSID Cases, 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/cases.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2007). 
13. Gabriel Bottini, Counsel, Office of the Attorney Gen., Republic of Arg., Issues of Juris-
diction and Merits Arising from the Argentine Litigation at ICSID, Lecture at the University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law Symposium: International Investment and 
Transnational Litigation: Challenges of Growing and Expanding Investor State Disputes (Feb. 2, 
2007). 
14. Wailin Wong, Argentina Treasury Attorney: World Bank Claims Could Reach $80 Bil-
lion, DOW JONES INT’L NEWS, Jan. 21. 2005. 
15. See Julio Burdman, La proteccion a las inversions extranjeras en Argentina (1989–2005): 
Una mirada político–económica, in POLÍTICAS LIBERALES EXITOSAS: SOLUCIONES PENSANDO 
EN LA GENTE 139, 149 (Gustavo Lazzari & Martín Simonetta eds., 2005), available at 
http://admin.fnst.org/uploads/1198/Politicas_liberales_exitosas.pdf. 
16. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 
Award, ¶¶ 332-55 (May 12, 2005) [hereinafter CMS Award], available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/CMS_Award.pdf. 
17. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 
U.S.–Arg., art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103–2 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.-
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state impairment of covered investment” and, in turn, weaken the BIT 
“as an instrument for regulating host-state governments.”18 As long as 
the host-state’s actions are taken in pursuit of one of the permissible ob-
jectives specified in the NPM clause, acts otherwise prohibited by the 
treaty do not constitute breaches of the treaty and states should face no 
liability under the BIT. The lawyers in Argentina’s Procuración del Te-
soro de la Nación have argued that the economic collapse of 2001–2002 
triggered the NPM clauses of many of its BITs and thereby relieved it of 
liability.19  
The history of NPM provisions reaches back far beyond Argentina’s 
BITs concluded in the 1980s and 1990s. NPM clauses were regular 
elements of U.S. Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) treaties 
beginning in the post-WWII era.20 The NPM clause in the U.S.-
Nicaragua FCN treaty was raised before the International Court of Jus-
tice (ICJ) in the 1984 Nicaragua case21 and an equivalent clause in the 
U.S.-Iran Treaty of Amity22 played an important part in the Oil Plat-
forms case.23 NPM clauses migrated from the early FCN treaties to the 
international investment regime beginning with the establishment of the 
German BIT program in the late 1950s. The first known investment 
treaty with an NPM clause was Germany’s first BIT, which was con-
cluded with Pakistan in 1959,24 and NPM clauses can be found in nearly 
every subsequent German BIT. Likewise, the first ever U.S. BIT, con-
cluded with Panama in 1982, contained an NPM clause.25 Again, each 
subsequent U.S. BIT has contained such a clause. Though BITs have 
been the subject of considerable academic inquiry,26 the NPM clauses 
                                                                                                                                      
Argentina BIT]. 
18. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Of Politics and Markets: The Shifting Ideology of the BITs, 11 
INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 159, 170 (1993). 
19. For one such clause, see, for example, U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 17, art. XI. 
20. See The Charles H. Sullivan Report on the Standard Provisions of the Treaty of Friend-
ship Commerce and Navigation as They Evolved Through Jan. 1, 1962, at page 302 (on file with 
authors). One of the earliest NPM clauses appears in the U.S.-China FCN treaty. Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-P.R.C., art. XXVI, Nov. 4, 1946, 63 Stat. 1299, re-
printed in 43 AM. J. INT’L L. (SUPPLEMENT) 27, 47 (1949). 
21. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, 15 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Judgment (Merits)]. 
22. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, U.S.–Iran, art. XX, Aug. 15, 
1955, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. 3853; 284 U.N.T.S. 93 [hereinafter U.S.–Iran FCN Treaty]. 
23. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Preliminary Objection, 1996 I.C.J. 803, 811 (Dec. 12). 
24. Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Protocol, F.R.G.–Pak., ¶ 2, Nov. 
25, 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 24 [hereinafter Germany-Pakistan BIT]. 
25. Treaty Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investments, U.S.–Pan., art. X(1), 
Oct. 27, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1227. 
26. The academic scholarship on BITs can largely be classed into two groups. The first wave 
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they often contain surprisingly have gone almost unnoticed. Yet, NPM 
provisions are relatively wide-spread in the legal regime governing in-
ternational investment. They appear regularly in the BITs of states that 
play a major role in the international financial system, such as Germany, 
India, the Belgian-Luxembourg Union, Canada, and the United States. 
They also arise sporadically in particular BIT relationships of numerous 
other states. Of the 2000 BITs presently in force, NPM clauses appear in 
at least 200 such treaties. 
The prevalence of NPM clauses in BITs has significant implications 
for the international investment regime more generally. BITs have long 
been understood as extremely strong “legalized” instruments of investor 
protection, providing far-reaching guarantees for cross-border invest-
ment.27 For example, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee re-
port affirmed that the “principal purpose of the bilateral investment trea-
ties is to encourage and protect U.S. investment in developing 
countries.”28 Yet, the presence of NPM clauses in BITs suggests that 
those protections do not apply in exceptional or crisis situations, when 
                                                                                                                                      
of scholarship examined the development of BITs and their substantive protections. See, e.g., 
RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES (1995); KENNETH 
J. VANDEVELDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY AND PRACTICE (1992); Gior-
gio Sacerdoti, Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on Investment Protection, 269 
RECUEIL DES COURS 251 (1997); Vandevelde, supra note 18. A second wave of scholarship has 
examined the diffusion of BITs and the impact of BITs on investment flows. See, e.g., Zachary 
Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman, & Beth A. Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilat-
eral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 60 INT’L ORG. 811 (2006); Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicho-
las P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their 
Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 75 (2005); Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jennifer Tobin, 
Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (Yale Law Sch., Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Pub. Policy, Research Paper 
No. 293, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=557121l; Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do 
Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries? (May 
2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=616242; see also Andrew 
T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 643 (1998); Jason W. Yackee, Sacrificing Sover-
eignty: Bilateral Investment Treaties, International Arbitration, and the Quest for Capital (Univ. 
of S. Cal. Ctr. in Law, Econ., & Org. Working Paper No. C06–15, Oct. 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=950567. Only two scholars have even noted 
the inclusion of NPM clauses in BITs and their treatment has been cursory. See Jose E. Alvarez, 
Political Protectionism and United States International Investment Obligations in Conflict: The 
Hazards of Exon–Florio, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 15, 176 (1989); Vandevelde, supra note 18, at 170.  
27. BITs generally rank highly on all three categories of legalization—obligation, precision, 
and delegation—suggested by Ken Abbott and his collaborators in the legalization project. For an 
explanation of the three categories, see Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 
INT’L ORG. 401 (2000). 
28. Investment Treaties with Senegal, Zaire, Morocco, Turkey, Cameroon, Bangladesh, 
Egypt, and Grenada, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 100-32, at 2–3 (1988). 
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international investments are at most risk. The traditional understanding 
of BITs is that host states commit through such treaties not to injure for-
eign investors or, at least, to bear the costs if they do. NPM clauses per-
form a risk-allocation function, transferring the costs of harming an in-
vestment from host states to investors in exceptional circumstances. 
Under BITs that include NPM clauses, the state must compensate inves-
tors for harms that breach the treaty in ordinary circumstances, but in 
exceptional circumstances, such as the Argentine financial crisis, NPM 
clauses transfer those risks to the investor, and the state will not be li-
able for actions that would ordinarily breach the BIT. In an ever more 
globalized world in which the very kinds of exceptional circumstances 
covered by NPM clauses—financial crises, terrorist threats, and public 
health emergencies—are all too common, NPM clauses fundamentally 
limit the legal regime protecting foreign investors. 
The interpretation and application of NPM clauses will therefore 
prove critical to determining both state freedom to respond to excep-
tional circumstances and the scope of investment protections accorded 
under BITs. Arbitral awards have recently been handed down by ICSID 
panels in the first four of the many cases brought against Argentina un-
der the U.S.-Argentina BIT as a result of the economic crises. The four 
tribunals, however, took diametrically different approaches to the NPM 
clause of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. On identical facts, three tribunals 
found the NPM clause inapplicable and held Argentina liable for dam-
ages to investors in breach of the BIT.29 A fourth tribunal found Argen-
tina’s invocation of the clause justified and held Argentina not liable for 
harms to investors caused during the period of necessity created by the 
economic crisis.30 In addition, an Annulment Committee under the 
ICSID Convention reviewed the first of these awards to hold Argentina 
liable and found it to contain “errors and lucans” of law.31 The split de-
                                                          
29. Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb/02/16, Award, ¶ 391  
(Sept. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Sempra Award], available at 
http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Sempra_Energy-Award.pdf; Enron Corp. Ponderosa 
Asset, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb/01/3, Award (May 22, 2007) [hereinafter 
Enron Award], available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Enron-Award.pdf; CMS Award, su-
pra note 16, ¶ 359. 
30. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb/02/1, Decision on Li-
ability (Oct. 3, 2006), ¶¶ 226, 266 [hereinafter LG&E Decision on Liability], available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pdf/09_LGE_Liability_e.pdf. 
31. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. Arb 01/08, Decision 
of the ad hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment (Sept. 25, 2007), ¶ 136 [hereinafter 
CMS Annulment Decision]. Despite the Annulment Committee’s findings of serious errors in the 
Award, it observed that it lacked jurisdiction under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention to over-
turn the Award. Id. ¶ 136. 
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cisions and, at times, poor jurisprudence of these tribunals are grounds 
for concern about the viability of an investor-state arbitral system with-
out meaningful appellate review,32 but also raise important questions 
about the interpretation and application of NPM clauses. How much 
freedom do NPM clauses give states to take actions in extraordinary cir-
cumstances that would otherwise breach a BIT? Are BITs really as 
strong a form of investor protection as they have been understood to be? 
In what sorts of situations can such clauses be invoked? What are the 
consequences of NPM clauses for states and investors in terms of liabil-
ity and compensation? Ultimately, should states or investors bear the 
risks and costs of actions by states to respond to extraordinary circum-
stances? 
For Argentina, the interpretation and application of the NPM provi-
sions of its BITs has the potential to relieve the state of billions of dol-
lars of liability and greatly ease its on-going economic recovery. More 
broadly, the interpretation and application of NPM clauses in a wide 
range of BITs will determine the risk allocation between states and in-
vestors in times of crisis. While a BIT’s substantive provisions clearly 
afford investors strong protections in ordinary situations, the interpreta-
tion of NPM clauses will govern whether, in exceptional situations, the 
host state or investors will bear the costs of actions deemed necessary to 
respond to the crisis. That calculation, in turn, has implications for the 
willingness of states to enter into investment protection treaties, the 
pricing of cross-border investment, the distribution of investment flows, 
the policy options available to states in emergencies, and the policy re-
sponses to a range of international crises. 
The interpretation and application of NPM clauses also raises more 
fundamental questions about the process of treaty interpretation itself. 
Ascertaining the meaning of NPM clauses will often depend on how 
states understood such clauses and the ways in which they memorialized 
those understandings in their treaty commitments. To what degree 
should states’ shared understandings of such clauses control their inter-
pretation? Must states document those understandings for them to be re-
levant in a subsequent arbitration? These issues become all the more 
pressing in the context of BITs, which confer direct rights on investors 
to arbitration, and in the ICSID forum, in which only one state party to 
                                                          
32. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Pri-
vatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 
1617–1625 (2005) (arguing for the establishment of an “Investment Arbitration Appellate Court” 
to prevent the proliferation of inconsistent individual decisions). 
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the treaty is formally before the tribunal. Unfortunately, the tribunals 
that have addressed NPM clauses to date have often failed to engage in 
the kind of rigorous treaty interpretation mandated by the Vienna Con-
vention and instead have taken interpretive short-cuts that threaten the 
very legitimacy of the investor-state arbitration system.33 Underlying 
the NPM analysis in this paper is a call for arbitral tribunals to return to 
first principles of treaty interpretation and to give serious consideration 
to the text of a treaty and, to the degree permissible under the Vienna 
Convention, the intent of states entering into such a treaty.  
This Article casts new light on a long-dormant element of the interna-
tional legal architecture of foreign investment with significant conse-
quences for states, investors, and the international financial system more 
generally. In so doing, it offers four theoretical contributions to the ex-
isting literature on treaty interpretation, investment regulation, and in-
ternational arbitration. The Article’s first theoretical contribution is to 
question the standard assumption that BITs are solely instruments of in-
vestment protection by recognizing that such treaties often incorporate 
significant exceptions that preserve state freedom of action in excep-
tional circumstances. A second theoretical contribution is that the Arti-
cle begins a heretofore overlooked exploration of the legal mechanisms 
through which states control and allocate risks in their bilateral treaty 
agreements. A third theoretical contribution relates to the process of 
treaty interpretation itself. The Article critiques the approach taken by 
all of the ICSID tribunals in the Argentina cases thus far, suggesting 
that their one-size-fits-all approach to interpretation does not reflect the 
range of meanings states have intended for NPM clauses. A final theo-
retical contribution is that the Article suggests that the ICSID system 
would be strengthened if arbitral tribunals were to import the margin of 
appreciation doctrine from the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) to the international investment 
context with respect to issues that touch at the core constitutional issues 
of the state in question, using the margin as a template for determining 
the deference to be accorded to a state’s own invocation of NPM provi-
sions. 
From a practical perspective, the Article provides an urgently needed 
framework for understanding, interpreting, and applying NPM provi-
sions in BITs. The split ICSID decisions arising from the Argentine cri-
                                                          
33. Some of these interpretive shortcuts are identified in the CMS Annulment Decision. See 
CMS Annulment Decision, supra note 31, ¶¶ 96–100 (noting, for example, that “it is quite un-
clear how the Tribunal arrived at its conclusion”). 
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sis make this framework ever more timely. The framework presented 
here examines the interpretation of key elements of many NPM clauses 
and considers the consequences of their invocation for liability and 
compensation. Such a framework can help guide states in formulating 
policy responses in exceptional circumstances, can assist investors in 
identifying and pricing risk in their international investment decisions, 
and can aid arbitral tribunals in interpreting and applying NPM clauses 
in investment arbitrations. 
This Article is the first of a two-part study. In a subsequent article we 
explore risk limitation and risk allocation devices in bilateral treaty 
agreements more generally. Whereas this Article focuses on the identi-
fication, interpretation, and application of NPM provisions in BITs, the 
companion article seeks to answer the broader question of when and 
why states include risk allocation devices, such as NPM clauses, in their 
bilateral instruments and seeks to explain the variance in state usage of 
such provisions. Taken collectively, the two articles offer the first de-
tailed exploration of risk allocation in bilateral treaties. Such risk alloca-
tion devices may well have their most important consequences in the 
circumstances discussed in this paper, namely when NPM clauses shift 
the risk of investor harms from host states to investors themselves and 
thereby alter the basic relationships of international investment law. 
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II we will document the 
relatively widespread use of NPM clauses in international investment 
instruments and suggest that they are a critical, though largely unrecog-
nized, element of the international investment regime. In Part III we will 
explore the relationship between NPM clauses and background defenses 
in customary international law, such as the state of necessity, and will 
argue that NPM clauses provide an additional exception from the sub-
stantive protections of a BIT. In Part IV we will examine the elements 
of NPM clauses from the practice of various states, identify key compo-
nents, and consider the relationship between NPM clauses and the larger 
treaty in which they are situated. In Part V we will offer a detailed in-
terpretive framework for assessing the applicability of NPM clauses that 
will be of use to states, investors, and arbitral tribunals. In Part VI we 
will consider the appropriate standards with which to review a state’s 
invocation of an NPM clause and argue that the margin of appreciation 
doctrine, imported from European human rights law, offers a template 
for how arbitral tribunals can undertake such a review. In Part VII we 
will examine the consequences of a successful invocation of an NPM 
clause for a state’s liability in international law and the duty to pay 
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compensation. Part VIII will return briefly to the four recent cases 
against Argentina and seeks to explain the contradictory outcomes 
based on the tribunals’ very different understandings of the function of 
NPM clauses. Part IX will examine the implications of various interpre-
tations of NPM clauses for states, investors, and the international finan-
cial system more broadly. A brief conclusion will follow. 
II. THE PREVALENCE OF NPM CLAUSES IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 
NPM clauses appear in a range of international treaties,34 are a rela-
tively frequent element in BITs, and play an important role in the legal 
regime of foreign investment more broadly. Though they are far from 
ubiquitous, they appear in all or most of the BITs concluded by a num-
ber of states of importance to international investment flows, including 
the United States, Germany, the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union, 
and India.35 In addition, Canada has also included NPM clauses in its 
BITs concluded after the mid-1990s, expanding the NPM provisions 
over time.36 Collectively, these six states account for more than 200 
BITs containing NPM clauses. 
                                                          
34. Many other bi- and multilateral agreements include NPM–type exceptions as well. In ad-
dition to the U.S. FCN treaties mentioned above, see supra note 20, such provisions can be found 
in the General Agreement on Trade in Services arts. XIV & XIV bis, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 183; 33 I.L.M. 1167; the North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., arts. 
2101 & 2102, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 612; the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade arts. 
XX & XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; and the Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Community (consolidated version) art. 30, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2002/c_325/c_32520021224en00010184.pdf. Re-
gional and global human rights treaties recognize limitations on otherwise protected rights for 
specified, overarching public policy reasons, such as security and public order, as well. See, e.g., 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 8(2), 
9(2), 10(2), 11(2), & 15, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter 
ECHR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 4(1), 12(3), 13, 19(3), 21, 
22(2), G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).  
35. Instead of citing all of these countries’ BITs with NPM clauses, we refer the reader to the 
BIT country lists available at United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Country-
Specific Lists of BITs, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2344&lang=1 (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2007), and to the discussion of these BITs’ NPM clauses below in Section IV; see 
infra notes 67–129 and accompanying text. 
36. Canada’s early BITs did not include an NPM clause. Beginning in 1995, Canada’s BITs 
contained a limited NPM clause with permissible objectives including the protection of human, 
plant, and animal life. See Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.–Pan., art. 
XVII(3), Sept. 12, 1996, C.T.S. 1998/35, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_panama.pdf. Canada’s most recent BITs, 
based on its 2004 Model BIT, include a much more expansive NPM clause with permissible ob-
jectives including the integrity of the financial system, the protection of essential security inter-
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In addition to these states, which include NPM clauses as a matter of 
course, several other countries include such provisions in their invest-
ment treaties on an occasional basis. NPM clauses can, for example, be 
found in Peru’s BITs with Bolivia,37 Paraguay,38 and Venezuela;39 Tur-
key’s BITs with Qatar40 and Morocco;41 China’s BITs with Singapore,42 
New Zealand,43 and Sri Lanka;44 Switzerland’s BITs with Chad,45 Mau-
ritius,46 Uganda,47 and the United Arab Emirates,48 and Uganda’s BITs 
with Sudan49 and Eritrea.50 This list, though far from exhaustive, is in-
                                                                                                                                      
ests, and actions required under the U.N. Charter. See Agreement for the Promotion and Protec-
tion of Investments, Can.-Peru, art. 10, Nov. 14, 2006, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_peru.pdf. 
37. Convenio sobre Promoción y Protección de Inversiones, Peru-Bol., art. 3(5), July 30, 
1993 [hereinafter Peru–Bolivia BIT], available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/peru_bolivia.pdf. 
38. Convenio sobre Promoción y Protección Reciproca de Inversiones, Peru–Para., art. 11(1), 
Feb. 1, 1994, [hereinafter Peru-Paraguay BIT], available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/peru_paraguay_esp.pdf. 
39. Convenio sobre Promoción y Protección de Inversiones, Peru-Venez., art. 3(5), Jan. 12, 
1996 [hereinafter Peru-Venezuela BIT], available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/peru_venezuela_esp.pdf. 
40. Agreement Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Turk.–
Qatar, art. VII(1), Dec. 25, 2001 [hereinafter Qatar-Turkey BIT], available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/turkey_qatar.pdf. 
41. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Turk.-Morocco, art. 2(2), 
Apr. 8, 1997, [hereinafter Turkey-Morocco BIT] available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/turkey_morocco.pdf. 
42. Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, P.R.C.-Sing., art. 11, Nov. 
21, 1985, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_singapor.pdf. 
43. Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, N.Z.-P.R.C., art. 11, Nov. 22, 
1988, 1787 U.N.T.S. 186 (1994) [hereinafter New Zealand-China BIT]. 
44. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, P.R.C.-Sri Lanka, 
art. 11, Mar. 13, 1986 [hereinafter Sri Lanka-China BIT], available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_srilanka.pdf. 
45. Accord de commerce, de protection des investissements et de coopération technique, 
Switz.–Chad, art. 2,(3), Feb. 21, 1967 [hereinafter Swiss-Chad BIT], available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/switzerland_chad_fr.pdf. 
46. Accord concernant la promotion et la protection réciproque des investissements, Switz.-
Mauritius, art. 11(3), Nov. 26, 1998, available at  
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/switzerland_mauritius_fr.pdf. 
47. Convention concernant l’encouragement et la protection réciproque des investissements, 
Switz.-Uganda, Aug. 23, 1971, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/switzerland_uganda_fr.pdf. 
48. Accord concernant la promotion et la protection réciproque des investissements, Switz.-
U.A.E., art. 11(4), Nov. 3, 1998, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/switzerland_uae_fr.pdf. 
49. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Uganda-Sudan, 
art. 14, available http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/sudan_uganda.pdf. 
50. Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, Eri.-Uganda, art. 14, June 30, 2001, 
avalable at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uganda_eritrea.pdf. 
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dicative of the relatively wide-spread use of NPM clauses and their con-
siderable importance to the international investment legal regime. 
Even in BITs involving Germany or the United States, which already 
include NPM clauses as a matter of course, these two state’s negotiating 
partners have often pushed for clarification or expansion of a particular 
treaty’s NPM provisions. For example, in the negotiation of the U.S.-
Panama BIT, Panama sought to ensure the applicability of the public 
order exception, and this standard exception was memorialized in a pro-
tocol to the treaty.51 In the U.S.-Bangladesh BIT negotiations, Bangla-
desh sought assurances that the NPM clause would apply to employ-
ment questions, and this understanding was again reflected in the 
protocol.52 When negotiating the U.S.-Russia BIT, Russian officials in-
sisted that the self-judging nature of the NPM clause be explicitly 
stated, and this too was eventually reflected in the protocol to the trea-
ty.53 NPM clauses thus are of significance not just to those states that 
regularly include the provisions, but also to a range of other countries, 
including lesser-developed states. 
III. DISTINGUISHING TREATY-BASED NPM CLAUSES FROM 
BACKGROUND DEFENSES IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Customary international law provides states some legal flexibility in 
exceptional situations. As the International Law Commission (ILC) 
                                                          
51. Panama Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Pan, Oct. 27, 1982, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-
14, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43582.pdf (“Because of political 
sensitivities in Panama, the Panamanians insisted on a separate exchange of notes (information 
copy attached) clarifying the standard provision in the BIT which exempts measures taken for 
public order. In these notes the Parties agree that this exception is not meant to authorize either 
Party to take such measures in the territory of the other.”). 
52. See Letter of Submittal from Michael Armacost to President Reagan, May 9, 1986, an-
nexed to Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-
Bangl., Mar. 12, 1986, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-23. (1986) (“The treaty's employment provision 
is also limited by paragraph 3 of the Protocol. That paragraph: (1) subjects the right of nationals 
or companies to employ personnel to Article X, which provides that Parties are not precluded 
from, inter alia, adopting measures necessary to maintain public order, protecting essential secu-
rity interests, or prescribing special formalities for the establishment of investments.”). 
53. See Bilateral Investment Treaties With the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, The Peo-
ples’ Republic of the Congo, the Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, and Tunisia, and Two Protocols 
to Treaties with Finland and Ireland: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 102nd 
Cong., 66, 73 (1992) [hereinafter August 4, 1992 Hearings] (statement of Kenneth J. Vandevelde, 
Associate Professor of Law, Western State University College of Law, San Diego, California). 
For a clause to be “self-judging” means that the issue of whether its invocation is legally justified 
is removed from substantive review by other treaty parties as well as third-party dispute settlers; 
this independent evaluation by the invoking state remains, however, subject to a good faith re-
view. See infra notes 295–313 and accompanying text. 
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Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrong-
ful Acts (Draft Articles) explain, there are secondary rules of customary 
international law that govern “the circumstances in which the wrongful-
ness of conduct under international law may be precluded.”54 Among 
these circumstances are force majeure, distress, and necessity, each of 
which can relieve a state of international liability. Force majeure can be 
invoked where “acts of God” outside a state’s control intervene and 
make it impossible for the state to fulfill its legal obligations.55 A situa-
tion of distress occurs when a state has no other way to safeguard a life 
in its care than to violate a legal rule.56 Necessity arises when a state has 
no other means available to safeguard an essential interest and can do so 
without harming an essential interest of another state.57 Each of these 
defenses precludes the wrongfulness of a state’s actions and thereby al-
lows the state to avoid liability. 
NPM provisions are distinct from these customary defenses in terms 
of their substantive content, their theoretical justification, their source of 
legal authority, and their scope of applicability. First, the substantive 
content of NPM clauses differs from the relatively narrow background 
customary defenses. Background customary defenses provide an excuse 
for breaching a treaty that may absolve a state of international legal re-
sponsibility after the fact. In contrast, NPM clauses remove certain 
types of state actions from the substantive protections of a particular 
treaty instrument. Generally speaking, NPM clauses will remove a 
broader array of state actions from the protections of a particular treaty 
than would be excused after the fact by the relatively narrow group of 
ex-post defenses provided for in customary law. 
Second, NPM provisions are distinct from customary defenses in 
terms of their theoretical justification. NPM clauses exempt from the 
protections of a treaty certain types of state actions because the actions 
are sufficiently related to particular state objectives. In contrast, cus-
tomary defenses remove liability after the fact due to overriding sys-
temic policy goals, such as the fact that an actor should not have to 
jeopardize his own life or a state imperil its essential interests. 
                                                          
54. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts with Commentaries, art. 24(14), U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Draft 
Articles], available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf.  
55. See id. art. 23. 
56. See id. art. 24; see also Rainbow Warrior (N.Z. v. Fr.), 82 I.L.R. 499, 554–55 (1990). 
57. See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 54, art. 25. 
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Third, NPM clauses have a different source of legal authority than do 
customary defenses. Customary defenses are secondary legal rules that 
relive liability after the fact. In contrast, NPM clauses are primary legal 
rules that limit the applicability of an international treaty with respect to 
certain types of conduct.58 NPM clauses arise from treaty law, rather 
than from customary international law. Whereas background customary 
defenses are a general part of customary international law arising 
through state practice and opinio juris, NPM provisions are included in 
the specific language of a treaty. As such, they constitute the lex spe-
cialis rules in force between the two states parties to the particular BIT 
in which the NPM clause is included.59 
Finally, NPM clauses are distinct from customary defenses in terms 
of their scope of applicability. Whereas customary defenses are applica-
ble to all states as a general part of customary law, NPM clauses apply 
only to the states parties to a particular treaty that includes such a 
clause. NPM clauses arise where the two states parties to a BIT decide 
to include such a clause in their treaty relationship to further their par-
ticular interests. As a result, whereas customary defenses are uniform, 
NPM clauses exhibit considerable variation across states and treaty in-
struments. While there is only one version of force majeure in custom-
ary international law, there are a theoretically unlimited number of po-
tential NPM clause formulations based on the particular bargains 
negotiated by the states parties to a BIT. Similarly, states can impart dis-
tinct meanings to the terms used in their NPM clauses. Even identical 
formulations of NPM clauses may not have uniform meaning because 
states may have understood those terms differently in drafting their trea-
ties. As a result, the interpretation of NPM clauses requires a particular-
ized analysis of the specific clause in question. We offer a framework 
for such analysis in Part IV. 
In recent cases against Argentina, some tribunals have conflated 
NPM clauses and customary law defenses, perhaps due to their common 
use of the term “necessary.”60 The defense of necessity in customary 
                                                          
58. See CMS Annulment Decision, supra note 31, ¶¶ 132–33. 
59. Article 55 of the ILC Draft Articles confirms the principle of lex specialis derogat legi 
generali, stating that “[t]hese articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for 
the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the interna-
tional responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of international law.” ILC Draft Arti-
cles, supra note 54, art. 55; see also Gabriel Bottini, Protection of Essential Interests in the BIT 
Era, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2008) (noting that BIT clauses are part of the primary 
treaty rules intended to define what constitutes a breach in the first place, whereas necessity is a 
secondary rule that may justify a violation once this has already occurred). 
60. See CMS Award, supra note 16. 
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law provides that a state may not be liable for actions taken to “safe-
guard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril.”61 In 
terms of the legal rules of treaty interpretation, equating NPM clauses 
with this background defense of necessity is inappropriate for two rea-
sons: it fails to recognize the distinction between treaty and custom and, 
it violates the principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation. Treaty 
and custom are separate sources of international law and consist of in-
dependent legal regimes. As the ICJ found in the Nicaragua case, “even 
if two norms belonging to two sources of international law appear iden-
tical in content, and even if the States in question are bound by these 
rules both on the level of treaty-law and on that of customary interna-
tional law, these norms retain a separate existence.”62 
Reducing the NPM clause to merely a treaty-based reiteration of the 
necessity defense would violate the principle of effectiveness in treaty 
interpretation (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). As the WTO Appellate 
body found in the U.S.-Gasoline case,  
[o]ne of the corollaries of the “general rule of interpretation” in 
the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning 
and effect to all the terms of a treaty. An interpreter is not free to 
adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or 
paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.63 
                                                          
61. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 54, art. 25 (“Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a 
ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obliga-
tion of that State unless the act: (a) Is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest 
against a grave and imminent peril; and (b) Does not seriously impair an essential interest of the 
State or States towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a 
whole.”). See also Gabcikovo–Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 39 (Sept. 25). 
62. Nicaragua Judgment (Merits), supra note 21, at 95. In Nicaragua, the United States ar-
gued that background customary law had been “subsumed” or “supervened” by the existence of 
certain identical or nearly identical rules in the U.N. Charter. Id. The Court rejected this argu-
ment. For a further treatment by the Court of the relationship of custom and treaty, see North Sea 
Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 38 (Feb. 20). See also II 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONS 232 (A.D. McNair ed., 1956), as cited in ILC Draft Articles, 
supra note 54, art 25(4) (describing Anglo-Portuguese Dispute of 1832, in which the British gov-
ernment was advised that Portugal could invoke necessity to excuse the appropriation of British 
property). 
63. Appellate Body Report, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter United States—Standards for Reformu-
lated and Conventional Gasoline]. Similarly, Professor Fitzmaurice observes, “texts are to be pre-
sumed to have been intended to have a definite force and effect, and should be interpreted so as to 
have such force and effect rather than so as not to have it and so as to have the fullest value and 
effect consistent with their wording.” G. G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L 
L. 1, 8 (1951); see also H. Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effective-
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Reading an NPM clause as equivalent to the customary defense of ne-
cessity would render the clause pointless because the customary defense 
of necessity would be available to states irrespective of the inclusion of 
the NPM clause in a BIT. In order to satisfy the principle of effective-
ness in treaty interpretation, NPM clauses must be read as distinct rules 
that states create in their treaty relationships, independent of the neces-
sity defense in customary international law. 
Given that the necessity defense and NPM clauses are distinct rules 
of law, a further question arises as to the relationship between the two: 
namely, does an NPM clause replace the customary defense of necessity 
or do the two continue to coexist? The ICJ answered that question in the 
Nicaragua case, observing: “customary international law continues to 
exist and to apply, separately from international treaty law, even where 
the two categories of law have an identical content.”64 The only circum-
stances in which the treaty rule could be said to replace the customary 
rule are if the treaty specifically indicates that it replaces customary 
rules or if the treaty provision and the customary rule are in such direct 
conflict that they cannot co-exist.65 Where the treaty or the particular 
treaty provision in question is silent as to its relationship with customary 
law, as is the case with most BIT NPM provisions, then both the cus-
tomary and treaty rule should be treated as applicable separately and in-
dependently. Hence, as a result of including NPM clauses in their BITs, 
states have created a treaty-based legal mechanism to allocate risks be-
tween themselves and investors in extraordinary circumstances that is 
distinct from, but coexistent with, defenses otherwise available in cus-
tomary international law. 
IV. THE ANATOMY OF NPM CLAUSES 
Just as substantive protections found in BITs vary, so do NPM provi-
sions. Even in the BITs of those states that include NPM exceptions as a 
general practice, the specific wording used varies. These differences 
arise in part from adjustments of the standard phrases used in model 
treaties over time and in part from modifications agreed upon in the 
                                                                                                                                      
ness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 48 (1949). 
64. Nicaragua Judgment (Merits), supra note 21, at 96. 
65. In those cases, the interpretive rules of lex specialis and lex posterior dictate that the more 
specific and generally later treaty provision would trump the preexisting customary rule. See Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 30, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter 
Vienna Convention]. For an early discussion, see Hans Aufricht, Supersession of Treaties in In-
ternational Law, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 655, 656–57 (1952). 
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course of negotiations of particular BITs with a treaty partner. The spe-
cific formulations of NPM clauses define the extent of state freedom of 
action in exceptional circumstances and the protections available to in-
vestors in times of crisis. This section offers an overview of the princi-
pal types of NPM provisions by way of several representative examples, 
taken primarily from the practice of those states that most frequently in-
clude NPMs in their agreements. 
A. Placement of NPM Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Many bilateral investment agreements consist of three types of doc-
uments: the main treaty text, a protocol attached thereto, and an ex-
change of notes accompanying them. In such a tripartite agreement 
structure, the main treaty text contains the principal substantive and 
procedural provisions, including guarantees of national and most-
favored nation treatment, rules on expropriations and dispute settlement, 
as well as standard treaty provisions on, inter alia, entry into force, du-
ration, and termination. Where a protocol is attached to the treaty, it of-
ten addresses primarily interpretive issues that are intended to clarify the 
meaning and scope of the treaty’s core substantive provisions.66 Any 
remaining issues not yet sufficiently addressed in these two documents 
may then be taken up in exchanges of notes between the negotiating 
governments.67 
NPM provisions may appear either in the main treaty text or in the at-
tached protocol, though they are more often found in the body of the 
treaty itself.68 The United States, India, and the Belgium-Luxembourg 
                                                          
66. The choice to address such interpretive matters in the protocol rather than in the main 
treaty text will often be guided by considerations of linguistic economy and does not as such give 
rise to any normative hierarchy; rather, a protocol, considered as a document in its own right and 
regardless of its specific title, is an international treaty just like the BIT to which it relates. Cf. 
Vienna Convention, supra note 65, art. 2.  
67. See, e.g., U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 17 (including Exchange of Notes). 
68. We have found no instance in which a general NPM clause is included in the exchange of 
notes. A related issue that is at times discussed in such notes, however, concerns the modalities 
for the entry of employees related to an investment. For example, the letters of exchange between 
Ceylon and Germany upon the conclusion of their 1963 BIT confirm the mutual understanding 
that “Ceylon will grant the necessary permits to German nationals who in connection with in-
vestments by German nationals or companies desire to enter and stay in Ceylon and to carry on an 
activity there as employees, except as reasons of public order end security, of public health or 
morality may warrant otherwise.” Treaty for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ments, Letters of Exchange, F.R.G.-Ceylon, Nov. 8, 1963 (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_ceylon.pdf. The practice of addressing 
limitations on the entry of personnel in the letters of exchange appears to have been pursued until 
the 1970s. Subsequent agreements in the 1980s and 1990s then switched to including a provision 
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Economic Union69 follow this practice, as do most other states whose 
BITs contain such exceptions on an occasional basis. Germany gener-
ally places the NPM clause in the protocol rather than in the main treaty 
text.70 This placement of the NPM provision in the protocol to the treaty 
is a structural-textual decision which does not affect or diminish the le-
gal value of the NPM clause.71 Once a state expresses its consent to be 
bound by the protocol’s provisions—usually through ratification to-
gether with the main treaty text, as in the German practice—then NPM 
provisions included therein have the same legal effect as those found in 
the main treaty text. 
B. Examples of NPM Clauses 
A few examples of NPM clauses offer an overview of their form and 
structure. Germany has included NPM clauses in its BIT protocols since 
the first such instrument was signed with Pakistan in 1959; that treaty’s 
NPM provision provided that “[m]easures taken for reasons of public 
security and order, public health or morality shall not be deemed as dis-
crimination within the meaning of Article 2.”72 The “non-
discrimination” standard to which the exception refers was replaced in 
subsequent German BITs with the now predominant national and most-
favored-nation treatment standards which stipulate that investments by 
nationals of the other contracting party shall not be submitted to treat-
                                                                                                                                      
in the protocol according to which “sympathetic consideration” was to be accorded to the issuing 
of entry permits for employees related to an admitted investment. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Protocol, Somal.-F.R.G., pmbl., Nov. 
27, 1981, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_somalia.pdf. 
69. Upon ending the customs union with Germany following World War I, Luxembourg en-
tered into an economic union with Belgium on July 2, 1921 (Belgium-Luxembourg Economic 
Union), which took effect on May 1, 1922. For documentation, see 18 CHRONIQUE DE POLITIQUE 
ÉTRANGÈRE 367–464 (July 1965). 
70. In only three of 95 German BITs with NPM provisions reviewed has the NPM exception 
been moved to the main treaty body. See Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments, Thail.-F.R.G., art. 3(2), June 24, 2002, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_thailand.pdf; Tratado sobre Fomento y 
Reciproca Protección de Inversiones de Capital, F.R.G.-El Sal., art. 3(7), Dec. 11, 1997 [hereinaf-
ter Germany-El Salvador BIT], available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_elsalvador_sp_gr/pdf; Agreement for 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments, F.R.G.-India, art. 12, July 10, 1995, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_india.pdf. 
71. In German practice, the protocol’s chapeau generally states that the additional “arrange-
ments” agreed upon therein “shall be regarded as an integral part of the Treaty.” Treaty Concern-
ing the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Capital Investment, F.R.G.-Haiti, Aug. 14, 1973, 
1016 U.N.T.S. 83, 88 (1976); see also supra note 66. 
72. Germany-Pakistan BIT, supra note 24, Protocol, ¶ 2. 
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ment “less favorable than” that accorded to investments of one’s own 
nationals, or nationals of third countries, respectively. The standard 
NPM provision in German BITs was adjusted accordingly, and now 
reads: “Measures that have to be taken for reasons of public security and 
order, public health or morality shall not be deemed ‘treatment less fa-
vorable’ within the meaning of Article 3 [the article containing the na-
tional and most favored nation treatment standards].”73 
U.S. BITs likewise have included NPM clauses since the beginning 
of the BIT program in the early 1980s. For example, the first U.S. BIT, 
signed with Panama in 1982, stipulates in Art. X that “[t]his treaty shall 
not preclude the application by either Party of any and all measures nec-
essary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obliga-
tions with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international 
peace and security, or the protection of its own essential security inter-
ests.”74 Over the years, the United States has developed new versions of 
its Model BIT and, hence, variations in the form and structure of the 
NPM clause have appeared over time. One of the more notable modifi-
cations occurred in the late 1990s when the United States clarified its 
position on the self-judging nature of the NPM clauses in its BITs by 
including explicit language to that effect, now stating that a party was 
not precluded from taking any measures that “it considers necessary” 
for the protection of the stated permissible objectives.75 In the most re-
cent 2004 U.S. Model BIT, the NPM provision reads: “Nothing in this 
Treaty shall be construed: …to preclude a Party from applying measures 
that it considers necessary for the fulfillment of its obligations with re-
spect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or secu-
rity, or the protection of its own essential security interest.”76 
The Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU)77 also habitu-
ally includes NPM clauses in its BITs. The typical NPM clause is 
                                                          
73. Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Protocol, 
P.R.C.–F.R.G., ¶ 4(a), Dec. 1, 2003 [hereinafter China-Germany BIT], available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/china_germany.pdf. 
74.  Treaty Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investments, U.S.-Pan., art. X(1), 
Oct. 27, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1227 [hereinafter U.S.-Panama BIT]. A subsequent protocol amending 
the dispute settlement provisions of the original treaty was signed on June 1, 2000. See Protocol 
Amending Investment Treaty with Panama, U.S.-Pan., June 1, 2000, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-
46, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/us_panama_2000.pdf. 
75. For greater in–depth discussion of NPM clauses in U.S. BITs, see infra notes 316–33 and 
accompanying text. 
76. See 2004 U.S. Model BIT art. 18(2) [hereinafter 2004 U.S. Model BIT], available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pdf 
77. See supra note 69. 
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phrased as an exception to the subsequently defined treatment standard: 
“Except for measures required to maintain public order, such invest-
ments shall enjoy continuous protection and security, i.e. excluding any 
unjustified or discriminatory measure which could hinder, either in law 
or in practice, the management, maintenance, use, possession or liquida-
tion thereof.”78 While the overwhelming number of BLEU BITs only 
give “public order” as a permissible NPM objective, a few add “security 
of the state” as another.79 
India’s BITs also include NPM provisions as a matter of course. The 
country’s BIT program began in the mid-1990s as India’s international 
trade expanded, with all currently operative BITs concluded in or after 
1994. The first BIT, signed with the United Kingdom, contains the 
NPM clause in Article 11: “Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of this Arti-
cle nothing in this Agreement precludes the host Contracting Party from 
taking action for the protection of its essential security interests or in 
circumstances of extreme emergency in accordance with its laws nor-
mally and reasonably applied on a non-discriminatory basis.”80 A few 
Indian NPM clauses also reserve the right of each contracting party to 
take measures necessary “for the prevention of diseases and pests in 
animals or plants.”81 
Finally, while Canada’s first half-a-dozen BITs signed between 1989 
and 1991 did not contain any NPM clauses, in the mid-1990s Canada 
began to include NPM clauses and has, since 1994,82 incorporated in-
                                                          
78. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Uganda-Belg.-
Lux., art. 3(2), Feb. 1, 2005 [hereinafter Uganda-Belgium-Luxembourg BIT], available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uganda_belgium.pdf. 
79. See Accord concernant l'encouragement et la protection réciproques des investissements, 
Belg.-Lux.-Uzb., art. 3(2), Feb. 17, 1998 [hereinafter Uzbekistan-Belgium-Luxembourg BIT] 
(emphasis added), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/belg_lux_uzbekistan_fr.pdf (“Sous réserve des 
mesures destinées à maintenir l'ordre public et à garantir la sûreté de l'Etat, ces investissements 
jouiront d'une sécurité et d'une protection constantes, excluant toute mesure injustifiée ou dis-
criminatoire qui pourrait entraver, en droit ou en fait, la gestion, l'entretien, l'utilisation, la jouis-
sance ou la liquidation desdits investissements.”); see also Accord concernant l'encouragement et 
la protection réciproques des investissements, Belg.-Lux.-Mex., art. 3(2), Aug. 27, 1998 [herein-
after Belgium-Luxembourg-Mexico BIT], available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/belg_lux_mexico_fr.pdf. 
80. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-India, art. 11(2), Mar. 
14, 1994, 1995 India T.S. No. 27 [hereinafter U.K.-India BIT], available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uk_india.pdf. 
81. See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, India-Neth., art. 
12, Nov. 6, 1995, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/investment_india_netherlands.pdf. 
82. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Ukr., art. 17, Oct. 24, 
1994, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canada_ukraine.pdf. 
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creasingly detailed catalogues of permissible objectives in all of its in-
vestment protection agreements.83 In revising its BITs, Canada took par-
ticular guidance from the investment provisions of Chapter 11 of the 
North-American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).84 In the most recent 
2004 Canadian Model BIT, the NPM exceptions are addressed in Art. 
10.85 Permissible objectives include measures necessary “(a) to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health; (b) to ensure compliance with 
laws and regulations that are not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement; or (c) for the conservation of living and non-living ex-
haustible natural resources.”86 Also included are measures necessary to 
preserve “integrity and stability of a Party’s financial system,”87 meas-
ures related to national and international security concerns,88 and meas-
ures “adopted by a Party in conformity with a decision” of the WTO.89 
C. Form and Structure of NPM Clauses 
Despite textual variation, NPM clauses share several structural ele-
ments. First, NPM clauses require a link between the measures adopted 
by the host state that might breach the treaty and the permissible objec-
tives stated in the provision (the “nexus” requirement). Second, they de-
fine the breadth, or “scope,” of the NPM clause’s application vis-à-vis 
the other treaty provisions. Third, they list the “permissible objectives” 
in the pursuit of which measures deviating from other substantive treaty 
provisions are not precluded by the BIT. Collectively, these terms de-
termine whether states or investors will bear the costs of state action in 
exceptional circumstances. 
                                                          
83. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Annex I, Can.-Uru., Oct. 9, 
1997, 1999 Can. T.S. No. 31 [hereinafter Canada-Uruguay BIT] (including four and one half pag-
es of text detailing exceptions). 
84. See Andrew Newcombe, Canada’s New Model Foreign Investment Protection Agree-
ment, CAN. COUNCIL ON INT’L L. (Fall 2004), available at http://www.ccil-
ccdi.ca/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=89&Itemid=76. 
85. Canadian 2004 Model Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement (FIPA) 
art. 10 [hereinafter Canadian 2004 Model FIPA], available at http://www.dfait–maeci.gc.ca/tna–
nac/documents/2004–FIPA–model–en.pdf. 
86. Id. art. 10(1). 
87. Id. art. 10(2)(c). 
88.  Id. art. 10(4). This provision is taken almost verbatim from Article 2102 of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 605, 699–700 [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
89. Canadian 2004 Model FIPA, supra note 85, art. 10(7). 
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1. The Nexus Requirement 
NPM clauses require that measures taken by a state that would oth-
erwise deviate from a treaty obligation must be sufficiently related to 
the permissible objectives specified in the clause (discussed infra). We 
term this relationship the “nexus requirement.” The wording of this 
“nexus” requirement differs both across and within the practice of indi-
vidual states, reflecting different allocations of risk between the states 
parties to a BIT and investors. One widely used phrasing requires that 
measures undertaken have to be “necessary” for the attainment of one of 
the permissible objectives.90 Other NPM clauses define the nexus re-
quirement by specifying that the state’s measures must be “required,”91 
“directed to,”92 or “have to be taken”93 in furtherance of a permissible 
objective. Yet other BITs use less demanding formulations, stating that 
“measures taken for reasons of”94 or “in the interest of”95 one of the 
listed objectives are permissible.96 The nexus requirement is of consid-
                                                          
90. The NPM clauses in the U.S. BITs consistently use the “necessary for” wording. See, e.g., 
Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, U.S.-Mozam., 
art. XIV, Dec. 1, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106–31 (2000) [hereinafter U.S.-Mozambique BIT]; 
U.S.-Panama BIT, supra note 74, art. X(1). Similarly, the French language versions of the BITs 
by the Belgium–Luxembourg Economic Union refer to “mesures nécessaires” (emphasis added). 
See, e.g., Accord concernant l'encouragement et la protection réciproques des investissements, 
Belg.-Lux.-Est., art. 3(2), Jan. 24, 1996, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/belg_lux_estonia_fr.pdf. For an example in 
Spanish speaking of “medidas necesarias,” see Acuerdo para la Promocion y Proteccion Recipro-
cas de Inversiones, Arg.-Morocco, art. 3(3), June 13, 1996 [hereinafter Argentina-Morocco BIT], 
available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/argentina_morocco_sp.pdf. 
91. The English language versions of the Belgium-Luxembourg BITs use “required.” See, 
e.g., Belgium-Luxembourg BIT with Uganda, supra note 78; Agreement on the Reciprocal Pro-
motion and Protection of Investments, Kaz.-Belg.-Lux., art. 3(3), Apr. 16, 1998, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/kazak_belgo_lux.pdf. 
92. See, e.g., Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, N.Z.-P.R.C., art. 
11, Nov. 22, 1988, 1787 U.N.T.S. 186 (1994). Some Belgium-Luxembourg BITs use the phrase 
“destinées à.” See, e.g., Belgium-Luxembourg-Mexico BIT, supra note 79, art. 3(2). 
93. This is a common phrase in Germany’s NPM clauses. See Agreement Concerning the En-
couragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Protocol, F.R.G.-Burundi, ¶ 3(a), Sept. 
10, 1984, 1517 U.N.T.S. 288 (1988). 
94. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Capital Invest-
ment, Protocol, F.R.G.-Haiti, ¶ 2(a), Aug. 14, 1973, 1016 U.N.T.S. 84 (1976); Swiss-Chad BIT, 
supra note 45. 
95. See Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
F.R.G.-U.S.S.R., Protocol, ¶ 2(c), June 13, 1989, 1707 U.N.T.S. 194 (1993) [hereinafter Ger-
many-Russia BIT]. 
96. See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Kaz.-
India, art. 12(2), Dec. 9, 1996, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/kazakh_india.pdf. 
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erable importance in the interpretation of NPM provisions for it governs 
how closely related state action must be to the objective pursued.  
2. Scope 
NPM clauses can either be drafted so as to apply to an entire BIT or 
can be written in a more limited form so that they apply only to a subset 
of the treaty’s substantive provisions. The U.S., Indian, and Canadian 
NPM clauses, for example, are of “comprehensive scope” and apply to 
the treaty as a whole. The NPM clauses in U.S. BITs provide that 
“[t]his Treaty shall not preclude”97 the application of the subsequently 
specified measures. As a result, the successful invocation of the NPM 
clause precludes the existence of a violation with respect to any and all 
substantive treaty provisions. This approach is even more explicit in the 
Indian and Canadian BITs, which note that “nothing in this Agree-
ment”98 shall preclude the host state from taking measures in pursuit of 
the stated permissible objectives.99 Like certain types of general excep-
tions found in multilateral treaties,100 NPM clauses of comprehensive 
scope establish exceptions to all treaty provisions.101 
By contrast, “limited scope” NPM clauses apply only to specified 
provisions. In this sense, the German and BLEU NPM clauses are of 
“limited scope.” The protocols to German BITs, for example, provide 
that measures undertaken in pursuit of one of the permissible objectives 
shall not be considered “treatment less favourable”102 in the context of 
the national and most favored nation (MFN) treatment standards. The 
clause only applies to this particular standard and not to other treaty 
provisions, such as those on dispute settlement. In BLEU BITs, the 
NPM clause prefaces the pledge of “continuous protection and security” 
for foreign investments and the scope of the NPM clause is thus limited 
                                                          
97. See, e.g., U.S.-Panama BIT, supra note 74 (emphasis added); U.S.-Mozambique BIT, su-
pra note 90 (emphasis added). 
98. See, e.g., U.S.-India BIT, supra note 80, art. 11(2); Canadian 2004 Model FIPA, supra 
note 85, art. 10 (emphasis added). 
99. For other examples of BITs with a comprehensive NPM clause, see, for example, Qatar-
Turkey BIT, supra note 40, art. VII(1) (“This Agreement shall not preclude…”); Peru-Venezuela 
BIT, supra note 39, art. 3(5) (“Nada de lo acordado en el presente Convenio impedirá...”); Peru-
Paraguay BIT, supra note 38, art. 11(1) (“El presente Convenio no impedirá…”). 
100. See, e.g., Conference on Trade & Dev., National Treatment, at 44, UNCTAD Doc. 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/11(Vol. IV) (1999) (noting that general exceptions in international investment 
agreements “apply to all provisions in the agreement, not only to national treatment”). 
101. For an identical interpretation of similar language in the context of GATT art. XX, see 
United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, supra note 63. 
102. See, e.g., China-Germany BIT, supra note 73, Protocol, ¶ 4(a). 
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to allow only for what would otherwise be violations of the “continuous 
protection and security” guarantee.103 
3. Permissible Objectives 
NPM clauses seek to protect state freedom of action in certain do-
mains of public policy from the restrictions or limitations that would 
otherwise be imposed by obligations created by a BIT. To achieve this 
end, NPM clauses specify the policy domains in which state action shall 
remain permissible even in the face of otherwise countervailing invest-
ment protection standards under the BIT. The following sections high-
light the permissible objectives that occur with the greatest frequency. 
a. Security 
The security objective allows the state to act in the protection of its 
own security interests. There is some variation in the specific wording 
of the security objective. German BITs use the term “public security,”104 
whereas Indian and U.S. BITs employ the phrase “essential security in-
terests.”105 Notably, and somewhat contrary to expectations, the formu-
lation “national security”106 is rarely used; equally rare are such cog-
nates as “internal or external national security”107 and “security of the 
state.”108 Indian NPM clauses furthermore authorize non-precluded 
measures in “circumstances of extreme emergency,” which would in-
clude both security and other emergencies of particular gravity.109 
b. International Peace and Security 
From the inception of the U.S. BIT program, U.S. NPM clauses have 
included the “fulfillment of…obligations with respect to the mainte-
                                                          
103. See, e.g., Uganda-Belgium-Luxembourg BIT, supra note 78, art. 3(2). A similar example 
of the limited scope NPM clause can be found in the Turkey-Morocco BIT, supra note 41, art. 
2(2) (“Each Contracting Party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment and subject to the strictly 
necessary measures to maintain the public order provide full protection and security for invest-
ments of investors of the other Contracting Party.”). 
104. See, e.g., China-Germany BIT, supra note 73, Protocol, ¶ 4(a). 
105. See, e.g., U.K.-India BIT, supra note 80, art. 12(2); U.S.-Panama BIT, supra note 74, 
art. X(1); see also Canadian 2004 Model FIPA, supra note 85, art. 10(4)(a)–(b). 
106. See Peru-Paraguay BIT, supra note 38, art. 11(1) (referring to “la seguridad nacional”). 
107. See Peru-Venezuela BIT, supra note 39, art. 3(5); Peru-Bolivia BIT, supra note 37, art. 
3(5) (speaking of “seguridad nacional interna y externa”). 
108. See Belgium-Luxembourg-Mexico BIT, supra note 79, art 3(2) (including “la sûreté de 
l'Etat” as a permissible objective); Uzbekistan-Belgium-Luxembourg BIT, supra note 79, art. 3(2) 
(including “la sûreté de l'Etat” as a permissible objective). 
109. See, e.g., U.K.-India BIT, supra note 80, art. 11(2). 
2008] INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN EXTRAORDINARY TIMES  333 
 
 
nance or restoration of international peace and security”110 among per-
missible objectives. Similar phrasing can also be found in the 2004 Ca-
nadian Model BIT111 as well as in the BIT between Turkey and Qatar.112 
c. Public Order 
The “public order” objective is part of almost all NPM clauses in the 
BITs concluded by Germany113 and BLEU,114 and also appears in 
agreements entered into by the United States,115 India,116 Peru,117 Argen-
tina,118 and Turkey.119 The term is rarely defined and may have diver-
gent meanings within domestic legal orders. In domestic law, particu-
larly of civil law states, public order often appears under its domestic 
linguistic labels “ordre public,” “orden público,” or “öffentliche Ord-
nung.” Some BITs expand the already potentially broad concept of pub-
lic order by including a separate reference to “law” as a permissible ob-
jective. For example, the BIT between China and BLEU adds defense of 
the state law to maintenance of public order as permissible objectives.120 
Likewise, the agreement between the Russian Federation and Germany 
provides that “[m]easures undertaken in the interests of law and order” 
shall not be regarded as discriminatory measures in the context of the 
treatment of investments.121  
                                                          
110. See, e.g., U.S.-Panama BIT, supra note 74, art. X(1). 
111. See Canadian 2004 Model FIPA, supra note 85, art. 10(4)(c). 
112. Qatar-Turkey BIT, supra note 40, art. VII(1). 
113. See, e.g., Germany-El Salvador BIT, supra note 70, art. 3(7). 
114. See, e.g., Belgium-Luxembourg-Mexico BIT, supra note 79, art. 3(2). 
115. See, e.g., U.S.-Argentine BIT, supra note 17, art. XI. 
116. See, e.g., Agreement on the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments, Port.-
India, art. 12, ¶ 2, July 28, 2000, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/portugal_india_por.pdf. 
117. See, e.g., Peru-Venezuela BIT, supra note 39, art. 3(5); Peru-Paraguay BIT, supra note 
38, art. 11, ¶ 1; Peru-Bolivia BIT, supra note 37, art. 3(5). 
118. See, e.g., Acuerdo para la Promocion y Proteccion Reciproca de las Inversiones, Mex.-
Arg., art. 2(5)(b), Nov. 13, 1996,  available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/mexico_argentina_sp.pdf; Argentina-Morocco 
BIT, supra note 89, art. 3(3). 
119. See Qatar-Turkey BIT, supra note 40, art. VII(1); Turkey-Morocco BIT, supra note 41, 
art. 2(2). 
120. See Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Belg.-Lux.-
P.R.C., art. 3(2), June 4, 1984, 1938 U.N.T.S. 334 [hereinafter BLEU-China BIT]. 
121. See Germany-Russia BIT, supra note 95, Protocol, ¶ 2(c). The treaty continues to be in 
force between Germany and the Russian Federation, the USSR’s principal successor state. 
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d. Public Health 
The permissible objective of public health is included in all of Ger-
many’s NPM clauses122 and also appears in several BITs concluded by 
China. Related exceptions found in Canadian BITs allow measures “ne-
cessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.”123 NPM claus-
es in BITs by India124 and China125 sometimes include the “prevention 
of diseases and pests in animals and plants.” 
e. Public Morality 
Public morality, like public health, is a consistent element in Ger-
many’s NPM clauses.126 It also appears in several BITs concluded by 
the United States127 and Peru,128 as well as in at least one Turkish agree-
ment.129 
f. Other Permissible Objectives 
Some permissible objectives appear on a less frequent basis and/or 
are limited to particular national drafting practices. Indian BITs rou-
tinely include an “extreme emergency” term.130 The Chinese BIT with 
Sri Lanka affirms, inter alia, the “right of either Contracting Party to 
apply prohibitions or restrictions of any kind or take any other action 
which is directed to the protection of its national interests.”131 This is an 
extremely broad formulation—allowing potentially unlimited deviation 
from the BIT—and appears in no other known NPM provision. Several 
Canadian NPM clauses cover the adoption of measures “relating to the 
                                                          
122. See China-Germany BIT, supra note 73, Protocol, ¶ 4(a). 
123. See, e.g., Canada-Uruguay BIT, supra note 83, Annex I § III 2(b); Canadian 2004 Model 
FIPA, supra note 85, art. 10(1)(a). 
124. See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Czech Rep.-India, 
art. 12, Oct. 11, 1996 [hereinafter Czech-India BIT], available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/czech_india.pdf. 
125. Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, P.R.C.-Sing., art. 11, Nov. 
21, 1985, 1443 U.N.T.S. 293. 
126. See China-Germany BIT, supra note 73, Protocol, ¶ 4(a). 
127. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Invest-
ments, U.S.-Egypt, art. X(1), Mar. 11, 1986, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-24 (1986); Treaty Concern-
ing the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, U.S.-Cameroon, art. X(1), Feb. 
26, 1986, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-22 (1986); Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement 
and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Sen., art. X(1), Dec. 6, 1983, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-15 
(1986).  
128. See Peruvian BITs, supra notes 37–39. 
129. See Qatar-Turkey BIT, supra note 40, art. VII(1). 
130. See, e.g., Czech-India BIT, supra note 124, art. 12. 
131. See Sri Lanka-China BIT, supra note 44, art. 11. 
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conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources if 
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption,”132 as well as “reasonable meas-
ures for prudential reasons” aimed at, inter alia, “ensuring the integrity 
and stability of a Contracting Party’s financial system.”133 
                                                          
132. Canada-Uruguay BIT, supra note 83, Annex I § III 2(c); see also Canadian 2004 Model 
FIPA, supra note 85, art. 10(1)(c). 
133. Canada-Uruguay BIT, supra note 83, Annex I § III (3)(c); see also Canadian 2004 Mod-
el FIPA, supra note 85, art. 10(2)(c). This Canadian formulation with respect to protecting state 
finances was first included in the 2004 Model BIT and may be a response to the Argentine finan-
cial crisis and the current ICSID arbitrations addressing the question of whether a financial crisis 
gives rise to either the national security or public order objectives of the U.S.-Argentina BIT. The 
Canadian language clarifies beyond any doubt that response to such a financial crisis would be 
permissible under the BIT. 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 1: KEY PROVISIONS IN NPM CLAUSES OF PRINCIPAL USERS 
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V. THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF NPM PROVISIONS 
A. The Interpretive Approach 
Despite the prevalence of NPM clauses in BITs, they were not a fo-
cus of investor-state arbitration until the Argentine financial collapse of 
2001-2002. Yet, more than forty cases are now pending in ICSID in 
which these clauses are likely to prove decisive. The four ICSID cases 
recently decided against Argentina under the U.S.-Argentina BIT high-
light the interpretive challenges presented by NPM clauses. The tribu-
nals were presented with identical facts and the NPM clause contained 
in the U.S.-Argentina BIT, according to which “[t]his treaty shall not 
preclude the application by either Party of any and all measures neces-
sary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obliga-
tions with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international 
peace and security, or the protection of its own essential security inter-
ests.”134 Moreover, in each case Argentina advanced the same argu-
ment—that the actions taken in response to the crisis were necessary to 
protect essential security interests and maintain public order—and pre-
sented very similar expert testimony. Yet, the tribunals reached opposite 
conclusions, based on different interpretations of the treaty’s NPM 
terms.135  More specifically, the CMS, Enron, and Sempra Tribunals 
found that the NPM clause was inapplicable, while the LG&E Tribunal 
found the clause to apply and relieve Argentina of liability during the 
period of applicability. 
Even setting aside the conflicting awards in these cases, the reasoning 
of the tribunals is deeply problematic from an interpretive perspective. 
At times, each tribunal appears to conflate customary international law 
and the treaty-based defense of the non-precluded measures provisions. 
None of the tribunals offer a coherent analysis of the “necessary for” 
nexus, nor do they fully define the contours of the permissible objec-
tives of “essential security” and “public order.” The tribunals fail to rec-
ognize or fully grapple with the variety of formulations of NPM clauses 
and the potential meanings of their terms. In essence, the tribunals take 
interpretive shortcuts that push toward uniform interpretation of treaty 
terms, but fail to do justice to the interpretive rules of the Vienna Con-
                                                          
134. U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 17, art. XI.. 
135. See CMS Award, supra note 16; LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 30. It is im-
portant to recognize that none of these past decisions is controlling in the interpretation of an 
NPM clause in a future case. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 30, June 26, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993. 
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vention, much less the intents of the states party to the treaty. A coher-
ent framework for the analysis of NPM clauses is, therefore, urgently 
needed to help states, investors, and arbitrators engage in the often diffi-
cult work of treaty interpretation and thereby determine the risk alloca-
tion states have chosen to incorporate into their BITs. This part of the 
Article provides such an interpretative framework. 
The tribunals’ interpretations of the NPM clause in the U.S.-
Argentina BIT also raise a deeper question about the process of treaty 
interpretation itself. As will be discussed in more detail below, there is 
strong evidence that both the United States and Argentina intended their 
BIT’s NPM clause to be self-judging and subject only to a good faith 
review. Yet, the states failed to expressly manifest that intent in the text 
of the treaty. In interpreting such treaties, a tribunal must decide what 
weight to give extrinsic evidence of state intent. The difficulty of ascer-
taining state intent is exacerbated in the context of an ICSID arbitration, 
in which investors bring a case directly, as only one of the two state par-
ties to the BIT is formally before the tribunal, and the other state cannot 
necessarily be called upon to provide its interpretation or documentary 
evidence thereof. To accept such extrinsic evidence of intent may well 
deny investors the legitimate expectation of rights that appear—based 
on the text of the treaty—to be conferred under it, and may result in a 
range of potentially contradictory interpretations of similar or identical 
language in different BITs. Yet, failure to give effect to states’ well-
established intents can violate the legitimate expectations of states party 
to the treaty and can undermine the legitimacy of the investor-state arbi-
tration system itself. 
The interpretation of any treaty instrument must be guided by Arti-
cles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,136 
widely regarded as part of customary international law. Yet even these 
two articles often result in an unsatisfactory compromise between strict 
textual interpretation, as in Article 31, and the recognition of extrinsic 
sources of intent and meaning, as in Article 32.137 The tribunals in the 
four Argentina cases essentially failed to grapple with this issue. While 
a satisfactory resolution of the use of external evidence and the balanc-
ing of competing interests in the interpretation of an NPM clause may 
                                                          
136. See Vienna Convention, supra note 65, arts. 31, 32. 
137. See generally Alexander P. Fachiri, Interpretation of Treaties, 23 AM. J. INT’L L. 745 
(1929); Philip Marshall Brown, The Interpretation of Treaties, 23 AM. J. INT’L L. 819 (1929) 
(both focusing on the use of preliminary materials in the interpretation of multilateral treaties). 
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be difficult, the Vienna Convention requires, and the dictates of legiti-
macy demand, that tribunals fully engage in that process. 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention instructs interpreters to look to 
the “ordinary meaning” of the text, in light of its “context” and the 
treaty’s “object and purpose.”138 A term’s context and the treaty’s object 
and purpose can, at times, assist in establishing an ordinary meaning, 
but “context” is defined narrowly under the Vienna Convention—
limited to the rest of the treaty and the documents concluded with it—
and the “object and purpose” of a treaty may be contested. Hence, the 
Vienna Convention clearly prioritizes a textual approach to interpreta-
tion. While an “ordinary meaning” interpretation may be possible in 
some circumstances, many of the terms found in NPM clauses lack 
clear, ordinary meanings. What is, for example, the ordinary meaning of 
“public morality”? Does it carry the same meaning in a BIT between 
Germany and Pakistan as in a BIT between Germany and Switzerland? 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention further recognizes that states may 
assign special meanings to treaty terms if those special meanings are 
clearly established.139 Often, however, states fail to “clearly establish” 
special meanings, precisely because their understandings of terms do 
not seem to them “special” in the context of Article 31(4) of the Vienna 
Convention. In these situations, the interpretive methods of Article 31 
may prove inadequate and a tribunal, operating under the framework of 
the Vienna Convention, must decide what weight to accord to external 
sources. 
Where an Article 31 analysis results in ambiguity in a treaty’s terms, 
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention allows recourse to external sources 
to aid in the interpretive process. Although the Convention does not di-
rectly look to the intent of the parties, Article 32 of the Vienna Conven-
tion clearly allows for recourse to circumstances of the adoption of a 
treaty, which may in turn be indicative of state intent. Article 32 looks 
to the travaux préparatoires to the treaty and the “circumstances of its 
conclusion.”140 Yet, the use of such external sources also opens the real 
possibility of divergent interpretations of similar or even identical treaty 
terms. For example, based on the travaux and the circumstances sur-
rounding a treaty’s conclusion, the term “public order” may have one 
meaning in a treaty between two civil law states and a very different 
meaning in a treaty between two common law states. Some may find 
                                                          
138. See Vienna Convention, supra note 65, art. 31. 
139. Id. art. 31(4). 
140. Id. art. 32. 
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this range of valid interpretations of similar terms troubling,141 but it is 
both appropriate and necessary given that a goal of treaty interpretation 
is, even within the framework of the Vienna Convention, to give effect 
to the intent of the parties which entered into the treaty instrument.142 
While there is an understandable attractiveness to assigning uniform 
meanings to similar or identical terms across various treaties,143 over-
looking the nuances of state intent, and skipping past external sources of 
interpretation, even the Vienna Convention recognizes that treaty inter-
pretation is a far more nuanced process that may, at times, lead to diver-
gent interpretations and may take into account circumstances external to 
the text of the treaty.144 Such an interpretive process is, admittedly, 
more difficult than merely accepting the interpretation of a prior tribunal 
or a particular asserted “ordinary meaning.” Yet, if the legitimacy of the 
investor-state arbitration system is to be preserved, the meanings of 
terms must be fully explored and the intent of state parties must be rec-
ognized, at least to the extent permitted by the Vienna Convention.145 If 
the potentially competing expectations of states and investors are to be 
accommodated, ICSID tribunals must do the hard work of serious treaty 
interpretation. 
The framework for the interpretation of NPM clauses we present here 
offers a foundation for such a nuanced interpretive process. It takes as 
its starting point the Vienna Convention’s focus on the actual text of the 
agreement, but also recognizes the need—particularly in the context of 
bilateral treaties—to give effect to the intent of the parties where ordi-
nary meanings prove illusive or ambiguous.146 Even within the textual 
                                                          
141. For a detailed discussion of the tension between diversity and uniformity in the interpre-
tation of international obligations, see Philip C. Jessup, Diversity and Uniformity in the Law of 
Nations, 58 AM. J. INT’L L. 341 (1964). 
142. See Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3, 63 (Dec. 19) (de Cas-
tro, J., dissenting) (“It is a well–established principle that the purpose of interpretation is to ascer-
tain the true will of the parties. The terms used in a declaration of intention must be regarded as 
the means…to be used in order to reach a conclusion as to the intention of the authors of the dec-
laration.”). 
143. See Quincy Wright, The Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties, 23 AM. J. INT’L L. 94, 
103–104 (1929) (noting the danger of “misunderstandings that would result” from non–uniform 
interpretations). Some of the ICSID tribunals in the cases against Argentina have fallen victim to 
this seduction, particularly with respect to the interpretation of the “necessary for” clause in the 
US-Argentina BIT as equivalent to the customary law defense of necessity. See Enron Award, 
supra note 29, ¶ 309. 
144. See Vienna Convention, supra note 65, arts. 31, 32.  
145. For a discussion of the need for strongly documented jurisprudence to preserve the le-
gitimacy of international dispute resolution, see Anne-Marie Slaughter & Laurence Helfer, To-
ward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273 (1997). 
146. See, e.g., Maltass v. Maltass, 1 Robb. Ecc. 67, 76 (1844) (U.K.) (“[I]n constru-
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formalism of the Vienna Convention, interpretive space is afforded to 
recognize that ordinary meanings may differ between treaties; to look to 
special meanings established by the parties; to account for a term’s con-
text and the treaty’s object and purpose; and to consider preparatory 
works and the circumstances of a treaty’s conclusion where the text it-
self is ambiguous. The framework we offer, while based in the rules of 
the Vienna Convention, also recognizes the convention’s shortcomings, 
notably the restrictions on recognizing the intent of the parties and the 
difficulty of giving effect to both the expectations of states parties and 
those of investors. It offers a process for the interpretation of NPM 
clauses, poses the questions that must be asked in construing the mean-
ing of the text and the intent that lies behind that text, and suggests 
some of the possible meanings key NPM terms may carry in the practice 
of states that most commonly use NPM clauses.147 
B. Interpreting Key Terms in NPM Clauses: Meanings and 
Ambiguities 
Given that different interpretations of NPM terms may be appropriate 
in particular treaties and that distinct meanings may be implied from 
states’ own practices and the bargains underlying specific BITs, the in-
terpretative analysis offered here does not seek to provide a single inter-
pretation of any BIT language. Rather, it undertakes the requisite proc-
esses of treaty interpretation needed to explore the potential range of 
meanings of NPM terms, suggesting particular usages of terms in the 
practice of three states that most commonly use NPM clauses—United 
States, Germany and India—and offering a framework of interpretation 
reflective of both the legal requirements of the Vienna Convention and 
the potential risk allocations intended by states. The framework offered 
                                                                                                                                      
ing…treaties, we ought to look at all the historical circumstances attending them, in order to as-
certain what was the true intention of the contracting parties, and to give the widest scope to the 
language of the treaties in order to embrace within it all the objects intended to be included.”) (on 
file with author); see also Hersch Lauterpacht, Some Observations on Preparatory Work in the 
Interpretation of Treaties, 48 HARV. L. REV. 549, 563–64 (1935). 
147. This approach explicitly recognizes that: 
A treaty is not concluded in vacuo.… As a result of past developments, certain cir-
cumstances came into existence which the parties desired in some manner to regulate or 
alter and to accomplish this end they chose to enter into a treaty. The treaty, in short, 
stands, therefore, as a related part of the general setting in which the parties acted, and 
that setting must be taken into account if the purpose which the treaty was intended to 
serve is to be fully comprehended and effectuated. 
Comment to Article 19, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 
(SUPPLEMENT) 666, 953 (1935). 
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here may be of particular use to arbitrators as a guide for considering 
the potential meanings states may have assigned various treaty terms, 
but it puts the onus back on the tribunal itself to find an interpretation 
appropriate to each specific clause and individual treaty bargain. 
1. The Nexus Requirement 
The nexus requirement of NPM clauses requires a link between the 
actions taken by a state that would otherwise violate the treaty and the 
permissible objectives provided for in the NPM clause. The variety of 
linguistic formulations of the nexus requirement raises the first interpre-
tive challenge. The most common formulation, particularly evident in 
U.S. practice, requires that the actions taken by the state are “necessary 
for” the ends permitted in the NPM clause.148 Differences in word struc-
ture and phrasing are not uncommon. The BIT between China and New 
Zealand uses the phrasing “directed to,”149 which suggests that actions 
are permissible as long as they are intended by the government to fur-
ther a legitimate end. Perhaps the most lenient nexus standard is found 
in the BIT between India and Croatia, which merely uses the word “for” 
to establish the necessary nexus.150 Such a formulation would, at least in 
its ordinary meaning, suggest a relatively thin nexus, under which 
measures would appear to be permissible as long as they merely further 
a permissible objective. 
BITs for which the official language is not English obviously use dif-
ferent phrases and constructions to establish the nexus requirement than 
the common English versions noted above. Translations may not convey 
the exact meaning intended by the contracting parties. For example, the 
BIT between Bolivia and Peru provides: “nada le impedirá adoptar las 
medidas exigidas por razones de seguridad nacional interna y ex-
                                                          
148. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ment, U.S.-Bahr., art. 14, Sept. 29, 1999, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106–125 (2000) [hereinafter U.S.-
Bahrain BIT] (“This Treaty shall not preclude a Party from applying measures which it considers 
necessary for the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of 
international peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.”). 
149. The text provides that the treaty “shall not in any way limit the right of either Contract-
ing Party to apply prohibitions or restrictions of any kind or take any other action directed to the 
protection of its essential security interests.” New Zealand-China BIT, supra note 43, art. 11.  
150. Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, India-Croat., art. 
12(2), May 4, 2001, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/croatia_india.pdf (“Nothing in this agreement 
precludes the host Contracting Party from taking action for the protection of its essential security 
interests.”) (emphasis added). 
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terna.”151 This provision uses the phrase “exigidas por,” perhaps best 
translated as “required by” or “demanded by” to establish the nexus re-
quirement. Whether this phrase creates a measurably different standard 
than the more common “necessary for” remains an open question and 
will require an arbitrator to consider the text of the treaty and, perhaps, 
the intent of the parties entering into the treaty. 
Even with respect to the most common English language formulation 
of the nexus requirement—that the acts taken be “necessary for” the 
specified ends—at least four distinct interpretations of the identical lan-
guage can be identified in state practice and international jurisprudence. 
Each of these potential interpretations could well be considered an “or-
dinary meaning” of the term “necessary for” under Article 31 of the Vi-
enna Convention, and different states may have intended each of these 
meanings in particular BITs. Moreover, each potential interpretation re-
sults in a different set of circumstances in which an NPM clause trans-
fers the risks and costs of state action in exceptional circumstances from 
states to investors. Several ICSID tribunals in the cases against Argen-
tina have been quick to latch on to the first of these alternatives, which 
equates NPM clauses with the customary law defense of necessity, 
without any consideration of the well-established competing interpreta-
tions. 
The equation of the term “necessary for” with the requirements of the 
customary international law defense of necessity, chosen by three of the 
four Argentina tribunals,152 sets the highest nexus requirement. While 
the customary defense of necessity is separate and distinct from NPM 
clauses, the similar language used in the customary necessity defense 
has led some tribunals to use it as a point of comparison.153 As framed 
by the International Law Commission (ILC), the customary defense of 
necessity is available in the limited circumstances in which the action 
taken is “the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest 
against a grave and imminent peril” and that action “does not seriously 
impair an essential interest” of another state.154 The ICJ confirmed this 
most restrictive reading of necessity in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Pro-
ject case, finding that the defense was inapplicable because other means 
were available to Hungary to remedy the situation.155 According to the 
                                                          
151. Peru-Bolivia BIT, supra note 37, art. 3(5). 
152. See CMS Award, supra note 16; Enron Award, supra note 29. 
153. See CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶¶ 353–78.  
154. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 54, art. 25. 
155. See Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at  40, 42. The Court noted “that, even 
supposing, as Hungary maintained, that the construction and operation of the dam would have 
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Commentaries to the Draft Articles, “[t]he plea [of necessity] is ex-
cluded if there are other (otherwise lawful) means available, even if they 
may be more costly or less convenient.”156 An act is thus only necessary 
for the purposes of the necessity defense in customary law if it is the 
only means to secure an essential state interest. Reading the nexus ele-
ment of an NPM clause as equivalent to the customary necessity de-
fense would result in a narrow application of the clause and would not 
meaningfully enhance state freedom of action in exceptional circum-
stances beyond that already available in customary law. As a conse-
quence, the risks and costs of exceptional state actions would largely 
rest with states themselves.157 There is, however, good reason to doubt 
the appropriateness of the analogy to the necessity defense in the inter-
pretation of “necessary for” in most BITs. If states merely intended the 
NPM clause to refer to the necessity defense in customary law, the 
NPM clause would not have been necessary in the first place as the cus-
tomary defense of necessity would have been available to the state par-
ties in any event.158 
A second interpretation of the “necessary for” language is found in 
the ICJ’s application of a similar term contained in U.S. FCN treaties. In 
Nicaragua,159 for example, the ICJ noted that to satisfy the “necessary 
for” term of the U.S.-Nicaragua FCN Treaty, “the measures taken must 
not merely be such as tend to protect the essential security interests of 
the party taking them, but must be ‘necessary’ for that purpose.”160 Ap-
plying a restrictive standard, the Court concluded: “the mining of Nica-
raguan Ports…cannot possibly be justified as ‘necessary’ to protect the 
essential security interests of the United States.”161 In 2003, the ICJ ex-
                                                                                                                                      
created serious risks, Hungary had means available to it, other than the suspension and abandon-
ment of the works, of responding to that situation. It could for example have proceeded regularly 
to discharge gravel into the river downstream of the dam.” Id. at 42. 
156. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 54, art. 25, ¶ 15. 
157. For a treatment of an NPM clause in this way, see CMS Award, supra note 16. 
158. If such an incorporation of the strict necessity standard had indeed been desired, one 
could at least have expected that states would have indicated such an intent, for example, with an 
affirmative statement that the agreement shall be without prejudice to available defenses under 
customary law. Note in this context the inconsistent reasoning of the Enron Tribunal which re-
quires an explicit textual reference for a clause to be accepted as self–judging, but deems it ap-
propriate to infer the incorporation of the necessity nexus requirement without such a reference. 
See Enron Award, supra note 29, ¶¶ 334 et seq. 
159. The U.S.-Nicaragua FCN Treaty provides that “the present treaty shall not preclude the 
application of measures [by the state] necessary to protect its essential security interests.” Treaty 
of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Nicar., art. XXI, Jan. 21, 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 
4024, 9 U.S.T. 449 (1958). 
160. Nicaragua Judgment (Merits), supra note 21, at 141. 
161. Id.  
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amined a similar clause in the U.S.-Iran FCN treaty.162 In that case, the 
acts taken by the United States involved the use of force in potential 
violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. As a result, the ICJ again 
applied a restrictive interpretation, importing into the definition of ne-
cessity the requirements of self-defense in international law.163 The 
Court included the necessity and proportionality requirements of the law 
of self-defense in the interpretation of the “necessary” term.164 Yet, the 
ICJ recognized that the term “necessary for” in the FCN treaty was dis-
tinct from the necessity defense in customary law. Given the special 
context of the use of force in both the Nicaragua and Oil Platforms 
cases, the ICJ’s narrow construction of “necessary for”165 may not be 
applicable outside these special circumstances. An interpretation of 
“necessary for” based on the requirements of self-defense would again 
leave states very little freedom of action beyond that already available 
under customary international law and would largely make states them-
selves carry the costs of actions taken in exceptional circumstances.  
In stark contrast to the narrow interpretation of “necessary for” in the 
customary defense of necessity and the ICJ’s reading of FCN treaties, 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has taken a much 
broader approach to the interpretation of the term “necessary.” The 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR) permits restrictions of a number of rights and freedoms166 to 
the extent “necessary in a democratic society” and if the actions are 
taken, inter alia, “in the interests of national security…or public safety, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, [and] for the protection of health 
or morals….”167 In the 1976 case of Handyside v. U.K., the ECtHR in-
quired into the meaning of the nexus requirement and asked whether 
“the protection of morals in a democratic society necessitated the vari-
ous measures taken”168 by the state. The ECtHR compared the term 
                                                          
162. U.S.–Iran FCN Treaty, supra note 22, art XX(1)(d).  
163. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, 183 (Nov. 6) [hereinafter Oil 
Platforms Judgment] (“In the present case, the question whether the measures taken were “neces-
sary” overlaps with the question of their validity as acts of self–defence.”).  
164. Id. at 183, 196-97. 
165. The Court found that it is a “requirement of international law that measures taken avow-
edly in self–defence must have been necessary for that purpose is strict and objective, leaving no 
room for any ‘measure of discretion.’” Id. at 196. 
166. ECHR, supra note 34, art. 8 (the right to respect for privacy and family life); art. 9 (free-
dom of thought conscience and religion); art. 10 (freedom of expression); art. 11 (freedom of as-
sembly and association); Protocol, art. 1 (protection of property). 
167. Id. art. 10(2). 
168. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 21 (¶ 47) (1976) [hereinafter 
Handyside]. 
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“necessary” with other nexus terms used elsewhere in the Convention, 
noting: 
[W]hilst the adjective “necessary”, within the meaning of Article 
10 para. 2, is not synonymous with “indispensable” (cf., in Arti-
cles 2 para. 2…and 6 para. 1, the words “absolutely necessary” 
and “strictly necessary” and, in Article 15 para. 1, the phrase “to 
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”), 
neither has it the flexibility of such expressions as “admissible”, 
“ordinary” (cf. Article 4 para. 3), “useful” (cf. the French text of 
the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1), “reasonable” 
(cf. Articles 5 para. 3 and 6 para. 1) or “desirable.”169 
Situating “necessary” between indispensable and useful, the ECtHR 
concluded that “it is for the national authorities to make the initial as-
sessment of the reality of the pressing social need implied by the notion 
of ‘necessity’ in this context.”170 Leaving national governments with a 
margin of appreciation to determine which measures are necessary to 
achieve the objectives authorized by the Convention,171 the ECtHR will 
only examine whether the national determination falls within the inter-
nationally defined boundaries of that margin. The margin of apprecia-
tion is, of course, an interpretive process more than a particular stan-
dard. The breadth of the margin of appreciation varies based on the 
particular provision of the Convention being applied. Yet, in nearly all 
cases, the margin rests on an interpretation of the term “necessary” that 
is noticeably broader than that given to the same term in the context of 
the customary defense of necessity or the ICJ’s interpretation of particu-
lar FCN treaties. 
A fourth potential interpretation of “necessary for” effectively splits 
the difference between the necessity defense in customary international 
law and the approach employed by the ECtHR. This fourth approach 
might be called a “least restrictive alternative” test and stems both from 
U.S. constitutional practice and jurisprudence under the GATT and 
WTO. In U.S. practice, the state is allowed to take an action that bur-
dens citizens’ rights if it furthers an essential state interest, but only if it 
is the least restrictive alternative available to achieve a particular 
goal.172 As the U.S. Supreme Court has held, “where state action im-
                                                          
169. Id. at 22 (¶ 48). 
170. Id. 
171. For a brief discussion of the margin of appreciation doctrine, see infra notes 288, 289, 
and 292, as well as the accompanying text. 
172. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) ( “[E]ven though the governmen-
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pinges on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights or liberties 
[it] must…be found to have chosen the least restrictive alternative.”173 
A variant of the least restrictive alternative approach to the “neces-
sary for” formulation also has been employed by GATT and WTO pan-
els. In the Thailand Cigarettes case, Thailand banned foreign produced 
cigarettes but allowed the sale of domestic produced cigarettes, justify-
ing the measure based on Article XX (b) of GATT on the grounds that 
such restrictions were “necessary to protect human...health.”174 The 
GATT panel in that case disagreed, finding that  
the import restrictions imposed by Thailand could be considered 
to be “necessary” in terms of Article XX (b) only if there were 
no alternative measure consistent with the General Agreement, or 
less inconsistent with it, which Thailand could reasonably be ex-
pected to employ to achieve its health policy objectives.175  
In other words, Thailand’s actions could only be justified if they were 
the least restrictive means of achieving the legitimate policy objective. 
In this case, a ban on all foreign cigarettes was not the least restrictive 
means available and was deemed a breach of GATT obligations. 
Though this “least-restrictive-means” test is somewhat similar to the 
ECtHR’s margin of appreciation approach, it will often be narrower 
when applied, since the margin of appreciation does not require the 
measure chosen by the state to be the least restrictive available as long 
as it falls within the court-determined margin.176 
                                                                                                                                      
tal purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly 
stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of 
legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same 
basic purpose.”). 
173. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973). Petitioners may show 
that a measure fails the least restrictive alternative test if they can prove that other “less drastic” 
“methods of satisfying the State's interest” are available. Id. In the context of non–precluded 
measures provisions, interpretation of the “necessary for” provision as a least restrictive alterna-
tive test would mean that a state action could fall under the NPM clause unless claimants can 
identify a less restrictive alternative than the one chosen by the government that would have 
achieved the same permissible objectives. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-6 to 16-8 (1978). 
174.  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX(b), Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; GATT, Annex, art. XXI. GATT 1947 is incorporated into 
GATT 1994. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. 1(a), Apr. 15, 1994, 33 
I.L.M. 1125 (incorporating all provisions from GATT 1947 into GATT 1994). 
175. Panel Report, Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, 
¶ 75, WT/DS10/R (Oct. 5, 1990). 
176. See generally DAVID M. BEATTY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
(1995). 
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NPM provisions, even if they employ the common “necessary for” 
formulation, rarely provide conclusive interpretive guidance as to which 
of these or other possible interpretations should be given to their nexus 
term. Though some have suggested that the interpretation of the ICJ in 
the Nicaragua and Oil Platforms cases should be controlling,177 those 
decisions are only binding on the parties to those disputes. Further, it 
only reflects the ICJ’s interpretation of the U.S.-Nicaragua and U.S.-
Iran FCN treaties in the special context of the use of force and of self-
defense. As such, the determination of the appropriate nexus standard in 
any particular NPM provision will require first instance analysis by the 
tribunal interpreting that treaty. Given the range of potential meanings 
of even the standard “necessary for” phrase, a textual analysis will often 
leave considerable ambiguities. Thus, interpretation may require resort-
ing to the supplementary means of interpretation provided for in Article 
32 of the Vienna Convention.178 What is not permissible in this process 
is interpreting the absence of specific interpretive guidance in the BIT 
as an authoritative indication that the nexus requirement was intended to 
merely mirror the strict necessity defense standard under customary 
law.179 This might be a convenient option and attractive shortcut, but 
such an approach disregards the fact that the absence of interpretive 
guidance does not privilege a reading based on available customary law 
and fails to engage in the serious interpretation of competing and 
equally valid interpretations from other areas of international law. 
The interpretation of “necessary” is likely to have considerable con-
sequences for the allocation of risks and costs between states and inves-
tors. A narrow reading of “necessary” in an NPM clause will limit a 
state’s freedom of action and cause the state to bear the costs of many 
actions that would otherwise violate the BIT. In contrast, a broader 
reading of “necessary” will transfer more of the risks of state action in 
exceptional circumstances to investors. The critical question that a third 
party dispute resolution mechanism will need to consider is whether 
evidence, either from the BIT itself or from the travaux provides guid-
ance as to which of the potential interpretations of “necessary for” the 
parties may have intended. Absent such guidance—even in extrinsic 
sources—the least restrictive alternative approach developed by the 
                                                          
177. See CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶ 339 (stating the claimant’s view of the treaty’s emer-
gency clauses). 
178. See Vienna Convention, supra note 65, art. 32.  
179. See Enron Award, supra note 29, ¶ 334. 
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GATT and WTO panels offers perhaps the best middle ground for bal-
ancing the legitimate expectations of both states and investors. 
2. Permissible Objectives 
A second set of terms contained in NPM provisions specifies the 
permissible ends towards which state action must be directed if the 
NPM clause is to preclude a violation of the treaty. While some permis-
sible objectives may have ordinary meanings that can be determined 
from the text, others are less clear and may again present interpretive 
ambiguities that require recourse to background materials and the 
broader context of the bargain behind the treaty. Again, the interpreta-
tion of permissible objectives in NPM clauses will determine the types 
of measures states may take in exceptional circumstances without incur-
ring liability and, ultimately, the allocation of risk between states and 
investors in exceptional circumstances. 
a. Essential Security Interests 
The terms “essential security interests” or “security interests” appear 
in a wide range of NPM clauses as one of the permissible objectives.180 
Other treaties use slightly different formulations, including “public se-
curity”181 and “considerations of…security.”182 Whatever formulation is 
employed in the particular treaty, the key interpretative question is how 
a state’s “essential security” or “security” is defined. Does it encompass 
merely situations of armed attack against the state or should it be con-
strued more broadly to encompass preemptive action? Must the threat 
even be military, or can “essential security” be threatened by economic 
or public health crises? 
                                                          
180. See 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 18 (using the standard language found in 
most earlier U.S. BITs: “Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed…to preclude a Party from ap-
plying measures…for the…protection of its own essential security interests.”). Most Indian BITs 
use a similar formulation. The BIT between India and Egypt, for example, provides: “Nothing in 
this Agreement precludes the host Contracting Party from taking action for the protection of its 
essential[] security interests.” Treaty for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
Egypt–India, art. 11(2), Apr. 9, 1997 [hereinafter Egypt-India BIT], available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/egypt_india.pdf. 
181. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Invest-
ments, Protocol, F.R.G.-Bangl., ¶ 2(a), May 6, 1981, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/germany_bangladesh.pdf. 
182. See, e.g., Convention Concerning the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments, Belg.-Lux.-Cameroon, art. 4(2),  Mar. 27, 1980, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/belg_lux_cameroun.pdf 
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As noted above, the ICJ has examined language contained in both the 
U.S.-Nicaragua and U.S.-Iran FCN treaties similar to the “essential se-
curity interests” clause in many NPM provisions. The ICJ’s approach to 
these two treaties suggests a relatively wide, but not unlimited interpre-
tation of the “essential security” term. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ 
observed that “the concept of essential security interests certainly ex-
tends beyond the concept of an armed attack, and has been subject to 
very broad interpretations in the past.”183 The question as framed by the 
Court was “whether the risk run by these ‘essential security interests’ is 
reasonable.”184 In the Nicaragua case the ICJ did not need to further 
parse the meaning of “essential security interests” as it determined that 
the actions taken by the United States were not necessary to protect 
those interests, however defined, and hence, the United States’ actions 
failed the nexus test, and were not permissible under the treaty.185 
The ICJ revisited the interpretation of “essential security” in its 2003 
decision in the Oil Platforms case.186 Again, however, the Court did not 
directly opine on the scope of “essential security” interests.187 In its 
Counter Memorial in the case, the United States defined its essential se-
curity interests to include “the uninterrupted flow of maritime com-
merce in the Gulf” which was “essential to the economy and security 
interests of many States, including the United States.”188 The ICJ noted 
approvingly that both the United States and Iran recognized “some of 
the interests referred to by the United States—the safety of United 
States vessels and crew, and the uninterrupted flow of maritime com-
merce in the Persian Gulf—as being reasonable security interests of the 
United States.”189 The conception of essential security interests ad-
vanced by the United States and acknowledged by the ICJ190 appears to 
                                                          
183. Nicaragua Judgment (Merits), supra note 21, at 116. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 141. 
186. For a discussion of the case, see Pieter H. F. Bekker, International Decision: Oil Plat-
forms (Iran v. United States), 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 550 (2004). 
187. Oil Platforms Judgment, supra note 163, at 196 (providing that U.S. actions “cannot be 
justified, under Article XX, paragraph 1(d), of the 1955 Treaty, as being measures necessary to 
protect the essential security interests of the United States, since those actions constituted re-
course to armed force not qualifying, under international law on the question, as acts of self–
defence, and thus did not fall within the category of measures contemplated, upon its correct in-
terpretation, by that provision of the Treaty”). 
188. Counter Memorial of the United States, Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), ¶ 3.11 (June 23, 
1997) [hereinafter Counter Memorial of the U.S.], available at http://www.icj–
cij.org/docket/files/90/8632.pdf. 
189. Oil Platforms Judgment, supra note 163, at 196. 
190. Id. 
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include economic interests—such as the flow of maritime commerce—
as well as territorial or military interests.191 The ICJ’s interpretation of 
“essential security” is indicative of a broad reading of the term that goes 
well beyond pure military threats and encompasses other types of 
threats that may impact a state’s security. 
A similar essential security term is also found in the language of the 
GATT and WTO. GATT Article XXI provides for exceptions based on 
“the protection of [a party’s] essential security interests,”192 but does not 
further define what constitutes an “essential security interest.”193 The 
Article XXI exception has only been implicated in four GATT disputes 
and none of them have expressly addressed the scope of “essential secu-
rity interests.”194 Academic commentary on this GATT provision sug-
gests a broad interpretation of “essential security interests” in this con-
text as well. For example, Schloemann and Ohlhoff have argued that 
“[a] wide range of legitimate ‘essential security interests’ are conceiv-
able [under the GATT]. In principle, any policy interest of a certain in-
tensity may be legitimately protected under Article XXI.”195 The United 
States has considered the invocation of the Article XXI exception in a 
broad range of circumstances, including the Helms-Burton Act boycott 
of Cuba and the Massachusetts Burma law.196 To the degree such a 
broad invocation is accepted,197 “essential security” may be seen as an 
                                                          
191. Counter Memorial of the U.S., supra note 188, ¶ 3.12 (identifying attacks on U.S. war-
ships and commercial vessels as “serious threats” to essential U.S. security interests). 
192. GATT, supra note 174, art. XXI; see also NAFTA, supra note 85, art. 2102 (1993) (us-
ing same language). For discussion of the clause, see Raj Bhala, National Security and Interna-
tional Trade Law: What the GATT Says, and What the United States Does, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 263, 268–69, 275 (1998); Wesley A. Cann, Jr., Creating Standards and Accountability 
for the Use of the WTO Security Exception: Reducing the Role of Power–Based Relations and 
Establishing a New Balance Between Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 413 
(2001). 
193. See Peter Lindsay, Note, The Ambiguity of GATT Article XXI: Subtle Success or Ram-
pant Failure?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1278 (2003). 
194. The cases include: Czechoslovakia v. United States in 1949, Nicaragua v. United States 
in 1984 (Nicaragua I), Nicaragua v. United States in 1985–1986 (Nicaragua II), and Yugoslavia 
v. European Community in 1991–1992. For a discussion of why none of these cases expressly 
reached an interpretation of “essential security,” see Hannes L. Schloemann & Stefan Ohlhoff, 
“Constitutionalization” and Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of 
Competence, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 424, 426, 432–39 (1999). 
195. Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 194, at 444. 
196. As Ryan Goodman explains, “[t]he United States argued, in part, that these measures 
served its security interests because they responded directly to human rights violations committed 
by the respective regimes.” Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights Law in Practice: Norms 
and National Security: The WTO as a Catalyst for Inquiry, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 101, 102 (2001). 
197. Goodman argues that “in principle, the United States' position involves a wholly legiti-
mate definition of ‘security interests.’” Id. at 102. 
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even more encompassing term.198 Two commentators note that “the 
concept of national security, or ‘essential security interests,’ is a func-
tion of contemporary sovereignty, and as such demands individualiza-
tion, or individual definition, by the state concerned before its juridical 
application is possible…Any panel dealing with such issues will have to 
defer to the government concerned in that regard.”199 
Some states have made more explicit interpretations of the essential 
security term. The United States, for example, has asserted a broad in-
terpretation of “essential security,” both in its submissions to the ICJ in 
the Oil Platforms case and in testimony by the State Department to the 
U.S. Senate in BIT ratification hearings. As the State Department has 
observed with regard to the essential security objective, the executive’s 
understanding has been that “essential security interests would include 
security-related actions taken in time of war or national emergency” and 
that “actions not arising from a state of war or national emergency must 
have a clear and direct relationship to the essential security interest of 
the Party involved.”200 At least to the degree that this understanding has 
been communicated to and shared with the United States’ treaty part-
ners, this definition of essential security appears to govern the interpre-
tation of the NPM clauses in U.S. BITs. 
In German practice, NPM clauses use the term “public security” 
rather than “essential security.” Although there is no officially published 
interpretation of the “public security” objective in the specific context of 
Germany’s NPM clauses, domestic usage of the term is highly sugges-
tive as to its intended reach. German NPM clauses generally group the 
security objective and the public order objective together within a single 
reference to “public security and order” (“öffentliche Sicherheit und 
Ordnung”),201 a phrase with a long pedigree202 that is included in virtu-
ally all domestic state police laws to define the scope of the state’s po-
                                                          
198. Id. 
199. Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 194, at 450. Part of this deference stems from the 
phrase “as it considers necessary” included in GATT Article XXI. See generally id. 
200. Letter of Submittal from Strobe Talbott, U.S. Sec’y of State, to U.S. Senate (June 26, 
1995), S. TREATY DOC. No. 104–10, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43579.pdf. 
201. For a discussion of the key terms, see MARKUS MÖSTL, DIE STAATLICHE GARANTIE FÜR 
DIE ÖFFENTICHE SICHERHEIT UND ORDNUNG: SICHERHEITSGEWÄHRLEISTUNG IM 
VERFASSUNGSSTAAT, IM BUNDESSTAAT UND IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION [STATE 
GUARANTEE OF PUBLIC SECURITY AND ORDER] 119 (2002).  
202. The phrase “public security and order” originated in ch. II, tit. 17 § 10 of the Allge-
meines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten of 1794. See ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT FÜR DIE 
PREUßISCHEN STAATEN VON 1794, at 620 (1970), available at http://www.smixx.de/ra/Links_F-
R/PrALR/pralr.html (visited Nov. 19, 2007). 
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lice powers.203 In the 1985 Brokdorf judgment, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court summarized the core meaning of the “public security” ele-
ment of the term as follows: 
The term “public security” comprises the protection of central 
legal interests such as the life, health, freedom, honor, property 
and assets of the individual as well as the integrity of the legal 
order and of the institutions of the state; a threat to public secu-
rity will commonly be assumed in the face of an impending 
criminal violation of these protected interests.204 
This definition contains three elements.205 First, the integrity of the legal 
order is understood as covering the entire body of formally valid laws 
and regulations.206 Second, the integrity of the individual’s rights and 
legal interests is usually already addressed by the broader concept of the 
legal order, but on occasion the two may diverge.207 The third protected 
element, the integrity of the institutions of the state, refers to the state’s 
territorial integrity and political independence.208 Taken collectively, 
these three protected elements suggest that the German interpretation of 
the essential security permissible objective is, likewise, relatively broad. 
Indian BITs also use the “essential security” language as one of the 
permissible objectives.209 While there is no formal guidance available as 
to the interpretation of this clause in Indian BITs, Indian domestic prac-
tice sheds light on India’s understanding of the term. One possible read-
ing of the Indian “essential security” clause is as a reference to the “se-
curity of the state,” language which has received considerable treatment 
from Indian domestic courts. In Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, the 
                                                          
203. BODO PIEROTH, BERNHARD SCHLINK & MICHAEL KNIESEL, POLIZEI– UND 
ORDNUNGSRECHT [POLICE LAW] 123 (2d ed. 2004). 
204. Brokdorf Judgment, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 
May 14, 1985, 69 BVerfGE 315, 352 (F.R.G.), translated at 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/global_law/german-cases/cases_bverg.shtml?14may1985 (visited Nov. 
16, 2007). 
205. See Erhard Denninger, Polizeiaufgaben [Police Functions], in HANDBUCH DES 
POLIZEIRECHTS [HANDBOOK OF POLICE LAW] 205–211 (Hans Lisken & Erhard Denninger eds., 
3d ed. 2001); PIEROTH, SCHLINK & KNIESEL, supra note 203, at 124. 
206. PIEROTH, SCHLINK & KNIESEL, supra note 203, at 127–32. 
207. Id. at 132–135 (noting that threats to legal rights by natural phenomena, such as ava-
lanches, and by individuals themselves, as in suicide, may affect the individual rights without im-
plicating the integrity of the legal order). 
208. Id. at 135–137. 
209. See, e.g., Egypt-India BIT, supra note 180, art. 11(2) (“Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of 
this Article nothing in this Agreement precludes the host Contracting Party from taking action for 
the protection of its essential, secutrity [sic] interests or in circumstances of extreme emergency in 
accordance with its laws normally and reasonably applied on a non-discriminatory basis.”). 
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Indian Supreme Court drew a distinction between three categories: “The 
expressions ‘law and order,’ ‘public order,’ and ‘security of the State’ 
have been used in different Acts. Situations which affect ‘public order' 
are graver than those which affect ‘law and order’. Thus those situations 
which affect ‘security of the State’ are gravest.”210 Similarly, in the case 
of Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, Supreme Court Justice Hi-
dayatullah observed: 
One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order 
represents the largest circle within which is the next circle repre-
senting public order and the smallest circle represents security of 
state. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order 
but not public order just as an act might affect public order but 
not security of state.211  
Treating “essential security” in Indian BITs as equivalent to “security of 
the state” would set a rather high threshold, allowing the term to be trig-
gered only in the most grave of situations. 
The most recent interpretations of the “essential security” permissible 
objective arise in the context of the aforementioned ICSID arbitrations 
against Argentina, and confirm a broad reading of “essential security,” 
at least as intended in the U.S.-Argentina BIT. Despite arguments by 
claimants in all of these cases that the NPM clause of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT does not apply to situations of economic emergency, the 
tribunals interpreted the essential security and public order provisions 
broadly to encompass economic emergencies.212 The LG&E tribunal 
found Article XI applicable to an economic emergency, observing: 
To conclude that such a severe economic crisis could not consti-
tute an essential security interest is to diminish the havoc that the 
economy can wreak on the lives of an entire population and the 
ability of the Government to lead. When a State’s economic 
foundation is under siege, the severity of the problem can equal 
that of any military invasion.213 
Though the LG&E Tribunal appears more willing to accept an economic 
emergency as grounds for invoking the NPM clause, even the CMS Tri-
bunal noted that “there is nothing in the context of customary interna-
                                                          
210. Union of India and Another v. Tulsiram Patel and Others, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1416 (India). 
211. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 740 (1965) (India). 
212. LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 30, ¶ 203; CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶ 340; 
Enron Award, supra note 29, ¶ 332. 
213. LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 30, ¶ 238. 
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tional law or the object and purpose of the treaty that could on its own 
exclude major economic crises from the scope of Article XI.”214 This 
broad interpretation appears to conform both to the text of Article XI of 
the U.S.-Argentina BIT and the intent of both states. 
b. International Peace and Security 
The permissible objective of “international peace and security” ap-
pears frequently in NPM clauses and has a relatively uncontested inter-
pretation. For example, the 2004 Canadian Model BIT provides: 
“[n]othing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent any Party 
from taking action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Na-
tions Charter for the maintenance of international peace and secu-
rity.”215 This provision is generally understood to allow states to take 
actions mandated by the UN Security Council in furtherance of its 
“primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.”216 As UN member states are required to “accept and carry out 
the decisions of the Security Council,” the provision ensures that states 
parties will not be held in breach of their obligations under a BIT if they 
are acting in furtherance of a Security Council resolution.217 In so doing, 
this permissible objective shifts the risks of state action in pursuance of 
UN mandates from states to investors. 
There has been relative agreement as to the interpretation of this as-
pect of non-precluded measures provisions. The Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Draft Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment is instructive, though the drafting project was 
ultimately unsuccessful.218 According to the commentaries to a similar 
clause in that instrument, the negotiating parties understood the lan-
guage to “refer specifically to obligations under the UN Charter.”219 The 
                                                          
214. CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶ 359. 
215. Canada 2004 Model FEPA, supra note 85, art. 10(4). The NPM provision of 2004 U.S. 
Model BIT, for example, provides that “nothing in this treaty shall preclude the application by 
either Party of measures necessary for…the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the main-
tenance or restoration of international peace and security.” 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 76, 
art. 18. 
216. U.N. Charter art. 24. 
217. Id. art. 25. 
218. Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Draft Consolidated Text, OECD Doc. 
DAFFE/MAI(98)7/REV1 (Apr. 22, 1998), Pt. VI(2)(c) [hereinafter MAI Draft Text], available at 
http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng987r1e.pdf.  
219. See OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Commentary to the Consolidated 
Text, 41, OECD Doc. DAFFE/MAI(98)8/REV1 (Apr. 22, 1998) [hereinafter MAI Draft Text 
Commentary], available at http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng988r1e.pdf).  
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United States has confirmed that this reflects its view of the provision. 
According to the Letter of Submittal attached to the U.S.-Bahrain BIT, 
“[i]nternational obligations with respect to maintenance or restoration of 
peace or security would include, for example, obligations arising out of 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.”220 Some U.S. BITs have 
clarified the meaning of this clause in their protocols. The Protocol to 
the U.S.-Argentina BIT, for example, provides: “[t]he Parties under-
stand that, with respect to rights reserved in Article XI of the Treaty, 
‘obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of interna-
tional peace or security’ means obligations under the Charter of the 
United Nations.”221 
While this permissible objective is generally understood to refer to 
actions taken in pursuance of the UN Charter, some states might seek to 
invoke it with respect to actions mandated by regional organizations, 
rather than by the Security Council.222 To the degree regional action has 
been taken pursuant to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and considered 
necessary for the “preservation or restoration of international peace and 
security,” the NPM provision would presumably be applicable. Situa-
tions in which the regional action was not taken in pursuance of Chapter 
VIII of the UN Charter, but solely under the mandate of the regional or-
ganization, are less clear.  
A final context in which this objective might be raised by a state is 
with respect to the preservation of international peace and security on a 
unilateral basis or through a “coalition of the willing.”223 Such an action 
would not appear to fall within the general consensus as to the meaning 
of this permissible objective, though an arbitral tribunal would have to 
consider whether the states parties had intended a special meaning224 for 
the term that would include such unilateral actions. 
                                                          
220. Letter of Submittal of the U.S.-Bahrain BIT from Sec’y of State Albright to President 
Clinton, annexed to U.S.-Bahrain BIT, supra note 148. 
221. U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 17, Protocol, ¶ 6. 
222. An obvious example of this is the NATO intervention in Kosovo. That action was not 
approved by the Security Council, but was still aimed at the preservation of international peace 
and security. In the negotiations for the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, some par-
ties suggested adding a provision that measures taken in pursuant to “regional security arrange-
ments” are permitted under the general exceptions clause, although no such text was added as of 
the May 1998 drafting session. MAI Draft Text Commentary, supra note 219, at 42. 
223. If the state’s own essential security interests were implicated, the action would, pre-
sumably, be covered by the essential security objective of most NPM clauses. 
224. Cf. Vienna Convention, supra note 65, art. 31(4). 
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c. Public Order 
Together with security, “public order” is the permissible objective 
most frequently included in NPM clauses. Yet, its meaning is subject to 
contestation due to its different usages in various domestic legal systems 
and traditions. Notably, the common and civil law systems have very 
different understandings of the phrase.225 Though the interpretation of 
the public order term cannot simply be imported from domestic law,226 
the meaning of the term in domestic law may be relevant as indicative 
of either a special meaning assigned by the parties or as evidence of the 
                                                          
225. See Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, Ordre Public (Public Order), in III ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 788, 789 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1997) (noting that parties to an 
international agreement providing for such an exception “may have different conceptions of ordre 
public”). In the Anglo–American legal tradition, the issue of “public order” arises primarily in the 
context of riots on the streets or the application of the criminal law. See, e.g., Edmund H. Bennett, 
Public Meetings and Public Order: The United States, 4 LAW Q. REV. 237 (1888); George H. 
Dession, Sanction, Law and Public Order, 1 VAND. L. REV. 8 (1947–1948) (defining public order 
as “that measure of peace and observance of basic value patterns of a culture upon which the 
fruitful pursuit of legitimate interests in the given society depends” and discussing it in the con-
text of the methods of the criminal law as the “ultimate sanctions for the achievement and preser-
vation of public order”); George H. Dession, The Techniques of Public Order: Evolving Concepts 
of Criminal Law, 5 BUFF. L. REV. 22 (1955–1956); W. Ivor Jennings, Public Order, 8 POL. Q. 7, 
11 (1937) (noting in the context of the 1936 U.K. Public Order Act that, in England, “the problem 
of public order...becomes simply a problem of preventing riot”). By contrast, the civil law con-
cept of ordre public, originating in France with the Code Napoleon, is broader in scope and gen-
erally understood to encompass a country’s basic value system as a whole, expressed through all 
of its domestic legislation and regulations, not just its criminal laws. See, e.g., Seidl–
Hohenveldern, supra, at 788; Günther Beitzke, Ordre Public, in II WÖRTERBUCH DES 
VÖLKERRECHTS [DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] 665 (Hans–Jürgen Schlochauer ed., 
1961); Wyndham A. Bewes, Public Order (Ordre Public), 37 LAW Q. REV. 315, 318 (1921). The 
concept’s principal area of application has been in the field of the conflict of laws, or private in-
ternational law, where it performs the function of a “defense shield” against foreign legal acts that 
are deemed to contravene the national ordre public, with the consequence that such acts will not 
be given domestic effect. For a pertinent example, see Article 6 of the Introductory Law to the 
German Civil Code (EGBGB), which provides under the heading “Öffentliche Ordnung (ordre 
public)”: “A legal norm of another country is not to be applied if its application leads to a result 
that is manifestly incompatible with essential principles of the German legal order. In particular, 
it is not to be applied if its application is manifestly incompatible with [constitutional] basic 
rights” (authors’ translation). In the Anglo–American common law tradition, an essentially 
equivalent functional role is played by the concept of “public policy.” See Bewes, supra, at 315; 
Max Habicht, The Application of Soviet Laws and the Exception of Public Order, 21 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 238, 238 n.1 (1927). Within the French code civil, a distinction exists between ordre public 
interne, which refers to those rules of domestic law that private contracting parties cannot set 
aside, and ordre public international, which is the concept applicable in the context of the conflict 
of laws.  See Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra, at 788. 
226. But see Seidl-Hohenveldern, supra note 225, at 789 (stating that due to the different 
ordre public conceptions prevailing among the parties to an agreement, “the material content of 
the obligations assumed…may vary from State to State,” which suggests a domestically-informed 
interpretation). 
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broader context in which the treaty operates. That such conceptual dif-
ferences may matter in investment arbitration has become evident in the 
recent Enron arbitration before ICSID, where the claimant’s essentially 
common-law-informed interpretation of public order clashed with Ar-
gentina’s civil law notion of “orden público.”227 
Interpretations of the “public order” objective in international con-
texts similarly suggest a range of possible interpretations of the term. 
The OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property228 
contained a “public order” type exception, providing in Article 6 that 
derogations from its substantive provisions would be permissible if a 
state party was, inter alia, “involved in war, hostilities or other grave 
national emergency due to force majeure or provoked by unforeseen 
circumstances or threatening its essential security interests.”229 The 
commentary provided a few illustrative examples that emphasize secu-
rity-related aspects of public order, such as “civil wars, riots, or other 
widespread civil disturbances” as well as natural disasters, including 
“storm damage, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions etc.…with effects on a 
national scale.”230 The commentary suggests by way of reference231 that 
the exception was apparently intended to be reflective of the necessity 
defense under customary law, but some of the examples appear to go far 
beyond the normal applications of the customary defense. 
The ultimately unsuccessful Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI)232 also included a “public order” exception.233 In a footnote, the 
draft explained that “[t]he public order exception may be invoked only 
where a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the 
fundamental interests of society.”234 There remained disagreement 
                                                          
227. See Enron Award, supra note 29, ¶¶ 324, 338. The concept of “orden público” has been 
part of Argentine law since at least 1869 when it was included in Article 14 of the country’s Civil 
Code. See Habicht, supra note 225, at 241. 
228. O.E.C.D. Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, Text with Notes and 
Comments, 7 I.L.M. 118 (1968). 
229. Id. at 130 (emphasis added). 
230. Id. at 131. 
231. The commentary refers to a remark made by Judge Anzilotti in the Oscar Chinn case, 
according to which “[n]ecessity may excuse the non–observation of international obliga-
tions…the plea of necessity…by definition implies the impossibility of proceeding by any other 
method than the one contrary to law.” Id. at 132 (citing Oscar Chin Case, P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 
63, 114). 
232. MAI Draft Text, supra note 218. 
233. For background and discussion, see Alexander Böhmer, The Struggle for a Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment: An Assessment of the Negotiation Process in the OECD, 41 GER. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 267 (1998). 
234. MAI Draft Text, supra note 218, at 77 n.2. 
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among negotiating states, however, on what would qualify as a “funda-
mental interest.” There appears to have been consensus that the applica-
tion of a state’s criminal laws, anti-terrorist measures, and money-
laundering regulations235 would fall under the “public order” heading, 
but there was no agreement as to how much broader the exception 
should be.236 
In the U.S. BIT program, the “public order” objective has been un-
derstood as covering “measures taken pursuant to a Party’s police pow-
ers to ensure public health and safety.”237 The United States has sought 
to differentiate the essential security and public order components of its 
BIT agreements.238 With regard to the essential security objective, the 
United States’ understanding has been that “essential security interests 
would [generally] include security-related actions taken in time of war 
or national emergency.”239 The differentiating characteristic between 
public order and national security, then, appears to lie in a combination 
of severity and scale; whereas the “public order” objective covers essen-
tially law-enforcement related activities during peace time, “essential 
security interests” are implicated when the public order itself may be 
under severe stress due to armed hostilities or acute crises. 
German practice has also developed a distinct meaning for the “pub-
lic order” element of NPM clauses. As pointed out above, together with 
“public security,” “public order” is one of the two categories defining 
the reach of the state’s police powers. Whereas “public security” in-
cludes the integrity of the legal order in the form of all written laws and 
regulations, “public order” refers to the complementary240 category of 
all unwritten social, and thus extra-legal, norms that are nonetheless 
deemed necessary for a peaceful and harmonious coexistence of the 
                                                          
235. See MAI Draft Text Commentary, supra note 219, at 41. 
236. At least one delegation made the interpretation conditional on the MAI’s substantive 
scope, arguing that a broader understanding of “public order” would need to be considered if the 
MAI were not only to guarantee a national treatment standard, but also market access rights. Id.  
By contrast, another delegation suggested that the “public order” concept should exclude “eco-
nomic purposes” and that measures taken in pursuit of it needed to be subject to the principle of 
proportionality. Id.  
237. President’s Message to the Senate Transmitting the Mongolia-United States Bilateral In-
vestment Treaty with Annex and Protocol, Letter of Submittal by Sec’y of State Strobe Talbot, 
(June 16, 1995) [hereinafter Letter of Submittal]. For the text of the exception, see Treaty Con-
cerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Mong., art. X, Oct. 6, 
1994, S. TREATY DOC. No. 104-10 (1995) [hereinafter U.S.-Mong. BIT]. 
238. U.S.-Mong. BIT, supra note 237, art. X. 
239. See id. art. XII. 
240. See WÖRTERBUCH DER POLIZEI [DICTIONARY OF POLICE TERMINOLOGY] 1115 (s.v. 
“Öffentliche Ordnung und Sicherheit”) (Martin H. W. Möllers ed., 2001). 
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community.241 The concept of “public order” thus defined has been 
criticized for its lack of objectively identifiable standards, susceptibility 
to ideological abuse, and disconnect from the requirements of democ-
racy and the rule of law.242 Nonetheless, it continues to be accepted by 
German courts as a residual legal category.243 Because most areas of life 
today are regulated in some way by positive law, the practical relevance 
of the “public order” concept has receded.244 Yet, the use of the term in 
Germany’s NPM clauses suggests a broad exception to the substantive 
protections of a BIT and a considerable risk-shifting from states to in-
vestors in exceptional situations that implicate public order. 
This brief juxtaposition shows that the terms used to identify permis-
sible objectives, and particularly the “public order” objective, cannot 
simply be assumed to have identical meanings, even if they are lexically 
identical.245 Such concepts tend to be deeply rooted in and infused with 
meaning by predominantly domestic legal and political practices. While 
directly importing domestic meanings246 without explicit reference to 
                                                          
241. As the Federal Constitutional Court had noted in the Brokdorf case, “‘[p]ublic order’ re-
fers to the entirety of unwritten rules the compliance with which, according to prevailing social 
and ethical views, is deemed indispensable for orderly human cohabitation within a particular 
geographic region.” Brokdorf Judgment, supra note 204, at 352 (author’s translation). This defi-
nition traces back to jurisprudence by the Prussian Higher Administrative Court. See Women’s 
Boxing Competitions, 91 PrOVGE [DECISIONS OF THE PRUSSIAN HIGHER ADMINISTRATIVE 
COURT] 139, 140 (Nov. 9, 1933). 
242. See PIEROTH, SCHLINK & KNIESEL, supra note 203, at 138–40. 
243. Id. at 141. 
244. See Denninger, supra note 205, at 211–14. An example in which the Federal Constitu-
tional Court relied on the “public order” concept concerned the prohibition of a rally by right–
wing extremists on Holocaust Memorial Day, with the Court arguing that such a rally would vio-
late “fundamental social or ethical views” that infused that day with broadly shared symbolic 
value and meaning. See id. at 212 n.21 Another example is the prohibition of peep shows which 
had been justified on the basis of public order considerations. See Bundesverwaltungsgericht 
[Federal Administrative Court],  Dec. 15, 1981, 64 BVERWGE 274. 
245. Indian practice offers yet another definition of public order where it has been defined as  
the even tempo of the life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a 
specified locality. Disturbance of public order is to be distinguished from acts directed 
against individuals which do not disturb the society to the extent of causing a general 
disturbance of public tranquility…. [Such disturbances] affect the even tempo of life and 
public order is jeopardized because the repercussions of the act embrace large sections 
of the community and incite them to make further breaches of the law and order.  
Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1228, 1229–30 (India). Subsequent judi-
cial interpretations and applications of “public order” have been equally broad. See Derek P. 
Jinks, The Anatomy of an Institutionalized Emergency: Preventive Detention and Personal Lib-
erty in India, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 311, 330–31 (2001). 
246. See CHRISTOPH VON REYHER, DIE BILATERALEN KONZEPTE DER BUNDESREPUBLIK 
DEUTSCHLAND UND DER VEREINIGTEN STAATEN VON AMERIKA SOWIE DEREN BEDEUTUNG FÜR 
DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES SCHUTZES VON AUSLANDSINVESTITIONEN [THE BILATERAL CONCEPTS 
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THEIR 
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such a procedure in the treaty instrument247 may be inappropriate, inter-
national dispute settlers faced with incongruent meanings across the 
treaty’s authentic texts will have to resort to the applicable rules of 
treaty interpretation dealing with plurilingual agreements248 in order to 
establish the meaning that is to prevail at the international level.249 In so 
doing, they may well need to consider, as an auxiliary means, the state 
parties’ domestic understandings of the “public order” term in question. 
d. Public Health 
The public health term of NPM clauses raises perhaps the fewest in-
terpretative ambiguities and clearly shifts the risk of state action to in-
vestors in the case of exceptional actions taken to protect public health. 
What distinguishes public health from most of the other permissible ob-
jectives is that the existence of threats is far more susceptible to objec-
tive scientific proof than, for example, the more subjective threats to a 
nation’s security. As a consequence, the major question is what scien-
tific standards have to be met in order for a phenomenon to qualify as a 
threat to public health sufficient to trigger an NPM. There may be some 
easy cases, such as an outbreak of human-to-human transmitted bird flu. 
Other cases, for example, those involving assessments of whether cer-
tain products are sufficiently carcinogenic, may be less clear.250 
The case law of the WTO/GATT regime may suggest a possible 
emerging international consensus on the level of threat necessary to jus-
tify public health actions. Article XX(b) of the GATT permits states, 
                                                                                                                                      
SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS] 
136 (2005) (arguing for the direct reliance on domestic meanings); see also Seidl-Hohenveldern, 
supra note 225. 
247. Peru, for example, has explicitly provided for such an approach. See, e.g., Peru-Paraguay 
BIT, supra note 38, art. 11(2) (“[t]oda expresión que no esté definida en el presente Convenio 
tendrá el sentido utilizado en la legislación vigente en cada Parte Contratante”). 
248. See Vienna Convention, supra note 65, art. 33. 
249. See generally Dinah Shelton, Reconcilable Differences? The Interpretation of Multilin-
gual Treaties, 20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 611 (1997). 
250. In the asbestos cases before the World Trade Organization, for example, there was 
agreement among the parties that asbestos as such was toxic, but Canada and the EC differed with 
respect to the question of whether a specific variant of asbestos—chrysotile asbestos fibres—
posed a health risk even under conditions of “controlled use” and thus needed to be banned as 
well. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and As-
bestos–Containing Products, ¶¶ 16, 27, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001). While the panel had 
upheld the ban on the basis of the public health exception in Art. XX (b), see Panel Report, Euro-
pean Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos–Containing Products, ¶¶ 222–23, 
WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000), the Appellate Body did not reach that exception by deciding that 
there was no breach of the relevant Article III(4) of GATT to begin with. 
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subject to the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX,251 to adopt 
and enforce measures otherwise inconsistent with the GATT’s substan-
tive provisions if “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health.”252 The standards for the use of such measures have been elabo-
rated to some extent in the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement).253 Article 2(2) of the SPS Agreement con-
tains the basic standards clause which stipulates that “[m]embers shall 
ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the 
extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is 
based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient 
scientific evidence, except as provided for in paragraph 7 of Arti-
cle 5.”254 Article 3(1) obligates WTO members to base such measures 
on “international standards, guidelines or recommendations,” where 
available. If they do so, their measures are presumed to be in accordance 
with the GATT. Higher standards than those found internationally are 
permissible if they are scientifically justified on the basis of an appro-
priate “risk assessment” undertaken pursuant to Article 5.255 
In several cases brought before it, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB) addressed the specific requirements flowing from the SPS 
Agreement and made three important determinations256 relevant to the 
                                                          
251. The chapeau of Article XX provides that measures undertaken in pursuit of the excep-
tions therein are “[s]ubject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.” GATT, supra 
note 174, art. XX. 
252. Id. art. XX(b). 
253. See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, pmbl., Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement], available at 
http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm (stating that the WTO members desire 
“to elaborate rules for the application of the provisions of GATT 1994 which relate to the use of 
sanitary or phytosanitary measures, in particular the provisions of Article XX(b)”); see also id. 
art. 2(4) (“Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to the relevant provisions of this 
Agreement shall be presumed to be in accordance with the obligations of the Members under the 
provisions of GATT 1994 which relate to the use of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, in par-
ticular the provisions of Article XX(b).”). 
254. Id. art. 2(2). Article 5(7) permits provisional measures under the “precautionary princi-
ple” in cases in which sufficient scientific evidence is lacking. 
255. Id. art. 3(3). 
256. For an article-by-article analysis of the SPS Agreement’s provisions as interpreted by the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body, see WTO Analytical Index: Dispute Settlement Understanding, 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/sps_e.htm; see also Joost Pauwe-
lyn, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures as Applied in the First 
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interpretation of NPM clauses. First, the Appellate Body affirmed that 
the appropriate standard of review at the dispute settlement stage re-
quired an “objective assessment of the facts” in accordance with Article 
11 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, rather than complete 
deference to determinations made by the state invoking its right to adopt 
SPS measures.257 Second, as regards the requirement that such measures 
must not be adopted without sufficient scientific evidence, the Appellate 
Body required that “there be a rational or objective relationship between 
the SPS measure and the scientific evidence.”258 Third, such “risk as-
sessments” and the SPS measures adopted based on them need not nec-
essarily reflect majority views within the relevant scientific community, 
but can be based on minority views coming from respected sources, as 
long as they are reasonable and the rational link between risk assess-
ment and measures taken is preserved.259 
The standards developed by the WTO—that measures be based on 
scientific evidence (or appropriate risk assessments) and that there be a 
rational link between that evidence (or risk assessment) and the measure 
claimed to have been adopted on the basis of it—seems to reflect both 
the ordinary understanding of public health and the likely bargain states 
would have struck between the protection of investment and the protec-
tion of the health of their citizens. The WTO standard suggests that, 
where states take measures to protect public health that are rationally 
related to respected scientific evidence, the risks and costs of such ac-
tions under a BIT shift from the state to investors. 
                                                                                                                                      
Three SPS Disputes: EC-Hormones, Australia-Salmon and Japan-Varietals, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
641 (1999). 
257. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities–Measures Concerning Meat and 
Meat Products (Hormones), ¶¶ 116–19, WT/DS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) 
[hereinafter EC Hormones Case]. 
258.  Appellate Body Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, ¶ 84, 
WT/DS76/AB/R (Feb. 22, 1999) (“Whether there is a rational relationship between an SPS meas-
ure and the scientific evidence is to be determined on a case-by-case basis and will depend upon 
the particular circumstances of the case, including the characteristics of the measure at issue and 
the quality and quantity of the scientific evidence.”). This “rational relationship” requirement also 
applies to measures adopted on the basis of “risk assessments” conducted pursuant to Article 5 of 
the SPS Agreement. See EC Hormones Case, supra note 257, ¶ 193. 
259. See EC Hormones Case, supra note 257, ¶ 194; see also Appellate Body Report, Euro-
pean Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 178, 
WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001). 
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e. Public Morality 
In contrast with the public health objective, public morality is a 
highly relational concept.260 Public morality derives meaning from the 
predominant moral values shared by (usually) the majority in a given 
polity. As a legal concept it is aimed at regulating the conduct of mem-
bers of that polity on the basis that they are deemed morally wrong.261 
The inherent relativity of the “public morality” term in a BIT may ne-
cessitate granting states broad freedom of action in pursuit of this objec-
tive in order to give effect to the bargain behind BITs containing this 
term. Though some political and social communities may have common 
understandings of public morality, even within the comparatively ho-
mogenous European Union, significant divides have emerged. It would 
clearly do injustice to the concept if a tribunal were to try to squeeze the 
public morality notions prevailing in, say, Germany and Pakistan, into a 
uniform meaning of the term in interpreting the relevant NPM exception 
in the Germany-Pakistan BIT of 1959.262 
In the European context, both the ECtHR and the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) have addressed questions of public morality. Their general 
approach has been to give considerable deference to determinations by 
national authorities that certain measures were necessary to protect a 
community’s moral values. This approach was taken by the ECtHR in 
the Handyside judgment, which concerned permissible restrictions on 
freedom of expression based on considerations of morality under the 
ECHR:263 
[I]t is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Con-
tracting States a uniform European conception of morals. The 
view taken by their respective laws of the requirements of morals 
varies from time to time and from place to place, especially in 
our era which is characterized by a rapid and far-reaching evolu-
tion of opinions on the subject. By reason of their direct and con-
tinuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, State au-
                                                          
260. See Jeremy C. Marwell, Trade and Morality: The WTO Public Morals Exception After 
Gambling, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 815 (2006) (noting that “[w]hat one society defines as public 
morals may have little relevance for another, at least outside a certain core of religious or cultural 
traditions”). 
261. See Christopher Wolfe, Public Morality and the Modern Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. 
JURISPRUDENCE 65, 65–66 (2000); see also Francesco Francioni, International Law as a Com-
mon Language for National Courts, 36 TEX. INT’L L.J. 587, 595–96 (2001) (arguing for the exis-
tence of an independent international concept of “public morality”). 
262. Germany-Pakistan BIT, supra note 24, Protocol, ¶ 2. 
263. ECHR, supra note 34, art. 10(2). 
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thorities are in principle in a better position than the international 
judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these require-
ments as well as on the “necessity” of a “restriction” or “penalty” 
intended to meet them.264 
The ECJ has adopted a similar line of reasoning, affirming that it was 
first and foremost a prerogative of each member state to fill out, within 
its jurisdiction, the meaning of “public morality.”265 In another case 
dealing with the question of whether legal abortions could be considered 
a “service” for purposes of EC law (and thus be regulated by it), the 
ECJ noted that it was in no position to replace a member state’s moral 
judgment with its own,266 and affirmed that they could legitimately re-
strict the procedure.267  
The GATT also contains a “public morality” exception,268 but cases 
involving the exception have only arisen recently269 and are based on a 
similarly worded exception in the General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices (GATS).270 Conceiving of “public morality” as comprising “stan-
dards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a com-
munity or nation,”271 the panel found the prohibition of the remote 
                                                          
264. Handyside, supra note 168, at 22 (¶ 48); see also Müller and Others v. Switzerland, 133 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 22 (¶ 35) (1988). 
265. See Case 34/79, Regina v. Henn and Darby, 1979 E.C.R. 3795, 3813; Case 121/85, 
Conegate Ltd. v. H. M. Customs and Excise, 1986 E.C.R. 1007, ¶ 14. For discussion of Henn and 
Darby, see Joseph H. H. Weiler, Europornography—First Reference of the House of Lords to the 
European Court of Justice, 44 MODERN L. REV. 91 (1981). 
266. See Case C-159/90, Society for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. v. 
Stephen Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. I-4685, I-4739. 
267. Id. ¶ 21. The case is discussed in David O’Connor, Note, Limiting “Public Morality” 
Exceptions to Free Movement in Europe: Ireland’s Role in a Changing European Union, 22 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 695 (1997). 
268. See GATT, supra note 174, art. XX(a). For general treatments, see CHRISTOPH 
FEDDERSEN, DER ORDRE PUBLIC IN DER WTO: AUSLEGUNG UND BEDEUTUNG DES ART. XX(A) 
GATT IM RAHMEN DER WTO-STREITBEILEGUNG [ORDRE PUBLIC AT THE WTO: 
INTERPRETATION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ART. XX(A) GATT IN THE CONTEXT OF WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT] (2002); Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 
689 (1998).  
269. Morality concerns had been addressed in pleadings in at least two cases under the old 
GATT. See Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on the Import of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1598, 1611  
(Australia arguing that art. XX(a) could justify measures against the inhuman treatment of ani-
mals and that “a panel could not judge the morals of the party taking the measure”); Panel Report, 
United States-Restrictions on the Import of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 842, 870 (the Netherlands and the 
EEC commenting in the context of art. XX(a) that “public morality [was] an issue which was 
normally strongly determined by specific religious and cultural traditions”). Neither of the two 
reports was officially adopted. 
270. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex 1B, art. XIV(a), Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167. 
271. Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling 
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provision of gambling services—the service at stake in the dispute—to 
generally fall within the public morality objective,272 a conclusion af-
firmed by the Appellate Body.273 Both the Panel and Appellate Body ul-
timately decided against the United States on other grounds, but they 
generally accepted the clearly stated domestic determinations that a 
measure served the purpose of protecting public morals. 
The collective approach of the ECtHR, the ECJ, and the WTO may 
represent an emerging standard for the interpretation of public morality, 
namely, that a state invoking the public morality exception would need 
to adduce evidence that the adopted measures reflect or respond to pre-
vailing moral views within its own polity and indeed are intended to 
protect them. Applying this standard to the public morality objective in 
NPM clauses would preserve for states considerable flexibility to re-
spond to exceptional situations that implicate public morality. Such an 
approach is likely the only way to reconcile the competing conceptions 
of public morals. The deferential interpretation accorded to the term 
likewise indicates a considerable risk transfer from states to investors 
under a BIT containing this term.  
The inherently relative definitions of terms such as public order or 
public morals also raise the broader question as to whether there can 
ever be a uniform international jurisprudence as to the meaning of cul-
turally relative terms. It is, of course, always possible for states to pro-
vide precise meanings for such terms through definitions in a treaty. 
Where they do not do so, however, ascribing one state’s or one culture’s 
understanding of such terms to another would be inappropriate. The re-
sult may well be asymmetric treaty obligations in that the two states 
party to a BIT may have very different understandings of, for example, 
a public morality provision. Yet, in such a case, both states have agreed 
that public order or public morality can justify actions that would oth-
erwise breach the treaty and have at least implicitly accepted that its 
treaty partner may understand public order differently. 
f. Situations of Extreme Emergency 
Many Indian BITs include a permissible objective of actions taken 
“in circumstances of extreme emergency.”274 Assessing the meaning of 
                                                                                                                                      
and Betting Services, ¶ 6.465, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004). 
272. Id. ¶ 6.474. 
273. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross–Border Sup-
ply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 299, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) . 
274. See Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, India-Switz., art. 11(2), 
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an extreme emergency in the practice of India and its treaty partners is 
difficult as there is no case law or scholarly commentary from India on 
the clause, nor are there available drafting materials from the Indian 
government. In one case, the Indian Supreme Court considered the in-
terpretation of Article 12 of the 1965 Convention on Transit Trade of 
Land-locked States,275 which also provides for exceptions in times of 
emergency.276 While the Court noted that Article 12 provides some lee-
way to states, it did not offer any clear standards for determining 
whether a particular situation constitutes an “extreme emergency.” 
On its face, the clause appears to be relatively broad in scope—
covering all kinds of emergencies, but would presumably have a rela-
tively high threshold for invocation—the emergency must be extreme. 
Some evidence from Indian domestic practice provides insight into the 
likely intent of Indian treaty drafters. One potential reading of the clause 
based on Indian practice would construe it as a reference to a formal 
state of emergency.277 Under the Indian Constitution, a state of emer-
gency refers to a period of governance under an altered constitutional 
structure that can be proclaimed by the president in the face of grave 
threats to the nation from internal and external sources or from financial 
situations of crisis.278 
                                                                                                                                      
Apr. 4, 1997 [hereinafter India-Switzerland BIT], available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/switzerland_india.pdf. 
275. See Gramophone Co. of India Ltd. v. Birendra Bahadur Pandey and Ors, A.I.R. 1984 
S.C. 667 (India). 
276. Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States art. 12, June 9, 1967, 597 U.N.T.S. 
8641 (“Exceptions in case of emergency: The measures of a general or particular character which 
a Contracting State is obliged to take in case of an emergency endangering its political existence 
or its safety may, in exceptional cases and for as short a period as possible, involve a deviation 
from the provisions of this Convention on the understanding that the principle of freedom of tran-
sit shall be observed to the utmost possible extent during such a period.”). 
277. On states of emergency in Indian constitutional law, see SHIVRAJ B. NAKADE, 
EMERGENCY IN INDIAN CONSTITUTION (1990). 
278. See INDIA CONST. art. 352(1) (“If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists 
whereby the security of India or any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or 
external aggression or armed rebellion, he may, by Proclamation, make a declaration to that effect 
in respect of the whole of India or of such part of the territory thereof....”). India has declared 
such a state of emergency on at least three occasions. Between October 26, 1962, and January 10, 
1968, during the India-China war, the security of India was determined to be threatened by exter-
nal aggression and a state of emergency declared. A second state of emergency was declared in 
December 1971 during the India-Pakistan war, and a third state of emergency was declared be-
tween June 1975 and March 1977 based on threats from internal disturbances. IMTIAZ OMAR, 
EMERGENCY POWERS AND THE COURTS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN 7 (2002). With respect to fi-
nancial crises, see INDIA CONST. art. 360 (providing for the declaration of emergency in financial 
crises). 
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Whether the extreme emergency clause in Indian BITs applies only 
to states of emergency or some broader set of circumstances is unclear. 
Indian law also provides for a number of lesser forms of emergency. For 
example, Article 356 of the Indian Constitution allows the president to 
assume powers generally reserved to states in situations of emergency 
where there has been a failure of a state government.279 This approach is 
also suggested by the findings of a government commission established 
to examine federalism in India.280 The commission found that there has 
been “no uniformity of approach” to the declaration of an emergency 
but that such provisions were particularly important in India due to 
“multitudinous people, with possibly divided loyalties.”281 In a recent 
case, the Indian Supreme Court has considered the Commission’s report 
and noted that the “[t]he common thread in all the emergency provisions 
is that the resort to such provision has to be in exceptional circum-
stances when there be the real and grave situation calling for the drastic 
action.”282 This standard—based on exceptional circumstances and a 
grave threat—though originally developed in relation to Indian Consti-
tutional practice, appears to be the best available articulation of the 
minimum threshold for invoking the extreme emergency NPM provi-
sion in Indian BIT agreements. 
VI. REVIEWING THE INVOCATION OF NPM PROVISIONS: THE SCOPE 
OF DEFERENCE AND THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION 
Ultimately, the crucial question underlying the preceding discussions 
of the nexus requirement and the various permissible objectives of BITs 
is how much deference ought an arbitral tribunal pay to the respondent 
state’s initial determination that a particular measure at issue falls within 
the NPM clause? Generally, NPM clauses will only become relevant 
when a state decides to invoke such a clause in response to asserted or 
potential treaty violations. The question, then, is whether that initial de-
termination is subject to full substantive and conclusive review by arbi-
tral tribunals charged with settling a dispute, or if assertions by national 
                                                          
279. INDIA CONST. art. 356. For a judicial interpretation of the article, see S. R. Bommai v. 
Union of India, (1994) 3 S.C.C. 1. 
280. See GOV’T OF INDIA, COMM’N ON CENTRE-STATE RELATIONS, REPORT (1987–88), §§ 
4.2, 4.3 (finding that emergency clauses should only be invoked in exceptional circumstances 
when there is a real and grave situation calling for drastic action). 
281. Id. at ch. VII. 
282. Rameshwar Prasad and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. (Jan. 24, 2006), 2005 [Sup. Ct. 
India] 20. 
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authorities that a state action was covered by an NPM clause deserve 
some degree of deference, with the result that tribunals will undertake 
something less than full substantive review? 
This is, in fact, a specific application of a more general question of 
international law, namely, the international relevance of a party’s do-
mestic determinations. The basic rule, of course, is that domestic deter-
minations based on internal law that an act is not wrongful or otherwise 
excused cannot be adduced as proper justification for the non-
performance of international legal obligations.283 Should such domestic 
determinations of the applicability of an NPM clause therefore simply 
be ignored or might they have some—even if limited—relevance for a 
tribunal’s interpretation? Such relevance must indeed be affirmed where 
the treaty instrument in question itself provides for the relevance of do-
mestic determinations, which is the case with many NPM clauses. As 
the ILC has pointed out, the basic rule of the irrelevance of domestic de-
terminations may be modified by way of relevant primary rules,284 and 
states can and do provide in their treaties for different levels of defer-
ence to their own domestic determinations.285 Many BIT NPM clauses 
do accord to states greater deference for their own domestic determina-
tions than would ordinarily be available. 
In this section, we make two main arguments. First, we argue that the 
absence of an explicit specification of the level of deference to be ac-
corded to an invocation of a BIT’s NPM clause does not mean that 
every decision taken by national authorities in pursuit of one or more 
permissible objectives should be second-guessed by an arbitral tribunal, 
with the consequence that the tribunal would substitute its own view as 
to whether the actions in question further a permissible objective and 
meet the nexus requirements. Rather, certain treaty clauses and terms 
imply through their textual formulation some deference to state deter-
minations, so that it is appropriate, both as a matter of treaty interpreta-
tion and judicial policy, to read NPM clauses as incorporating a “margin 
of appreciation” that grants states some latitude to make initial determi-
nations as to whether their actions are covered by an NPM clause. The 
function of a tribunal, then, ought to be the determination of the permis-
sible and legitimate boundaries of the margin of appreciation that arises 
from the terms of an NPM clause. We argue that the jurisprudential 
                                                          
283. See Vienna Convention, supra note 65, art. 27; ILC Draft Articles, supra note 54, arts. 3, 
32. 
284. See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 54, art. 32(2). 
285. See id. art 3. 
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practice of the European Court of Human Rights provides useful guid-
ance in how to operationalize such analysis and review.286 
Second, we argue that even when states make NPM clauses explicitly 
self-judging, such as the United States has done, this does not entirely 
remove their invocation from review by an arbitral tribunal. Rather, 
what a self-judging clause indicates is that the state invoking the clause 
is to have a very wide margin of appreciation as to whether a measure is 
necessary to protect one of the permissible objectives. Such a margin, 
even if very wide, still has outer limits and we suggest that these limits 
are found in the general principle of performance of treaty obligations in 
good faith, as required by Article 26 of the Vienna Convention.287 We 
discuss both types of NPM clauses—those that are silent as to the de-
gree of deference to be accorded and those that are self-judging—in 
turn. 
The determination of the applicable degree of deference in a tribu-
nal’s analysis is perhaps the single most important factor governing the 
risk allocation between states and investors under a BIT. While the 
nexus requirement and the scope of permissible objectives set the legal 
contours of the NPM clause, the applicable standard of review deter-
mines what deference will be accorded to a state’s own determination 
that an NPM clause applies to a given situation. The greater the defer-
ence given to a state’s own invocation of an NPM clause, the more the 
clause will serve to shift the risks and costs of exceptional state action 
from host states to investors since tribunals will have less room to in-
validate the state’s invocation. 
A. Non-Self-Judging NPM Clauses: The Applicability of the 
Margin of Appreciation 
When treaty partners do not specify—either explicitly in the text or 
implicitly through the context and drafting materials of a treaty—the 
degree of deference to be accorded to their invocation of an NPM 
clause, arbitrators must determine what deference to give to a state’s de-
termination. In such cases, arbitrators will have to deduce the appropri-
ate deference from the treaty’s language, subsequent practice in inter-
                                                          
286. In this Article, we merely outline the relevance and appropriateness of a “margin” ap-
proach in the context of BITs and NPM clauses. In a forthcoming piece to be published in early 
2008, we will discuss in greater depth the legal and normative justifications for such an approach 
and defend it against criticisms that have been levied against margins of appreciation in other 
contexts. 
287. “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in 
good faith.” Vienna Convention, supra note 65, art. 26 (emphasis added). 
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preting and applying the treaty, its context and drafting materials. The 
fact that a BIT is textually silent on the issue of deference does not, 
however, automatically translate into a presumption in favor of full re-
view to the extent that arbitrators may fully replace a state’s assessment 
of a situation and the measures necessary to remedy it with their own. 
The permissible objectives of a BIT or language employed in defining 
the nexus requirement may indicate or even necessitate a lower standard 
of review that gives greater deference to a state’s own invocation of an 
NPM clause. In such cases, the margin of appreciation, employed in 
similar circumstances by the European Court of Human Rights, offers a 
useful interpretive approach for reviewing sate behavior. We offer three 
distinct justifications for the use of the margin of appreciation in re-
viewing state behavior pursuant to particular BIT terms, such as NPM 
clauses: textual, jurisprudential, and practical. 
Where the text of the treaty provision in question, explicitly or im-
plicitly, suggests some deference to a state’s own determination, it be-
comes appropriate to utilize an interpretive standard such as the margin 
of appreciation to give more deference to state policy determinations 
than would ordinarily be available. A treaty provision may, of course, 
explicitly indicate the level of deference to be provided, as is the case 
with expressly self-judging NPM clauses discussed below. Yet, even 
without an express reference to a standard of review, the treaty language 
may indicate the appropriateness of some deference to state determina-
tions. 
The very ambiguity and lack of a shared standard inherent in many of 
the NPM terms suggest that some deference be given to a state’s own 
determination that the NPM clause is applicable. This is especially true 
with respect to those permissible objectives, such as essential security or 
public morality, which depend upon a particular domestic determina-
tion. As Hersch Lauterpacht recognized, it is “doubtful whether any tri-
bunal acting judicially can override the assertion of a state that a dispute 
affects its security.”288 It is difficult to subject highly policy-relevant 
terms like public order, health and morality, or essential security inter-
ests, to judicial evaluation by an ad hoc tribunal in the same way as 
other, more technical legal terms, such as “most-favored-nation” treat-
ment. Nor does it seem likely that the provisions of BITs were, at least 
in some cases, intended to authorize a third-party dispute settler to en-
gage in such review. 
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With respect to the objective of public morality, for example, the 
deeply subjective nature of the concept makes it difficult for a tribunal 
to second-guess a state’s invocation of the clause. Can an arbitral tribu-
nal reasonably access the meaning of public morality in Germany or the 
United States, much less in Pakistan or Bahrain? In such cases, giving 
deference to state determinations may be the only way to reconcile two 
competing domestic understandings of a particular treaty term or con-
cept. It seems quite implausible to assume that states, by concluding a 
BIT with an NPM clause, delegated the authority to conclusively deter-
mine whether their security, public morals or other permissible objec-
tives had been threatened to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal set up to deal 
with investment disputes. But if such a delegation was not intended, 
then the only interpretation of the relevant terms that faithfully gives ef-
fect to the actual bargain struck by the states parties is one that ac-
knowledges a degree of deference on the part of the arbitral tribunal to 
determinations made by domestic authorities relating to national secu-
rity, public order and other subjective permissible objectives covered by 
an NPM clause. 
Granting some degree of deference to a state’s own invocation of 
NPM clauses is also appropriate as a matter of judicial policy. Although 
the ICSID system was established to deal specifically with investment 
disputes, ICSID tribunals have, to an ever greater degree, faced ques-
tions of a quasi-constitutional nature, such as the legally permissible re-
sponses to a massive economic collapse or the definition of public mo-
rality. Yet, ICSID tribunals are ad hoc tribunals established pursuant to 
the ICSID Convention to resolve investment disputes. They are not 
courts of appeal of any particular state and the members of an ICSID 
panel are often very distant, physically, politically, culturally, and so-
cially, from the particular state or circumstances in question. They often 
lack the fact-finding capacity to fully appreciate the context of govern-
ment policies. Without the kind of deep connection to the state, society, 
and community impacted by the dispute, such ad hoc panels are poorly 
positioned to engage in full substantive review of critical state policies 
that reach beyond pure investment law. Such tribunals are, therefore, ill 
positioned to undertake substantive review that essentially second-
guesses core governmental policy. Hence, from a jurisprudential per-
spective, the more a particular dispute implicates questions of a quasi-
constitutional nature and the more disconnected the tribunal from the 
particular societies impacted, the more appropriate it becomes for the 
tribunal to utilize an interpretive approach such as the margin of appre-
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ciation, that gives some deference to the first-order determinations of 
government policy by the state itself. 
In contrast to the poor positioning of ICSID tribunals to undertake 
first-order review of quasi-constitutional issues, ad hoc tribunals are in a 
far better position to determine whether the policies chosen by a gov-
ernment are within the margin of appreciation suggested by the terms of 
a particular NPM clause. The European Court of Human Rights has al-
ready developed an extensive jurisprudence on ascertaining the appro-
priate margin of appreciation to apply given the terms of a particular 
treaty provision. Ad hoc tribunals can relatively easily determine the ap-
propriate margin of appreciation to be accorded under a treaty clause, 
either on their own or by drawing on the approaches of the ECtHR. It is 
both far easier and far more appropriate for such a tribunal to determine 
whether a state’s particular policy response falls within a relatively 
well-defined margin of appreciation than it is for the tribunal to second-
guess that state’s particular policy choices. 
Finally, as a practical matter, the use of an interpretive approach such 
as the margin of appreciation may help preserve the legitimacy of the 
ICSID system. As ICSID tribunals have come to review issues of great 
national significance and of a quasi-constitutional nature, often award-
ing extraordinary sums to investors, the legitimacy of the ICSID system 
has been called into question.289 Operationalizing the margin of appre-
ciation in investment arbitration would help preserve the legitimacy of 
ICSID panels by defining their supervisory function, while preserving 
the primary responsibility of states to develop policy responses within 
their legal obligations in extreme situations. 
Such “margins of appreciation” granted to domestic authorities are 
well known from other areas of international law290 and especially from 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR,291 where the margin doctrine has be-
                                                          
289. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration 
and the Rule of Law, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 337 (2007); Franck, supra 
note 32; Susan D. Franck, ICSID Institutional Reform: The Evolution of Dispute Resolution and 
the Role of Structural Safeguards, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL REFORM: PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE HAGUE JOINT CONFERENCE ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 268 
(Agata Fijalkowsi ed., 2007).  
290. For the most recent discussion of margins of appreciation, see Yuval Shany, Toward a 
General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2005). 
291. See id., at 926–27. The literature on the margin of appreciation has become quite volu-
minous; among general treatments, see, for example, YUTAKA ARAI–TAKAHASHI, THE MARGIN 
OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE 
OF THE ECHR (2002); STEVEN GREER, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION: INTERPRETATION AND 
DISCRETION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2000); HOWARD 
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come an important device to balance domestic treaty execution with in-
ternational supervision. Although it has featured most prominently in 
the human rights area, the “margin of appreciation” as a tool of judicial 
deference and self-restraint is not restricted in its application to any spe-
cific subject area of the law. The margin doctrine simply acknowledges 
the fact that in many legally regulated areas of human activity there will 
often be a range of actions and behaviors that satisfy the requirements of 
an applicable international legal obligation, and that first and foremost, 
it is for the domestic authorities to decide which one to adopt.292 
The development of such a margin in the specific context of the NPM 
exceptions discussed here would recognize that a situation covered by 
one of the NPM permissible objectives may be subject to a spectrum of 
assessments, several of which may rise to the level of legitimately trig-
gering the NPM exception, and that a range of possible responses may 
be developed by states to deal with such situations. Both because the 
state may be better positioned to assess the situation and possible policy 
responses and due to the uncertainties that often affect the policy-
making space, the development of a margin of appreciation in NPM as-
sessments would allow tribunals to engage in a substantive review while 
preserving for states some of the freedom of action they sought through 
the inclusion of an NPM clause.293 The principal task for a tribunal ad-
judicating claims involving a non-self-judging NPM clause would then 
be to determine the appropriate boundaries of the margin of appreciation 
and, hence, respondent state’s freedom of action. In the ECtHR’s juris-
prudence, states do not possess “an unlimited power of appreciation”; 
                                                                                                                                      
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (1996); Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, 
Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843 (1999); Jeffrey Brauch, 
The Margin of Appreciation and the European Court of Human Rights: A Threat to the Rule of 
Law, 11 COLUM. J. INT’L L. 113 (2005); Howard Charles Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence, 3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 111, 
118 (1987). 
292. See, e.g., Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) 22 (1990) (Martens, J., 
dissenting) (remarking that states possess a margin of appreciation not “as a matter of right, but as 
a matter of judicial self–restraint”); Ronald St. John, The Margin of Appreciation, in THE 
EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 83, 123 (Ronald St. John Mac-
donald, Franz Matscher & Herbert Petzold eds., 1993) (noting that the margin of appreciation 
doctrine serves to balance the Court’s and member states’ respective spheres of authority); Paul 
Mahoney, Marvellous Richness of Diversity or Invidious Cultural Relativism?, 19 HUM. RTS. L.J. 
1, 4 (1989) (noting that the doctrine is seen by some commentators as an “auto-limitation by the 
Court of its own powers”). 
293. As the ECtHR had put it in the seminal Handyside judgment, “it is in no way the Court’s 
task to take the place of the competent national [authorities] but rather to review [under the appli-
cable Convention article] the decisions they delivered in the exercise of their power of apprecia-
tion.” Handyside, supra note 168, at 23 (¶ 50). 
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rather, a domestic margin “goes hand in hand” with international “su-
pervision,” and such supervision “concerns both the aim of the measure 
challenged and its ‘necessity.’”294 
As in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence,295 the margin of appreciation given 
to a state would vary in breadth, based on the character of the permissi-
ble objectives asserted and the level of state interference with investor 
rights. Deference would, presumably, be smallest with regard to situa-
tions in which objective standards are available for assessing the per-
missible objective and required nexus and would be largest where ob-
jective standards are lacking, or where meanings and standards differ 
considerably between treaty parties.296 Applied to the permissible objec-
tives discussed here, deference would have to be highest with respect to 
issues of “public morality,” lowest in the area most susceptible to scien-
tifically validated evidence, such as “public health,” and somewhere in 
between intermediate as concerns threats to “security.” The result of the 
development of such a margin of appreciation would be to recognize 
fully the bargain inherent in BITs with NPM provisions by preserving 
some freedom of action for states in extraordinary circumstances and to 
give arbitral tribunals a highly tractable approach to analyzing state ac-
tions under NPM clauses without the need to fully substitute a tribunal’s 
                                                          
294. Id. at 23 (¶ 49). 
295. For variation in the “width” of the margins recognized by the ECtHR, see the contribu-
tions in The Doctrine of the Margin of Appreciation Under the European Convention on Human 
Rights: Its Legitimacy in Theory and Application in Practice, 19 HUM RTS. L.J. 1 (1998) (dis-
cussing the margins of appreciation under various Convention provisions) and the literature cited 
in supra note 90. Notably, the margin of appreciation for state interference with property rights, 
as protected under Article 1 of ECHR Additional Protocol No. 1 (1952), is a relatively wide one. 
See Yves Winisdoerffer, Margin of Appreciation and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, 19 HUM RTS. L. 
J. 18 passim (1998); see also Ronald St. John Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine 
in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, in 1–2 COLLECTED COURSES OF 
THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW 95, 139–56 (Andrew Clapham & Frank Emmert eds., 1990). 
The test that the Court applies to determine whether a measure that affects property rights falls 
within the margin’s boundaries asks “whether a fair balance has been struck between the demands 
of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s 
fundamental rights.” Macdonald, supra, at 141. 
296. This gradation based on the availability of objective standards echoes the approach 
adopted by the ECtHR. See Paul Mahoney, Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint in the 
European Court of Human Rights: Two Sides of the Same Coin, 11 HUM. RTS. L.J. 57, 78–80 
(1990); Macdonald, supra note 292, at 103 (noting that “the margin of appreciation is probably 
wider in the absence of applicable European standards”). Compare Handyside, supra note 168, at 
22 (¶ 48) (noting the absence of a uniform standard of morality and that the “requirements of 
morals” are varying “from time to time and from place to place”) with Sunday Times v. United 
Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) at 36 (¶ 59) (1979) (noting the difference in the margins of 
appreciation between determining issues of public morality and questions that concern “far more 
objective notions”). 
376 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 48:2 
 
 
determination—often removed from the events and facts—for a state’s 
own analysis. 
B. Self-Judging NPM Clauses: Residual Good Faith Review 
While many BITs are silent as to the appropriate level of review to be 
undertaken by an arbitral tribunal, others, particularly those of the 
United States, may be explicitly self-judging, thus seeking to limit the 
scope of review that an arbitral tribunal can undertake. The explicitly 
self-judging NPM clauses in U.S. BITs provide that “[t]his treaty shall 
not preclude a party from applying measures which it considers neces-
sary for the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to international 
peace and security or the protection of its own essential security inter-
ests.”297 Such explicitly self-judging NPM clauses, containing the “it 
considers necessary” language or similar formulations could be read as 
an absolute bar to judicial or arbitral review. Some states have argued 
that a general principle exists in international law according to which 
disputes involving political questions impinging on a country’s vital in-
terests—such as the permissible objectives covered by BIT NPM 
clauses—are non-justiciable and exempt from review by international 
courts and tribunals.298 In the original GATT context, for example, the 
claim has been made that when a state invokes the national security ex-
ception, “a panel could not or should not be established.”299 The ration-
ale behind the non-justiciability position is the alleged absence of “judi-
cially manageable standards”300 of a legal nature for the evaluation of 
national security interests.301 Similarly, in domestic practice, a number 
of states have a political question doctrine according to which the judi-
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298. See, e.g., Nicaragua Judgment (Merits), supra note 21, at 220–36 (Oda, J., dissenting); 
id. at 285 (Schwebel, J., dissenting); THOMAS J. BODIE, POLITICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF AN 
ACTIVIST INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1995); LAUTERPACHT, supra note 288, at 6–48; 
Dapo Akande & Sope Williams, International Adjudication of Security Issues: What Role for the 
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does not directly interest the safety of the nation.” EMMERICH DE VATTEL, II THE LAW OF 
NATIONS 278 (Joseph Chitty ed., T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1858) (1758) (emphasis added). 
299. Akande & Williams, supra note 298, at 374. 
300. See C. Todd Piczak, The Helms-Burton Act: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Cuba, the Na-
tional Security Exception of the GATT and the Political Questions Doctrine, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 
287, 318–26 (1999–2000). 
301. See Akande & Williams, supra note 298, at 381–82. 
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ciary will not address explicitly political questions which must instead 
be resolved by the state’s executive or legislative authorities.302 
Three factors militate against excluding even explicitly self-judging 
BITs entirely from arbitral review. First, the stipulated principle of non-
justiciability remains ultimately an appeal to judicial discretion. States 
have again and again brought cases in international fora with national 
security implications, vitiating the general acceptance of such a position 
that would be needed for it to pass as either a general principle or as 
customary international law. Accordingly, international tribunals, in-
cluding the ICJ, ECJ, the ECtHR as well as various arbitral tribunals, 
have never recognized the political nature of a question as a legal bar to 
the exercise of their jurisdiction and have regularly pronounced on cases 
concerned with national security issues.303 
Second, even a self-judging NPM clause remains within the jurisdic-
tion of an arbitral tribunal, because states remain subject to the general 
obligation, enshrined in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention, to carry 
out their obligations “in good faith.”304 Hence even Judge Schwebel, 
who supported the United States’ interpretation of the essential security 
clause in its FNC treaty with Nicaragua, held that it would still be up to 
a tribunal to determine whether a party had invoked that clause in good 
faith.305 While the United States generally follows the self-judging 
model of NPM clauses, it appears to have come to accept a residual 
good faith requirement. As Senator Helms noted in September 2000, 
                                                          
302. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE 
OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992); TIM KOOPMANS, COURTS AND POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 98–104 (2003); THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE 
AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Nada Mourtada–Sabbah & Bruce E. Cain 
eds., 2007); Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 
1457 (2005); Jared S. Pettinato, Executing the Political Question Doctrine, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 61 
(2006); Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 441 (2004); Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: 
The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203 
(2002). 
303. See Richard B. Bilder, Judicial Procedures Relating to the Use of Force, in LAW AND 
FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 269 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David Scheffer eds., 
1983); Akande & Williams, supra note 298, at 382–83. 
304. Vienna Convention, supra note 65, art. 26. On “good faith” generally, see J. F. 
O’CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1991). For an affirmation of the relevance of 
the “good faith” standard in the specific context of self–judging NPM clauses included in BITs, 
see Vandevelde, supra note 18, at 176–81. 
305. See Nicaragua Judgment (Merits), supra note 21, at 311 (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (find-
ing that “the Treaty fails to provide a basis of jurisdiction for the Court in this case, certainly for 
the central questions posed by it, unless, at any rate, United States reliance upon Article 
XXI(1)(d) is, on its face, without basis”). 
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“the United States considers this language to be self-judging, though, in 
the words of the State Department, ‘each Party would expect the provi-
sions to be applied by the other in good faith.’”306 This more recent US 
approach suggests that even an explicitly self-judging NPM clause is 
not beyond the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal and is still subject to 
review for the state’s good faith invocation of the clause. 
A third reason for subjecting even an explicitly self-judging NPM 
clause to residual good-faith review is that such review ensures a bal-
ance between state freedom of action and investor protection. Such re-
sidual review ensures that, even when states have sought to preserve 
considerable freedom of action and transfer the risks of state action in 
extreme situations to investors, they cannot do so on mere pretext. Re-
sidual good faith review thus requires even states that have adopted ex-
plicitly self-judging NPM clauses to analyze their own invocation of the 
clause and articulate a rationale for the clause’s applicability. As a re-
sult, states are forced to internalize and apply the international legal 
standards of good faith in developing their responses to extraordinary 
situations. Where the state’s invocation of the clause cannot be justified 
in good faith, the state must bear the costs of its actions. 
If a self-judging NPM clause remains subject to a good faith review, 
a tribunal must then determine what such a residual “good faith” stan-
dard requires in practice. While good faith has long been a core princi-
ple of international law,307 a workable standard of good faith review has 
yet to be fully developed.308 Unfortunately, the paucity of case law on 
such an important legal principle means that arbitral tribunals will have 
to develop their own approaches to whether the good faith requirement 
                                                          
306. Bilateral Investment Treaties with Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bolivia, Croatia, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Jordan, Lithuania, Mozambique, Uzbekistan, and a Protocol Amending the Bilateral 
Investment Treaty with Panama: Report by the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, S. REP. NO. 106-23 (2000), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong_reports&docid=f:er023.106. The United States has, however, 
been less clear as to whether it would find that requirement subject to arbitral review. A 1998 re-
view of bilateral investment treaties by the United Nations Committee on Trade and Development 
observed: “The United States has taken the position that the determination of whether a measure 
is necessary for the protection of a country’s essential security interests is a matter exclusively 
within its competence, not subject to review by any international tribunal.” UNITED NATIONS 
COMM. ON TRADE & DEV., BITS IN THE MID-1990S, at 86 (1998). In the ICJ context, the United 
States has asserted that similar language in fact precludes any judicial review. See Military and 
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Jurisdiction and Admissibility). 
307. See Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 375(IV), Annex, art. 13, 
U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess. (Dec. 6, 1949) [hereinafter Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of 
States]. 
308. See generally JOHN O’CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1991). 
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has been met. In developing and applying such a standard, an arbitral 
tribunal will have to consider the nature of the bargain inherent in a BIT 
with a self-judging NPM clause. In essence, an arbitral tribunal will still 
utilize the margin of appreciation we suggested with respect to non-self 
judging NPM clauses. In the case of explicitly self-judging NPM 
clauses, however, tribunals will grant a particularly wide leeway that 
balances the investor protection goals of a BIT with the states parties’ 
explicit desire to determine themselves when the NPM clause is appli-
cable, subject to background rules of good faith. Drawing on the work 
of a range of scholars and international organizations, such a standard 
could be said to encompass two basic elements: first, whether the state 
has engaged in honest and fair dealing and, second, whether there is a 
rational basis for the assertion of the NPM provision. 
The “good faith” standard in treaty performance is well established. 
The 1949 Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States included 
such a standard at Article 13.309 As ILC’s commentary on the provision 
noted, it was seen as “a re-instatement of the fundamental principle 
pacta sunt servanda.”310 Perhaps the best articulation of the honesty and 
fair dealing element of the concept of good faith is contained in the 
1935 Harvard Research on the Law of Treaties, according to which 
“[t]he obligation to fulfill in good faith a treaty engagement requires 
that its stipulations be observed in their spirit as well as according to 
their letter, and that what has been promised be performed without eva-
sion or subterfuge, honestly, and to the best of the ability of the party 
which made the promise.”311 The question then is whether the state has 
acted honestly and to the best of its ability in deciding to invoke the 
NPM clause. Where evidence exists that a state uses the exception just 
as a pretext for ulterior economic motives, or where the connection be-
tween the measures taken and national security is so spurious as to 
clearly breach the good faith requirement,312 a tribunal would be compe-
tent to determine that the NPM clause was not invoked in good faith.313 
                                                          
309. “Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising from treaties 
and other sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its constitution or its 
laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty.” Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of 
States, supra note 307, art. 13. 
310. Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States with Commentaries, 1 YB. INT’L L. 
COMM’N 286, 288 (1949). 
311. Codification of International Law, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. (SUPPLEMENT) 1, 981 (1935). 
312. An illustrative example of this is provided by Sweden’s attempt in 1975 to justify import 
quotas on footwear for national security reasons under the GATT. See John A. Spanogle, Jr., Can 
Helms-Burton Be Challenged Under the WTO?, 27 STETSON L. REV. 1313, 1331 (1998). 
313. The only way to avoid even the good faith test would be to exclude the article containing 
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A state’s general conduct, the declaration of a national emergency, rele-
vant national legislation, and the transparency of the state’s decision 
making process might all be relevant in assessing this honesty and fair 
dealing requirement. In other words, reliance on a self-judging NPM 
exception would pass the honesty and fair dealing prong of the good 
faith test as long as there is no obvious and deliberate misuse of it. 
The second element of a good faith review involves a determination 
of whether there was a rational basis for the state’s invocation of the 
NPM clause. This element of the good faith test may have been best ex-
pressed by the International Whaling Commission in its evaluation of 
the good faith requirements of the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea.314 According to the Commission, good faith requires “fairness, rea-
sonableness, integrity and honesty in international behaviour.”315 The 
reasonableness requirement stressed by the Commission demands that 
the state have some rational basis for its actions. For an NPM clause to 
be invoked in good faith, the question a tribunal must ask is whether a 
reasonable person in the state’s position could have concluded that there 
was a threat to national security or public order sufficient to justify the 
measures taken. Two examples are illustrative. If a state were to invoke 
a self-judging NPM clause and claim a security threat from a possible 
alien landing, a tribunal would have to conclude there was no rational 
basis to believe such a landing was likely and hence the clause had not 
been invoked in good faith. In contrast, should an island state invoke an 
NPM clause to build sea barriers citing the potential for global warming 
to raise sea levels, notwithstanding potentially contradictory scientific 
evidence, the tribunal would have to conclude that the state had a ra-
tional basis for its determination and the self-judging NPM clause had, 
in fact, been invoked in good faith. 
A good faith standard based around these two key elements of hon-
esty and fair dealing and rational basis offers a number of important ad-
vantages to an arbitral tribunal assessing the invocation of a self-judging 
NPM clause. First, it reflects the nature of the bargain inherent in a self-
judging NPM clause, namely that a state will be able to determine for 
itself—consistent with the background norm of good faith in interna-
                                                                                                                                      
the exception from the tribunal’s terms of reference. 
314. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 300, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 
1261 (“States Parties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention and 
shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a manner 
which would not constitute an abuse of right.”). 
315. International Whaling Commission, Res. 2001-1 (2001), available at 
http://www.iwcoffice.org/meetings/resolutions/resolution2001.htm. 
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tional law—whether the provision applies. Second, it explicitly avoids a 
tribunal’s second-guessing of government policy choices for which ad 
hoc tribunals may be poorly positioned. Instead, the tribunal must re-
view the honesty and reasonableness of the state’s invocation of the 
clause, something arbitral tribunals are far better positioned to do. 
Third, it still imposes significant constraints on the freedom of states to 
take non-precluded measures by reviewing the honesty and reasonable-
ness of governmental action, thereby balancing investor protection goals 
with state freedom of action. 
C. Implicitly Self-Judging NPM Clauses? A Consideration of US 
Practice 
In adopting a policy of making such clauses self-judging, the United 
States has been largely unique among states utilizing NPM clauses. Be-
ginning in 1982, when the United States developed its first model BIT, 
the US executive and legislative branches insisted on an expansive in-
terpretation of NPM clauses in all BITs and have moved toward a more 
and more explicitly self-judging interpretation over time. The first U.S. 
BIT, signed with Panama in 1982, uses standard NPM language, but is 
not explicitly self-judging.316 Over time, the U.S. BIT program has be-
come increasingly explicit in the self-judging nature of the provisions. 
By the late 1990s, this view was stated plainly in the Model U.S. BIT’s 
NPM clause, which included the “which it considers necessary” phrase, 
making the NPM clause explicitly self-judging. 
While more recent BITs, negotiated on the basis of the later model 
treaties, are explicitly self-judging, the United States has continued to 
assert that even the earlier, not-explicitly-self-judging NPM clauses 
should, in fact, be read as self-judging and subject only to the more lim-
ited good faith review discussed above. From the perspective of an arbi-
tral tribunal, a determination of whether an NPM clause is implicitly 
self-judging will turn on whether there is evidence to suggest either that 
the parties established a special meaning for the clause or that the con-
text of the treaty and its drafting materials indicate a self-judging mean-
ing was intended by the parties. While a treaty-by-treaty analysis will be 
required to make that determination, compelling evidence in U.S. BIT 
practice indicates that even non-expressly self-judging U.S. NPM 
clauses should be treated as implicitly self-judging and subject only to 
good faith review. 
                                                          
316. See U.S.-Panama BIT, supra note 74, art. 10. 
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The catalyst for the U.S. policy of self-judging of NPM clauses was 
the Nicaragua case before the ICJ. Nicaragua based jurisdiction in part 
on the alleged violation of the U.S.-Nicaraguan Friendship, Commerce, 
and Navigation (FCN) treaty by the United States. The United States 
objected to the idea that a commercial treaty could restrict actions it 
deemed vital for the protection of its national security.317 Indeed the 
United States argued that the “essential security interests exception” in 
the FCN treaty, which is very similar to the NPM provision in various 
BITs then under negotiation, was self-judging, even though it lacked the 
“it considers necessary” language.318 The ICJ nevertheless granted ju-
risdiction over the suit and eventually found the equivalent language to 
the NPM clause in that treaty not to apply.319 Thereafter, the United 
States began taking special care to ensure that it had sufficient latitude 
within any specific BIT to take any measures it deemed necessary to 
protect its essential security interests. 
A determination of the level of deference to give to non-explicitly 
self-judging BITs must look to the context and negotiating history of the 
treaty, where available. All U.S. BITs must be presumed to follow 
whatever Model BIT is operative at the time they are negotiated, unless 
otherwise specified in a protocol or annex to the treaty. In 1988, the 
U.S. Senate considered and ratified a group of eight BITs. These treaties 
were drafted based on a then-operative model treaty discussed by the 
Senate in the ratification process. Article X of this model treaty contains 
the NPM clause. In the ratification process, the U.S. Senate attached an 
understanding to each of the treaties, according to which “[u]nder Arti-
cle X of the treaty either party may take all measures necessary to deal 
with any unusual and extraordinary threats to national security.”320 The 
Senate did not intend any change in the treaty as negotiated, however. 
On the contrary, the commentary to the model treaty states explicitly 
that the understanding merely “clarifies and highlights the importance 
of this article.”321 In the view of the U.S. Senate, the text of the NPM 
provision accorded “to the United States [the right] to take whatever 
steps deemed necessary by the President for national security reasons, 
notwithstanding any other provisions of the treaties.”322 The position of 
                                                          
317. Vandevelde, supra note 18, at 171. 
318. See Nicaragua Judgment (Merits), supra note 21, at 116. 
319. Id. at 115. 
320. S. EXEC. REP. No. 32, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 9–11 (1988). 
321. Id. at 8. 
322. Id. 
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the United States in 1988 was thus extremely clear—the President could 
take any measures he deemed necessary to protect national security. 
In addition, the U.S. Department of State released a formal policy 
statement on these treaties that specifically sought to avoid the “Nicara-
gua problem,” noting that the United States had negotiated these treaties 
“with certain assumptions about the scope of their obligations and the 
kinds of issues which they submit to compulsory arbitration, assump-
tions we believe our treaty partners share. Specifically…the United 
States Government preserves its right to protect its essential security in-
terests.”323 Even so, the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the treaty until an 
executive understanding was attached, according to which “either Party 
may take all measures necessary to deal with any unusual and extraor-
dinary threat to its national security.”324 These clarifications were de-
signed to ensure that nothing in an investment treaty would constrain 
the country’s freedom of action when security or public order issues 
were at stake. However, from the point of view of the original ideology 
underlying the United States’ drive to conclude BITs, this shift 
“weaken[ed the BIT] as an instrument for regulating host-state govern-
ments, facilitating uncompensated expropriations or other host-state im-
pairments of investment.”325 
U.S. policy-makers understood the potential consequences of their 
actions, but were prepared to take the risk of greater host country lati-
tude to impair investments as the price for guaranteeing their own rela-
tive freedom of action. In the ratification process of a set of similar BITs 
in August 1992, the Senate considered whether “the protections af-
forded investors diminished if each party can be the sole judge of its in-
terests” and concluded that, despite these risks, the provisions were “in 
the national interest.”326 As part of the materials submitted with these 
five treaties, the State Department included the U.S. Model BIT, ac-
companied by an official “description” of each article.327 The descrip-
tion of Model Article X—the NPM clause—states: 
                                                          
323. Bilateral Investment Treaties with Panama, Senegal, Haiti, Zaire, Morocco, Turkey, 
Cameroon, Bangladesh, Egypt and Grenada: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
99th Cong. (1988), quoted in Alvarez, supra note 26, at 38. 
324. S. EXEC. REP. No. 32, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., at 9–11 (1988) (Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee recommending that Senate give advice and consent to BITs with Senegal, Zaire, Mo-
rocco, Turkey, Cameroon, Bangladesh, Egypt, and Grenada). 
325. Vandevelde, supra note 18, at 170–71. 
326. August 4, 1992 Hearings, supra note 53, at 51. 
327. See United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty as of February 1992 [hereinafter 
1992 Model BIT],  in August 4, 1992 Hearings, supra note 51, at 65 (emphasis added). 
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A Party’s essential security interests include actions taken in 
times of war or national emergency, as well as other actions bear-
ing a clear and direct relationship to the essential security inter-
ests of the Party concerned. Whether these exceptions apply in a 
given situation is within each Party’s discretion. We are careful 
to note, in each negotiation, the self-judging nature of the protec-
tion of a Party’s essential security interests.328 
Once again, the United States asserted a self-judging interpretation and 
the State Department confirmed it had made this position apparent to its 
negotiating partners.329 The parties to these U.S. BITs appear to have 
shared an understanding that even a non-explicitly self-judging NPM 
clause should be interpreted as self-judging. In the BIT concluded the 
same year with the Russian Federation this shared understanding was 
explicitly noted in the Protocol attached to the main treaty text, at the 
request of the Russian negotiators.330 
The Letters of Submittal accompanying U.S. BITs submitted to the 
Senate for ratification likewise confirm the self-judging nature of U.S. 
NPM clauses. For example, the Letter of Submittal accompanying the 
1997 U.S. BIT with Azerbaijan,331 whose NPM clause (Art. XIV ¶ 1) is 
not explicitly self-judging, nonetheless provides that “[m]easures to pro-
tect a Party’s essential security interests are self-judging in nature, al-
though each Party would expect the provisions to be applied by the 
other in good faith.”332 Notably, the documents accompanying explicitly 
self-judging BITs have indicated that the change of language did not 
represent a policy change, but merely “makes explicit the implicit un-
derstanding that measures to protect a Party’s essential security interests 
are self-judging in nature, although each Party would expect the provi-
sions to be applied by the other in good faith.”333 
The United States has maintained a consistent interpretation of its 
NPM clauses as self-judging, even in ICSID proceedings brought by 
                                                          
328. Description of the United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT)—February 
1992, in August 4, 1992 Hearings, supra note 51, at 65 (emphasis added). 
329. Id. 
330. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Proto-
col, U.S.-Russ., ¶ 8, June 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 799 (stating that “[w]ith respect to Article X, para-
graph 1, the Parties confirm their mutual understanding that whether a measure is undertaken by a 
Party to protect its essential security interests is self-judging”). 
331. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-
Azer., Aug. 1, 1997, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43478.pdf. 
332. Letter of Submittal, Dep’t of State (Sept. 8, 2000), art. XIV, annexed to id. 
333. Letter of Submittal, Dep’t of State (Apr. 24, 2000), annexed to U.S.-Bahrain BIT, supra 
note 148, art. XIV. 
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American investors against foreign states. A September 2006 letter from 
James H. Thessin, Principle Deputy Legal Advisor at the U.S. Depart-
ment of State, to Abraham D. Sofaer, former Legal Advisor at the U.S. 
Department of State, addressed the interpretation of Article XI of the 
U.S.-Argentina BIT, specifically in the context of an ICSID arbitration 
against Argentina. The letter states that “notwithstanding the decision of 
the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, the position of the U.S. Government is 
that the essential security language in our…Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties is self-judging, i.e., only the Party itself is competent to determine 
what is in its own essential security interests.”334 
If the U.S. government is to be taken at its word that it informed ne-
gotiating partners of its self-judging interpretation of the NPM clause—
and there is no reason not to accept the State Department’s assertion in 
sworn testimony to the U.S. Senate—the self-judging nature of the 
NPM clause was part of the bargain struck between the United States 
and its treaty partners, even where that understanding was not expressly 
stated in treaty language. Certainly since 1992, and perhaps throughout 
the entire U.S. BIT program since 1982, even non-explicitly self-
judging NPM clauses were treated as self-judging, given the under-
standing of the United States and its treaty partners to that effect. As 
Kenneth Vandevelde has observed: “It is difficult to avoid the conclu-
sion that since 1984 the United States has interpreted the essential secu-
rity interests exception to be self-judging, although the Russia BIT 
represents the first time since 1986 that the United States has made its 
position clear publicly.”335 
In the case of such non-explicitly self-judging U.S. NPM clauses, ar-
bitral tribunals will need to engage in careful, treaty-by-treaty analysis 
of the text, context, background materials, and circumstances of a 
treaty’s conclusion to determine whether the parties shared an under-
standing of the NPM clause as implicitly self-judging. The treaty text 
would still be the starting point for any analysis, but to illuminate how 
the treaty partners expected NPM clauses to operate in practice, arbitra-
                                                          
334. Letter from James H. Thessin, Principle Deputy Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State to 
Abraham D. Sofaer, Senior Fellow, Hoover Inst., Stanford Univ. (Sept. 15, 2006) (on file with 
authors). Argentina has likewise accepted this self–judging interpretation and never has suggested 
any alternative reading of the article. These interpretations are directly relevant to Article XI of 
the US-Argentina BIT and therefore constitute “subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation,” pursuant to Ar-
ticle 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See Vienna Convention, supra 
note 65, art. 31(3)(b). 
335. Vandevelde, supra note 18, at 174. 
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tors would have to give due weight to the actual and demonstrable in-
tentions behind the provision. Where such evidence exists, it would be 
fully appropriate for a tribunal to apply a good-faith standard of review, 
discussed above, rather than a substantive review informed by a margin 
of appreciation, as would be appropriate for non-self-judging NPM 
clauses. 
VII. NPM CLAUSES AND LIABILITY 
NPM clauses raise two important questions with respect to state li-
ability under a BIT, each of which has implications for the allocation of 
risks and costs between states and investors. A first question is whether 
NPM clauses actually relieve states of responsibility, liability, and the 
duty to pay compensation for acts that would otherwise breach a BIT. If 
NPM clauses do not relieve responsibility and liability, they would have 
no practical impact on the allocation of costs, as states would bear the 
costs of action regardless of the inclusion of an NPM clause. In contrast, 
if NPM clauses do relieve states of liability, the successful invocation of 
such a clause would transfer the costs of action in exceptional cases 
from the state to an investor. Assuming NPM clauses relieve a state of 
liability, the second question still remains: for what period of time 
should the NPM clause be deemed to apply and liability remain pre-
cluded? 
A. Implications of NPM Clauses for State Responsibility, Liability 
and Compensation 
In most cases, NPM clauses will absolve states of international re-
sponsibility, liability to investors, and any duty to pay compensation ei-
ther to the other state party or directly to investors. NPM clauses are 
generally articulated as exceptions to a BIT’s substantive provisions, 
and not merely as justifications or excuses for breach. NPM clauses cre-
ate this exception through the use of the phrase “shall not preclude the 
applicability of measures” or “shall not apply to” particular measures. 
The exceptions contained in NPM clauses preclude the very applicabil-
ity of the specified substantive obligation(s) of the BIT to acts that fall 
within the scope of the clause. If a certain action is covered by the terms 
of the exception, the result is the preclusion of wrongfulness, not be-
cause a violation of a particular obligation is justified under the circum-
stances, but because the obligation does not apply to that action in the 
2008] INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN EXTRAORDINARY TIMES  387 
 
 
first place.336 In other words, the NPM clause exempts measures 
adopted for the specified permissible objectives from some or all sub-
stantive obligations under the BIT. NPM clauses may exempt covered 
state actions either from all the substantive protections of a BIT or only 
from certain treatment standards, based on the specific terms used in the 
BIT.337 
It is a well established principle of international law, codified in Arti-
cle 2 of the ILC Draft Articles, that for an action to give rise to an “in-
ternationally wrongful act of a State,” such an “action” must “consti-
tute[] a breach of an international obligation of the State.”338 By its very 
terms, an NPM clause specifies that actions taken consistent with it 
“shall not be precluded” by the treaty. Hence, such actions do not 
breach the treaty. In its commentaries to the Draft Articles, the ILC rec-
ognizes “there is no exception to the principle stated in article 2 that 
there are two necessary conditions for an internationally wrongful act—
conduct attributable to the State under international law and the breach 
by that conduct of an international obligation of the State.”339 The plain 
language of NPM clauses makes clear that acts properly taken under 
that article are not internationally wrongful at least so long as they re-
main necessary to achieve one of the permissible objectives specified in 
the clause. 
As long as the acts taken by a state are not internationally wrongful 
by virtue of an NPM clause, there is no state liability and no compensa-
tion can be due. Pursuant to Article 31 of the Draft Articles, compensa-
tion is only due for “injury caused by the internationally wrongful 
act.”340 Absent such an internationally wrongful act, state responsibility 
is not engaged and no compensation is due to the claimant. This posi-
tion was confirmed by the ICSID Tribunal in LG&E, which found: “Ar-
ticle XI establishes the state of necessity as a ground for exclusion from 
wrongfulness of an act of the State, and therefore, the State is exempted 
from liability.”341 
                                                          
336. Cf. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 559–60 (6th ed. 1990) (noting, inter alia, that an excep-
tion is the “[e]xpress exclusion of something from operation of contract or deed,” referring to “a 
person, thing, or case specified as distinct or not included”). 
337. See supra notes 97–103 and accompanying text. 
338. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 54, art. 2. See generally Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v. 
Fr.), 1938 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 74 (June 14). 
339. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 54, art. 2(9); see also Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24); Factory at Chorzów (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1925 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A) No. 9 (May 24). 
340. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 54, art. 31. 
341. LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 30, ¶ 261. 
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A reading of NPM clauses to do something less than provide an ex-
ception to the substantive protections of the BIT and, thereby, preclude 
the wrongfulness of a state’s actions would violate the principle of ef-
fectiveness in treaty interpretation. The principle of effectiveness means 
that, in the interpretation of a treaty, its terms must be construed in such 
a way as to give each of them effect and not render them meaning-
less.342 Reading an NPM clause merely to authorize such acts but not 
bar liability—would deny any meaning or effect to the “shall not pre-
clude” phrase or its equivalent in a BIT, rendering it a legal nullity 
since, even without an NPM clause, a state could always take such ac-
tions and face the consequences of liability after the fact. 
Even if an NPM clause removes the wrongfulness of a state’s actions 
and, hence, any duty to pay compensation to the other state party to the 
treaty,  it still must be determined whether the state could have some re-
sidual liability toward investors harmed by the state’s actions, rather 
than to the other state party to the treaty. There are, of course, circum-
stances in which international law provides for such liability, for exam-
ple in the field of expropriation, in which failure to pay compensation to 
foreign property owners can result in international responsibility.343 
Both the legal formulation and the function of NPM clauses, however, 
indicate that they must relieve a state of any such residual liability to in-
vestors as well as primary responsibility to the other state party, at least 
in the ICSID forum. Any residual duty a state may owe to investors for 
a breach of a BIT must stem from the BIT instrument itself. As the 
NPM clause specifies that the BIT “shall not preclude” state actions that 
fall under it and removes such actions from the scope of the BITs pro-
tections, no residual liability can be left under the BIT.344 In essence, the 
NPM clause means that the state assumed no obligations either toward 
the other state party or its investors with respect to actions covered by 
the NPM clause. While there may be other sources of liability that states 
may have toward investors, such as the rules of expropriation in cus-
                                                          
342. See United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, supra note 
63, at 621. 
343. See generally ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 391–415 
(2003); M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 344–88 (2d ed. 
2004). 
344. The situation will be different in the case of limited scope NPM clauses, such as those 
included in Germany’s BITs, which apply only to the specified treatment standards and not to the 
treaty as a whole. While a violation of the national treatment standard covered by the German 
NPM clause would thus not give rise to any claims for compensation, the provisions on expro-
priation would still apply if the severity of interference with the investment were to reach that 
level. 
2008] INVESTMENT PROTECTION IN EXTRAORDINARY TIMES  389 
 
 
tomary law, those issues are distinct from the BIT.345 Hence, investors 
would have to seek compensation in other fora, such as domestic courts. 
By preventing the wrongfulness of a state’s actions and thereby pre-
cluding both responsibility and liability, NPM clauses effectively shift 
the costs of such actions from the state to investors. Whereas, without 
the NPM clause, the state would be required to compensate investors for 
harms resulting from state action in breach of the BIT, the NPM clause 
prevents the duty to pay compensation and causes investors to bear the 
costs of state actions that fall within the scope of the NPM clause. 
B. Period of Applicability 
A second question with respect to liability relates to the period during 
which the exceptions provided for in the NPM clause apply. An NPM 
clause involves a nexus between particular actions taken by a state and a 
set of permissible objectives. Even if initially the nexus requirement is 
satisfied and the NPM clause is successfully invoked, at some point in 
the future that nexus might be severed by, for example, factual devel-
opments that remove the threat to, say, essential security, public order, 
or public health. Once that nexus is severed, the NPM clause would no 
longer apply and actions by the state might again give rise to liability. 
The key question then is at what point that nexus is severed and the po-
tential for liability returns. 
The text of the NPM provision provides the legal starting point for 
such an inquiry.346 Take for example a standard U.S. NPM provision: 
“[t]his Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of meas-
ures necessary for the maintenance of public order…or the protection of 
its own essential security interests.”347 The text makes clear that it is the 
measures necessary to respond to threats to public order or national se-
curity that are not precluded by the treaty. Hence, liability cannot attach 
to acts that would otherwise violate the treaty from the moment the state 
takes such measures until the time such measures cease or are no longer 
necessary for the maintenance of public order or the protection of na-
tional security interests. 
                                                          
345. If an ICSID tribunal has jurisdiction over such non-BIT sources of liability, the NPM 
clause would not apply and the state might face direct liability to investors outside the BIT and 
NPM regime. See ICSID Convention, supra note 11, art. 25. 
346. Vienna Convention, supra note 65, art. 31. 
347. See 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 18. 
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As used in an NPM clause, measure can be defined as “an action 
taken as a means to an end” or a “legislative bill or enactment.”348 It is 
the legislative act or acts taken in response to the public order or na-
tional security threat that is not precluded by the BIT. As long as the act 
itself occurred under the NPM clause, even if its long-term impact con-
tinues to such a time when the act itself would not have been initially 
justified under the NPM clause, no liability should attach as there was 
no internationally wrongful act by the state outside the period of NPM 
applicability. 
Other acts might involve continuing affirmative interference by the 
state with the rights of investors under the BIT. In this situation, acts are 
only permissible during the period of NPM applicability, and responsi-
bility could attach for acts subsequent to the severing of the nexus re-
quirement by developments on the ground. The determination of such 
an end point must, however, go beyond a simple conclusion that there is 
not, say, a present threat to public order from riots on the streets. A gov-
ernment cannot be required to take decisions that would reignite the 
very same threats to essential security and public order that existed at 
the time such measures were initially adopted. Say, for example, a state 
justified travel restrictions that would violate a BIT under the “public 
health” objective of an NPM clause as a response to a quickly spreading 
pandemic disease and the spread of the disease was largely stopped at 
the border. The state could not then be held liable for the continuation of 
those restrictions just because there was no pandemic threat within the 
state itself since, by lifting the restrictions, the disease could well spread 
into the State and the situation of emergency that justified the initial in-
vocation of the NPM clause would return. 
The duration of the period in which otherwise precluded measures 
are permitted under an NPM clause must look to the likely impact of the 
reversal or removal of those measures. Rather than examining only po-
tentially reversible facts on the ground, a legal analysis of the end point 
for the applicability of Article XI should be based either on the state’s 
own termination of the measures taken in response to the crisis or on 
economic and social evidence and analysis demonstrating that such 
measures have become unnecessary to prevent a return to the conditions 
that initially gave rise to the invocation of the NPM clause. During the 
period when the NPM clause is applicable, the costs of state actions are 
                                                          
348. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1117 (3d ed. 
1992); see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1400 (10th ed. 1993) (defining 
measure as “a step planned or taken as a means to an end; specif. : a proposed legislative act”). 
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shifted to investors; once the nexus between state actions and a permis-
sible objective is severed, however, liability shifts back to the state, 
which could then be required to compensate investors for subsequent 
harmful acts. 
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FIGURE 1: APPLICATION OF NPM CLAUSE FLOW CHART 
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VIII. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF NPM 
CLAUSES: REVISITING THE ARGENTINA CASES 
Two of the BITs under which cases have been brought against Ar-
gentina—the U.S.-Argentina BIT and the Belgium-Luxembourg Eco-
nomic Union-Argentina BIT (BLEU-Argentina BIT)—include NPM 
clauses.349 In each of these cases Argentina has invoked the NPM 
clause,350 arguing that the measures it took were not precluded by the 
BIT, that there was no internationally wrongful act, and, hence, no 
compensation is due to investors. Moreover, based on the long-standing 
United States policy of self-judging NPM clauses, Argentina has 
claimed that the NPM provision in the U.S.-Argentina BIT is self-
judging and Argentina’s invocation of the clause subject only to good 
faith review.351 Though more than forty cases are presently pending 
against Argentina, only four awards involving NPM clauses have been 
handed down by ICSID tribunals as of October 2007.352 The four 
awards illustrate both the interpretive challenges presented by NPM 
clauses and the dangers of interpretive short-cuts by arbitral tribunals. 
Moreover, the four awards highlight very different understandings of 
the risk allocation functions of NPM clauses. Whereas the tribunals in 
the cases of CMS v. Argentina, Enron v. Argentina and Sempra v. Ar-
gentina found the NPM clause inapplicable, the tribunal in LG&E v. 
Argentina found the clause properly invoked and Argentina’s liability 
precluded for a specified period during the crisis.353 Though the contra-
                                                          
349. See U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 17, art. 11; Convenio para la promoción y la protec-
ción reciproca de las inversions, Belg.-Lux.-Arg., art. XX, June 28, 1990 [hereinafter BLEU-
Argentina BIT], available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/belg_lux_argentina_esp.pdf. 
350. The case brought under the BLEU-Argentina BIT is ARB/03/7 (2005). For the complete 
list of cases brought against Argentina under the U.S.-Argentina BIT, see The World Bank 
Group, ICSID: List of Pending Cases, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pending.htm (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2007). 
351. LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 30, ¶¶ 208-218. 
352. The four cases decided to date are: CMS, supra note 16; LG&E Energy, supra note 30; 
Enron, supra note 29; and Sempra, supra note 29. The CMS case is presently subject to annul-
ment proceedings. The arbitral panel in the CMS case consisted of Francisco Orrego Vicuna 
(President), Marc Lalonde and Francisco Rezek. The LG&E panel consisted of Tatiana de Maek-
elt (President), Francisco Rezek, and Albert Jan van den Berg. The Enron panel consisted of 
Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Albert Jan van den Berg and Pierre Yves Tschanz. It is interesting to 
note the very different holdings despite the overlap of panel members.  
353. See Enron Award, supra note 29, ¶¶ 226–66 (“Argentina is exempt of responsibility, and 
accordingly, the Claimants should bear the consequences of the measures taken by the host 
State….”); CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶ 387. The divergent decisions raise the problem of an 
arbitral system without meaningful appellate authority and no means of resolving different out-
comes based on nearly identical facts. See Franck, supra note 32. 
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dictory outcomes cannot be reconciled, they can be explained by the  
tribunals’ very different understandings of the bargain that lies behind 
the U.S.-Argentina BIT and the risk allocation function of the NPM 
clause in the treaty. 
A. The Jurisprudence of the ICSID Panels 
While the four tribunals reach different substantive outcomes and 
their decisions take distinct approaches to the function of NPM clauses, 
they do agree on at least two critical points. First, the tribunals interpret 
the essential security and public order provisions of the U.S.-Argentina 
BIT broadly so as to encompass economic emergencies,354 as suggested 
in our interpretive analysis of the clause above. A second area of 
agreement between the tribunals is their interpretation of the NPM 
clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT as not self-judging.355 While the lan-
guage of the NPM clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT is not explicitly 
self-judging, Argentina has argued that it should be interpreted as self-
judging, again based on long-standing practice of the United States. The 
tribunals, therefore, apply a substantive review to Argentina’s invoca-
tion of the clause rather than a good-faith test. Yet, the tribunals justify 
this common approach on very different grounds. For the CMS Tribu-
nal, the non-self-judging character of the U.S.-Argentina NPM clause is 
based on a textual comparison of the NPM clause in the treaty with 
other instruments, such as GATT, that are explicitly self-judging and the 
ICJ’s treatment of similar language in the Nicaragua case.356 In con-
trast, the determinations by the LG&E Tribunal and the Enron Tribunal 
are, in part, based on supposed consideration of the parties’ understand-
ings at the time the treaty was concluded. In the words of the LG&E 
Tribunal: “[b]ased on the evidence before the Tribunal regarding the 
understanding of the Parties in 1991 at the time the Treaty was signed, 
the Tribunal decides and concludes that the provision is not self-
judging.”357 In reaching this conclusion, the LG&E tribunal recognizes 
that the “language of the BIT does not specify who should decide what 
constitutes essential security measures–either Argentina itself, subject to 
a review under a good faith standard, or the Tribunal,” and looks to both 
the background materials and broader context of the treaty negotia-
                                                          
354. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
355. Enron Award, supra note 29, ¶ 337; LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 30, ¶ 212; 
CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶ 373; Sempra Award, supra note 29, ¶ 388. 
356. CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶ 371. 
357. LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 30, ¶ 212; Enron Award, supra note 29, ¶ 337. 
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tions.358 Despite their agreement on the non self-judging nature of the 
NPM clause, only the Sempra tribunal gives serious consideration to the 
weighty evidence of the common intent of the United States and Argen-
tina that the clause should be self-judging.359 Yet, the Sempra tribunal, 
notably composed of two arbitrators who also served in the CMS case 
dismisses the relevance of that evidence.360 
The areas of disagreement between the four tribunals are significant 
and reflective of two very different understandings of the function of the 
NPM clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT. A first key difference among 
the decisions is their approach to the relationship between the NPM 
clause in the treaty and the customary law defense of necessity.361 The 
CMS Tribunal, the Enron Tribunal, and the Sempra Tribunal effectively 
read the requirements of the customary international law defense of ne-
cessity into the NPM clause of the treaty, testing Argentina’s invocation 
of the NPM clause against the basic requirements of the necessity de-
fense in customary international law.362 The Enron Tribunal observes: 
“because there is no specific guidance” as to the interpretation of the 
NPM clause “under the treaty…[it is] necessary to rely on the require-
ments of the state of necessity under customary law.”363 Likewise, the 
CMS Tribunal begins its analysis of Article XI with explicit reference to 
“Article 25 of the Articles on State Responsibility” which addresses the 
necessity defense in customary law and asks whether “the plea of neces-
                                                          
358. LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 30, ¶ 212. For example, the tribunal considers 
when the U.S. policy with respect to self–judging NPM clauses became explicit and finds that did 
not occur until 1992, after the U.S.-Argentina BIT was signed. Id. ¶ 213. Despite the agreement 
of the two tribunals that the NPM clause in the U.S.-Argentina BIT is not self–judging, there is 
reason to question both tribunals’ decisions. As noted above, prior to the conclusion of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT, the United States had asserted a self-judging interpretation of the NPM clause in 
its BITs. See supra notes 313–32 and accompanying text. 
359. See Enron Award, supra note 29, ¶ 337; LG&E Decision on Liability, supra note 30, ¶ 
212; CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶ 371. 
360. See Sempra Award, supra note 29, ¶¶ 382–88. 
361. For a discussion of the treatment of the state of necessity in the two cases, see August 
Reinisch, Necessity in International Arbitration—An Unnecessary Split of Opinions in Recent 
ICSID Cases? Comments on CMS v. Argentina and LG&E v. Argentina, 3 TRANSNATI’L DISP. 
MGMT. (2006); Stephan W. Schill, International Investment Law and the Host State’s Power to 
Handle Economic Crises, 24 J. INT’L ARB. 265, 277–84 (2007). 
362. CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶ 357 (asking if, “in the context of Article 25 of the Articles 
on State Responsibility [the necessity defense], the act in question does not seriously impair an 
essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation exists”); see also Sempra 
Award, supra note 29, ¶ 376 (“The Treaty provision is inseparable from the customary law stan-
dard.”). 
363. Enron Award, supra note 29, ¶ 333. 
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sity would…be precluded.”364 In contrast, the LG&E Tribunal considers 
Article XI of the BIT and the state of necessity in customary interna-
tional law independently and does not impose the requirements of cus-
tomary international law on Argentina’s invocation of the treaty-based 
NPM clause. The LG&E Tribunal notes: 
The concept of excusing a State for the responsibility for viola-
tion of its international obligations during what is called a “state 
of necessity” or “state of emergency” also exists in international 
law. While the Tribunal considers that the protections afforded 
by Article XI have been triggered in this case, and are sufficient 
to excuse Argentina’s liability, the Tribunal recognizes that satis-
faction of the state of necessity standard as it exists in interna-
tional law (reflected in Article 25 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility) supports the Tribunal’s conclusion.365 
Although the fact that the customary defense of necessity has been satis-
fied may support the LG&E Tribunal’s findings, the successful invoca-
tion of the NPM clause is based on a separate test and distinct evidence, 
independent from the customary defense of necessity itself. For the 
LG&E Tribunal, the NPM clause is a separate risk allocation device and 
an explicit part of the bargain in the U.S.-Argentina BIT, providing the 
states-parties greater protections than would have been available in cus-
tomary law. For the CMS, Enron, and Sempra Tribunals, in contrast, the 
NPM clause appears to be merely a textual restatement of the pre-
existing customary defense of necessity. 
As both a legal and policy matter, the approach taken by the LG&E 
Tribunal is far more appropriate. Legally, reading the customary de-
fense of necessity into the NPM clause both violates the Vienna Con-
vention rule of lex specialis and the canonical rule that each treaty pro-
vision must be given effect.366 As a matter of policy, the incorporation 
of the necessity defense into the NPM clause fails to recognize the ac-
tual understandings of the U.S.-Argentina BIT, whereby in exchange for 
granting investors greater protections than would have been available in 
customary law, the states also sought to preserve for themselves greater 
freedom of action through the NPM clause than would have been avail-
able in customary international law. The flawed approach of the CMS 
                                                          
364. CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶¶ 353, 358. The CMS tribunal did analyze Article XI of the 
treaty independently of the customary defense of necessity, but read the customary law standards 
for invoking necessity back into its analysis of the NPM clause. Id. ¶¶ 353–58 
365. LG&E Award, supra note 30, ¶ 245. 
366. See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
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Tribunal in conflating customary and treaty law is suggested by the de-
cision of the Annulment Committee in the CMS case. While the Annul-
ment Committee found that it lacked the power under the limited review 
provisions of the ICSID Convention to overturn the decision, it found 
that the “errors made by the Tribunal could have had a decisive impact 
on the operative part of the Award. As admitted by CMS, the Tribunal 
gave an erroneous interpretation of Article XI.”367 
A second area of significant disagreement between tribunals is the 
level of deference they accord Argentina’s invocation of the NPM 
clause. While all the tribunals agree the clause is not self-judging, the 
CMS, Enron, and Sempra Tribunals apply a far more rigorous standard 
to the nexus requirement under the NPM clause, importing the custom-
ary law requirements of necessity and requiring Argentina to show that 
the actions taken were the only ones available to the government. Al-
though the Sempra Tribunal recognizes that “it is not the task of the tri-
bunal to substitute its view for the government’s choices,” its interpreta-
tion of the “only available means” requirement essentially removes all 
policy responses from the government simply by finding that there were 
more than one possible response to the crisis.368 In contrast, the LG&E 
Tribunal takes an approach somewhat closer to the margin of apprecia-
tion doctrine we advocate above. The Tribunal suggests, for example, 
that were it “to conclude that the provision is self-judging, Argentina’s 
determination would be subject to a good faith review anyway, which 
does not significantly differ from the substantive analysis presented 
here.”369 In essence, then, the LG&E Tribunal reduces the level of scru-
tiny of Argentina’s invocation of Article XI down to something close to 
a good faith review and appears to afford Argentina a margin of appre-
ciation in which to make its own determinations of the appropriate re-
sponses to the crisis. For example, the LG&E Tribunal found: 
Certainly, the conditions in Argentina in December 2001 called 
for immediate, decisive action to restore civil order and stop the 
economic decline.…Article XI refers to situations in which a 
State has no choice but to act. A State may have several re-
                                                          
367. CMS Annulment Decision, supra note 31, ¶ 135. 
368. Sempra Award, supra note 29, ¶¶ 350–51. This approach fails to give the government 
any policy flexibility and does not recognize that some policy options may be more or less effec-
tive in responding to the crisis. 
369. LG&E Award, supra note 29, ¶ 214. 
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sponses at its disposal to maintain public order or protect its es-
sential security interests.370  
This approach recognizes the subjective nature of certain permissible 
objectives and that states, rather than tribunals, are in the best position 
to craft appropriate responses to emergency situations. 
A third area of substantive disagreement between the tribunals is the 
question of compensation. While the CMS Tribunal did not find either 
the requirements of necessity in customary international law or the stan-
dards of the NPM clause met, it suggested that neither provision would, 
even if properly invoked, excuse the state invoking the clause of liabil-
ity and the duty to pay compensation.371 In contrast, the LG&E Tribunal 
opined that “Article XI establishes the state of necessity as a ground for 
exclusion from wrongfulness of an act of the State, and therefore, the 
State is exempted from liability.”372 As a consequence, the LG&E Tri-
bunal found that Argentina was not liable for damages to investors dur-
ing the period of emergency.373 Given that the very purpose of the NPM 
clause was to guarantee states greater freedom of action in the face of 
extraordinary circumstances in exchange for enhanced protections for 
investors, the approach taken by the LG&E Tribunal appears to far bet-
ter reflect the bargain inherent in NPM clauses. If such clauses were not 
intended to prevent liability, they would not in fact serve the purpose of 
guaranteeing greater freedom of action to states in cases of emergency. 
B. Explaining the Differences: The Function of NPM Clauses 
While the holdings of the four tribunals cannot be reconciled, the 
contradictory awards can be explained by the tribunals’ different under-
standings of the function performed by NPM clauses and the nature of 
the bargain inherent in the U.S.-Argentina BIT. Each of the tribunals 
appreciates that the U.S.-Argentina BIT represents a bargain between 
the two contracting states. In the CMS case, the Tribunal notes that “[i]t 
                                                          
370. Id. ¶¶ 238–39. 
371. The CMS Tribunal observed, for example, that “the plea of state of necessity may pre-
clude the wrongfulness of an act, but it does not exclude the duty to compensate the owner of the 
right which had been sacrificed.” Hence, “in the absence of agreement between the parties the 
duty of the tribunal in these cases is to determine the compensation due.” CMS Award, supra 
note 16, ¶¶ 388, 394. 
372. LG&E Award, supra note 30, ¶ 261. 
373. Id. ¶ 266 (“Based on the analysis of the state of necessity, the Tribunal concludes that, 
first, said state started on December 1, 2001 and ended on April 26, 2003; second, during that 
period Argentina is exempt of responsibility, and accordingly, the Claimants should bear the con-
sequences of the measures taken by the host State.”). 
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must also be kept in mind that the scope of a given bilateral treaty, such 
as this, should normally be understood and interpreted as attending to 
the concerns of both parties.” If the treaty were interpreted otherwise, 
“it could well result in unbalanced understanding of Article XI.”374 
Similarly, the LG&E Tribunal notes that “[t]he provisions included in 
the international treaty are to be interpreted in conformity with the in-
terpretation given and agreed upon by both parties at the time of its sig-
nature.”375 The Enron Tribunal notes that “what is relevant is the inten-
tion the parties had in signing the treaty.”376 In approaching the NPM 
clause, then, each tribunal engages in a formal analysis of the text of the 
provision, but claims to do so with reference to the intent of the parties 
and, at least implicitly, to the bargains underlying the treaties. 
Yet, the Tribunals’ awards reflect very different understandings of 
the particular function of the NPM clause intended by the United States 
and Argentina. For the CMS Tribunal, the bargain inherent in the BIT is 
one of investor protection and, hence, the NPM clause has a minimal 
function that does not significantly limit investor protection. As the Tri-
bunal observed, “[t]he Treaty in this case is clearly designed to protect 
investments at a time of economic difficulties or other circumstances 
leading to the adoption of adverse measures by the Government.”377 
Further, the CMS Tribunal observed that “[i]f the Treaty was made to 
protect investors it must be assumed that this is an important interest of 
the States parties.”378 The NPM clause is thus seen as merely a restate-
ment of the limited preexisting necessity defense. Similarly, the Enron 
Tribunal finds that the treaty is intended to “apply in situations of eco-
nomic difficulty and hardship that require the protection of the interna-
tionally guaranteed rights of the beneficiaries.”379 Hence, for the Enron 
Tribunal, a “restrictive interpretation” of the NPM clause “is manda-
tory.”380 
In contrast, the LG&E Tribunal recognizes that the treaty provides for 
a balancing of interests between investor protection and state freedom of 
action. That Tribunal notes that it “must decide whether the conditions 
that existed in Argentina during the relevant period were such that the 
State was entitled to invoke the protections included in Article XI of the 
                                                          
374. CMS Award, supra note 16,  ¶ 360. 
375. LG&E Award, supra note 30, ¶ 213. 
376. Enron Award, supra note 29, ¶ 337. 
377. CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶ 354; Sempra Award, supra note 29, ¶ 373. 
378. CMS Award, supra note 16, ¶ 357. 
379. Enron Award, supra note 29, ¶ 331. 
380. Id. 
400 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 48:2 
 
 
Treaty.”381 In essence, for the LG&E Tribunal, the NPM clause is an 
explicit textual instrument to shift the costs of state action in exceptional 
circumstances from states to investors. 
These different understandings of the nature of the function of the 
NPM clause and the background bargain behind the U.S.-Argentina BIT 
guide the divergent interpretative approaches of the Tribunals. The 
CMS, Enron, and Sempra Tribunals, focusing on a bargain of investor 
protection and a limited role for the NPM clause, read the customary 
law requirements of necessity into the clause and restrict its applicabil-
ity. The LG&E Tribunal recognizes a bargain that balances investor pro-
tections and state freedom of action. It therefore treats the NPM clause 
as an essential element of the treaty that explicitly shifts costs to inves-
tors separate from the customary defense of necessity. These different 
understandings of the bargain in the treaty also drive the Tribunals’ ap-
proaches to compensation. For the CMS, Enron and Sempra Tribunals, 
compensation remains due, even if the NPM clause is appropriately in-
voked, precisely because the Tribunal sees the BIT as designed to pro-
tect investors. In contrast, for the LG&E Tribunal, the successful invo-
cation of the NPM clause alleviates responsibility during the period of 
emergency because the clause is specifically intended to balance inves-
tor protections with state freedom of action. 
While the contradictory outcomes of the arbitrations can be explained 
with reference to the four Tribunals’ understandings of the function of 
NPM clauses, the interpretations of the NPM clause in the U.S.-
Argentina BIT highlight the difficult choices with respect to ascertain-
ing state intent and the problems of interpretive shortcuts in that proc-
ess. While all four tribunals claim to look to state intent in determining 
the meaning of the NPM clause, none of them engage in the serious 
work necessary to really determine that intent or the appropriate mean-
ing of the NPM clause terms. This lack of interpretive rigor and the di-
vergent awards challenge the very legitimacy of ad hoc investor-state 
arbitration. Similarly, the CMS Annulment Committee’s rejection of the 
legal reasoning in the CMS award underscores the interpretative diffi-
culties and problematic jurisprudence of, at least, that tribunal. More-
over, the awards indicate the pressing need for a coherent and consistent 
approach to NPM clauses, such as that advanced above, that is based on 
a treaty’s text, but recognizes both the intent of states that include such 
clauses and the risk allocation function they intended NPM provisions 
to perform. 
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IX. THE SYSTEMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERPRETATION AND 
APPLICATION OF NPM CLAUSES 
The interpretation of NPM clauses must be an individualized process 
that considers the text of the clause, its context, the object and purpose 
of such treaties, the travaux, and the circumstances surrounding their 
conclusion. Yet, the interpretation and application of these clauses and, 
particularly, the degree of deference given to their invocations by na-
tional governments, have far reaching implications for the international 
legal and economic systems. These implications reach well beyond the 
Argentina cases and have potentially significant consequences for the 
risk allocation between states and investors, the willingness of states to 
enter into international agreements, the trajectory of investment flows, 
the pricing of cross-border investments, and the policy responses of 
states to extraordinary events such as economic crises. In this final sec-
tion, we explore these broader policy implications that arise out of the 
interpretation and application of NPM clauses and suggest that both the 
inclusion of NPMs in BITs and their interpretation is of considerable 
importance to the future of international cooperation and the stability of 
the international economic system. 
A. NPM Clauses, Risk Allocation, and Investment Pricing 
Perhaps the most significant implication of the interpretation and ap-
plication of NPM clauses relates to the risk allocation between states 
and investors. As customary international law offers only limited inves-
tor protections, cross-border investments made under such a customary 
law regime are at some risk of uncompensated impairment by host 
states.382 BITs provide investors with broader guarantees for the security 
of their investments by ensuring compensation and providing a forum in 
which investors can pursue claims against states.383 In essence, then, 
BITs shift the costs of potentially adverse state action from investors 
(who would bear the costs under a customary law regime) to the host 
state of inbound investments. The inclusion of an NPM clause in such a 
                                                          
382. Though customary international law does require compensation in the case of expropria-
tion, investors would generally bear the costs of lesser forms of interference. For a discussion of 
investor protection in customary international law, see SORNARAJAH, supra note 10; Guzman, 
supra note 10, at 614. 
383. BITs are often described as part of a “grand bargain” in which host states provide far 
reaching guarantees as to the security of investments in hopes of increasing in–bound investment 
flows. Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 26, at 75; see also Yackee, supra note 26, at 10 (describ-
ing BITs as a “grand bargain”). 
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BIT, in turn, reverses that risk allocation, shifting the risks and costs of 
state actions that meet the nexus requirement and are taken in pursuit of 
a permissible objective, back to investors. In short, NPM clauses reallo-
cate risks to investors, creating a less favorable legal regime for inves-
tors, but giving states considerable freedom of action to respond to ex-
ceptional threats. 
The interpretation of NPM clauses by arbitral tribunals also has con-
siderable bearing on the degree to which such clauses shift risks from 
states to investors. The more narrowly NPM clauses are construed and 
the more arbitral tribunals engage in substantive reviews of state invoca-
tions of NPM clauses, the more those risks and costs remain with host 
states, pursuant to the substantive protections of a BIT. In contrast, the 
more broadly the terms of an NPM clause are construed and the more 
arbitral tribunals defer to state invocations of NPM clauses, the more 
those clauses will shift the risks and costs of host-state actions back to 
investors. The interpretation of NPM clauses thereby governs the ulti-
mate allocation of risks between host-states and investors with respect 
to state actions taken in response to exceptional circumstances. With 
present day threats posed by terrorism, financial collapse, public health 
emergencies, and environmental disasters, just to name a few, this risk 
allocation is likely to be of ever-greater significance.384 
In an international market environment which rationally prices in-
vestment returns, the inclusion of an NPM clause in a BIT ought to re-
sult in investors demanding higher returns for investments made under 
such a BIT than they would absent the NPM clause. Investors will seek 
a risk premium in the form of higher returns to account for the potential 
of uncompensated state actions. As a result, the host states of invest-
ments under a BIT with an NPM clause will have to pay more for capi-
tal inflows than they would absent that clause. Moreover, if investment 
opportunities in such states cannot command the risk premiums inves-
tors should demand, capital flows should decline, as investors shift to 
either more lucrative or safer host states for their investments. In es-
sence, then, when states decide to include NPM clauses in their BITs, 
they engage in a compromise through which they increase their own 
costs of capital, but preserve for themselves greater freedom of action to 
respond to extraordinary circumstances. 
                                                          
384. For a more detailed discussion of the security threats states face today, see G. John Iken-
berry & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Forging a World of Liberty Under Law: U.S. National Security in 
the 21st Century (Final Paper of the Princeton Project on National Security, Sept. 27, 2006), 
available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/report/FinalReport.pdf. 
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The interpretation of NPM clauses by arbitral tribunals should also 
impact the pricing of cross-border investments. Given that the more 
broadly such clauses are interpreted, the more risks shift from states to 
investors, broader interpretations of NPM clauses ought to increase the 
costs of capital for states as investors perceive greater potential for un-
compensated state-interference with their investments. In contrast, nar-
row interpretations of NPM clauses that minimize the risk-shifting func-
tion of such clauses ought to have a more mild impact on the costs of 
capital as the range of state actions that will fall under the NPM clause 
is diminished. Hence, even broad interpretations of NPM clauses do not 
give states a free pass to interfere with foreign investments; those states 
essentially pay for the right to invoke the NPM clause through the high-
er costs of capital they will face in the financial markets. 
B. Clauses and the Legitimacy of Investor-State Arbitration 
The interpretation of NPM clauses often touches on the core domes-
tic functions of the state—the preservation of security, order, or morals. 
In the wake of the Argentine cases, the legitimacy of ad hoc tribunals to 
regulate within these core sovereign domains of domestic governments 
has been called into question. Particularly in light of the CMS Annul-
ment Decision, which reaffirms Argentina’s obligations to pay hundreds 
of millions of dollars in compensation, despite the finding of “errors” 
that “could have had a decisive impact on the operative part of the 
award, the legitimacy of subjecting such core state policy decisions to 
ad hoc arbitration,” is questionable.385 Argentina, for example, is now 
looking for a “diplomatic exit from ICSID suits.”386 Moreover, whereas 
international economic law has largely been based on objective rules 
that derive from treaties with identifiable ordinary meanings, NPM 
clauses present arbitral tribunals with far more subjective terms, the 
possibility of divergent meanings, and questions of constitutional sig-
nificance. Our argument for importing the margin of appreciation doc-
trine from the European human rights context to international economic 
law offers a potent means of resolving this legitimacy deficit. The mar-
gin of appreciation would provide arbitrators with a legal mechanism to 
embrace the ambiguity of some NPM terms and to reconcile potentially 
divergent understandings of other terms by varying the deference shown 
to a state’s own invocation of an NPM clause. Significantly, the use of 
                                                          
385. CMS Annulment Decision, supra note 31, ¶¶ 135–36. 
386. Shane Romig, Argentina Seeks Diplomatic Exit from ICSID Suits, DOW JONES 
NEWSWIRES, Oct. 15, 2007. 
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the margin of appreciation as an interpretive tool might well preserve 
the legitimacy of the ad hoc arbitral system387 by granting states space 
to develop and implement the policies they deem necessary and focus-
ing the tribunal on its supervisory role. Just as the European Court of 
Human Rights was able to enhance its legitimacy and credibility 
through the use of the margin of appreciation,388 ad hoc tribunals may 
be able to rescue their credibility by borrowing from the ECtHR. 
The choice of the standard with which to review a state’s invocation 
of an NPM clause will often be determinative of the risk allocation be-
tween states and investors for actions taken in extraordinary circum-
stances. Where states chose to specify explicitly or implicitly a self-
judging NPM clause, they effectively preserve for themselves the right 
to determine, subject to the confines of good faith, whether the clause 
applies to a given action and whether the state or investors will bear the 
cost of that action. As BITs are bilateral agreements between two states, 
the states are free to choose any risk allocation they agree upon, includ-
ing one that places a greater burden on investors, as long as both states 
understood that risk allocation when they drafted the treaty. Even if 
such a self-judging NPM clause limits protections for investors, it is a 
perfectly legitimate choice states may make in structuring their bilateral 
relations. Where states have made such a choice, investors ought to rec-
ognize their more limited protections and act accordingly. Similarly, ar-
bitral tribunals ought to give effect to the intent of state parties to pre-
serve for themselves the determination of risk allocation by applying a 
good-faith review. 
In contrast, where NPM clauses are silent as to the appropriate stan-
dard of review and there is no evidence of a shared understanding that 
the clause was self-judging, the application of the margin of apprecia-
tion would serve an important balancing function, simultaneously pre-
serving state freedom of action in exceptional circumstances and ensur-
ing a level of investor protection commensurate with the terms states 
chose to include in their NPM clauses. With respect to technical, objec-
tive NPM terms, the narrow margin of appreciation will constrain a 
state’s invocation of the NPM clause. In such cases, the NPM clause 
will allocate costs to investors when a state’s actions meet those techni-
cal standards and allocate those costs to the state when its actions do not 
                                                          
387. The legitimacy of this system has been recently called into question as ad hoc arbitral 
tribunals have sought to hold states liable for policy decisions that fall within the core sovereign 
competencies of the state and have done so inconsistently. See generally Franck, supra note 32. 
388. Slaughter & Helfer, supra note 145, at 317-318. 
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conform to the objective terms of the NPM clause. With respect to sub-
jective or broad NPM terms or where the two states’ understandings of 
those terms are difficult to reconcile, a wider margin of appreciation 
gives somewhat more deference to a state’s invocation of the clause, 
while retaining a supervisory review that ensures protections for inves-
tors.  
For states considering whether or not to provide investment protec-
tion through BITs or other treaty instruments, both the drafting and in-
terpretation of NPM clauses will impact their willingness to enter into 
such agreements and the depth of interstate cooperation. Despite the 
perceived benefits of BITs in terms of increased inbound investment,389 
many states are unwilling to allow ad hoc tribunals to review core state 
policies or to compensate investors for the potentially significant costs 
that may result from a state’s response to an emergency. Including NPM 
clauses in BITs provides states with a legal mechanism to regulate and 
control these risks, thereby reducing the sovereignty costs of coopera-
tion. While treaties with NPM clauses may provide fewer guarantees for 
investors in exceptional circumstances, states may be more willing to 
enter into agreements that control risks through NPM clauses. However, 
if arbitral tribunals interpret NPM clauses so narrowly as to deprive 
states of a legal mechanism to reallocate risks in exceptional circum-
stances, some states may continue to avoid entering into BIT agree-
ments and others may refuse to renew existing treaties when they ex-
pire. For states that do seek to enter into BITs with NPM clauses, a 
coherent approach to NPM interpretation by arbitral tribunals, perhaps 
through the framework we offer above, will help ensure that states are 
able to draft clauses that memorialize their preferred risk-allocation.  
An interpretive approach based around the margin of appreciation has 
the important benefit of helping structure the expectations of all actors 
in the international investment system. First, it gives the states that draft 
BITs the ability to choose between objective, technical NPM terms, 
which will generate a relatively narrow margin of appreciation and 
broader, subjective terms, which will be result in a wider margin of ap-
preciation. It puts investors on notice that an NPM clause will be inter-
preted with reference to the margin of appreciation implied by its terms 
and thereby allow investors to structure their investments based on the 
likely risks they face under the given terms of an NPM clause. For arbi-
                                                          
389. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 26. Even these perceived benefits have been called 
into question with new evidence suggesting that BITs may not actually alter cross-border invest-
ment flows. See Tobin & Ackerman, supra note 26. 
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trators, the margin of appreciation approach offers a tractable way to 
balance between the competing interests of investor protection and state 
freedom of action in an NPM clause. Likewise, it gives arbitrators a way 
of reconciling the different meanings of a given term in an NPM clause, 
affording a broader margin where states lack a shared understanding. 
C. Non-Precluded Measures Clauses and Investor Expectations 
Despite the clear legitimacy benefits of the use of the margin of ap-
preciation doctrine to interpret NPM clauses, investors may perceive the 
application of a margin of appreciation or the determination that NPM 
clauses are self-judging as detrimental to their interests. Admittedly, the 
process of treaty interpretation advanced herein is likely to be more fa-
vorable to states, at least on the surface, than it is to investors. As BITs 
are treaties between states parties, primary analysis must focus on the 
actual bargain struck by the states parties themselves. BITs may, how-
ever, confer rights on individuals and those rights ought to be respected 
in the process of treaty interpretation and application. The analysis with 
respect to the scope of deference of BIT interpretation in no way un-
dermines the rights such treaties confer on individuals. Rather, it pro-
vides a mechanism for accurately ascertaining the nature and breadth of 
rights states have chosen to grant to individuals through such treaties. 
Investors may also have legitimate expectations as to how their in-
vestments will be treated under a BIT, even absent an express conferral 
of rights in a treaty. In determining an appropriate scope of deference 
for the interpretation of an NPM clause term, such legitimate expecta-
tions ought to be recognized. However, in most cases investors will not 
have legitimate expectations that their own views of terms such as pub-
lic order or essential security will in fact be the applicable standard for 
the interpretation of an NPM clause. In some cases, investors may be 
able to claim a legitimate expectation that a non-expressly self-judging 
NPM clause will not subsequently be treated as self-judging. This could 
well be the case, for example, if the evidence that the states parties un-
derstood a non-expressly self-judging NPM clause as self-judging was 
kept secret or classified until it was raised in a subsequent arbitral pro-
ceeding. With respect to the U.S. BIT program, however, the U.S. inter-
pretation of NPM clauses as self-judging has been so consistent, open, 
and notorious since 1984, that any investor expectations that such claus-
es were not self-judging cannot be legitimate and should not be given 
significant weight by arbitral tribunals. 
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While investors may find in the short run that the greater deference to 
state invocations of NPM clauses that flows from the use of the margin 
of appreciation reduces their investment security, this approach, in fact, 
best represents the actual guarantees states provide to investors through 
BIT instruments. Moreover, investors are best placed to respond to the 
actual legal protections offered by particular BIT instruments and struc-
ture their longer-term investments accordingly. For example, investors 
may react to the fact that a particular BIT has a self-judging NPM 
clause or that a specific state interprets its NPM clauses as self-judging 
and limit their risk under that BIT by demanding higher returns from in-
vestments in such a state or by investing elsewhere. Hence, in the longer 
term, states will be forced to internalize the actual costs of self-judging 
NPM clauses or vague NPM terms that result in a wide margin of ap-
preciation through the reduced investment flows or higher prices of for-
eign direct investment that are likely in such a legal framework. 
D. NPM Clauses, Modern Threats, and Global Stability 
In the present world, states often face pressing and unexpected 
threats, whether terrorist attacks, financial crises or natural disasters. As 
states craft policy responses to these threats they will have to consider 
their BIT obligations and any cost and risk shifting that may result from 
NPM clauses. If states bear the full costs of harms to investors caused 
by a response to a crisis, their available policy options may be con-
strained. Where, as is the case with Argentina, the total cost of BIT 
claims based on harms to investors could top $80 billion, some states 
may simply not be able to afford their preferred policy in response to a 
crisis. Instead they may be forced to follow a sub-optimal policy that 
may or may not achieve an equally desirable outcome. Where states in-
clude NPM clauses and tribunals give effect to those clauses, the costs 
of host-state action will shift to investors, perhaps allowing the state to 
pursue its preferred policy response. While, at least in the short term, 
this flexibility may burden investors, in the context of present-day glob-
al threats it is fully understandable and, perhaps even wise, for states to 
preserve for themselves the right to craft preferred policy responses to 
pressing threats. 
The use of a margin of appreciation by arbitral tribunals will ensure 
states the leeway implied by NPM clause terms to undertake preferred 
policy options in response to international crises. The margin of appre-
ciation would allow states to pursue their preferred policy solutions, but 
would require them to justify their choices to an international tribunal 
408 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 48:2 
 
 
performing a supervisory function. This would, in turn, require states 
both to produce reasoned explanations for why it was necessary to com-
promise investor interests and might result in states internalizing the le-
gal rules governing international investments as part of their own delib-
erative process.390 
Similarly, the interpretation and application of NPM clauses may 
prove important to recovery from international financial crises and the 
development of a sovereign bankruptcy mechanism. Discussion of fi-
nancial crises and various proposals from both academe and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund for a sovereign bankruptcy system have largely 
focused on sovereign debt and the collective action problems associated 
with defuse bondholders.391 The Argentine case, however, highlights the 
fact that financial collapses may give rise to financial claims by inves-
tors under a state’s BITs. Even if a state is able to negotiate an advanta-
geous “hair cut” with debt-holders, it can still face directly enforceable 
liabilities under its BIT obligations.392 NPM clauses may thus prove to 
be an essential, if heretofore overlooked, element of a state’s post-
conflict economic recovery. States may chose to draft NPM clauses that 
explicitly include responses to economic crises among permissible ob-
jectives and arbitral tribunals may interpret terms such as “essential se-
curity” to include catastrophic economic collapse. In such cases, states 
may be relieved of the obligations they would otherwise face under a 
BIT, thereby facilitating post-crisis recovery. Moreover, any formal so-
vereign bankruptcy mechanism that may emerge will have to address 
investment liability under BITs as well as ordinary debt liabilities. En-
suring that risks and costs of a response to an economic collapse shift 
                                                          
390. For a discussion of how such internalization of norms operates in the area of human 
rights law, see Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and Human 
Rights Law, 54 DUKE L. J. 621 (2004). 
391. The primary proposal for a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism was authored by 
Anne O. Krueger of the International Monetary Fund. See ANNE O. KRUEGER, A NEW 
APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING (2002), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/index.htm. Her proposal, however, only ad-
dresses debt restructuring and not investment arbitration. For academic commentary and alterna-
tive approaches, see Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Redes-
igning the International Lender of Last Resort, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 177 (2005); Lee C. Bucheit & 
Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 53 EMORY L.J. 869 (2002); and Daniel K. 
Tarullo, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Role of the IMF in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 6 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 287 (2005). 
392. Sovereign debt litigation and BIT investment arbitration have become recently inter-
twined in a case in which Italian bondholders have initiated ICSID arbitral proceedings against 
Argentina. For a discussion of this, see Jilted Argentine Bondholders Appeal to World Bank in 
Final Throw of the Dice, CREDIT MAGAZINE, Dec. 7, 2006, available at http://atfa.org/cgi–
data/news/files/32.shtml. 
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from states that include NPM clauses in their BITs to investors will be 
an important part of any such sovereign bankruptcy mechanism. 
X. CONCLUSION 
The way states choose to allocate risks in exceptional circumstances 
has important and far-reaching consequences. In many cases, the risk 
allocation performed by NPM clauses can be highly beneficial to states, 
investors, and, perhaps, the international economic system more gener-
ally. Investors can often account for increased risks they face under 
NPM clauses through investment strategies and the pricing of their in-
vestments. Given the risk allocation performed by NPM clauses, how-
ever, all parties to the international investment system must structure 
their behavior around relatively clear legal rules. In order for them to do 
so, arbitral tribunals need to develop a consistent and coherent approach 
to such clauses. Ultimately, however, each NPM clause will have to be 
interpreted on its own terms and in light of the risk allocation intended 
by the parties to that treaty. Arbitral tribunals must undertake such in-
terpretation with extraordinary care and diligence. 
We have sought to explore some of those terms and their meanings 
here. As the system continues to develop, states will need to draft trea-
ties that put all parties on notice of the risk allocation being performed 
by the particular NPM clause in question. Arbitral tribunals will have to 
develop consistent interpretive approaches. Investors will have to struc-
ture their investments accordingly. As we have argued, the margin of 
appreciation may provide the best legal mechanism for arbitral review 
that preserves for states the freedom of action to respond to crises that 
they intended when drafting NPM clauses, yet maintains the supervisory 
authority of an arbitral tribunal to hold states liable when their policies 
exceed the margin of appreciation derived from the terms of the treaty 
itself. 
As arbitral tribunals are confronted with NPM clauses in investor-
state disputes, they will have to develop both a framework for interpret-
ing such clauses and methodologies for reconciling the inherent subjec-
tivity and potentially divergent understandings of their terms. The con-
tradictory decisions in the four recently decided cases against Argentina 
and the CMS Annulment Decision noted above highlight the urgent need 
for a harmonized approach that is legally and theoretically justifiable. 
The framework we offered in Part V provides such a coherent approach 
for the interpretation of NPM clauses that is grounded in the Vienna 
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Convention, yet also recognizes the intent of states parties in entering 
into BITs. More broadly, the challenges presented by the interpretation 
of NPM clauses must serve as a reminder of the urgent need for diligent 
and serious interpretation of treaty terms. Reliance on interpretive short-
cuts or inappropriate invocation of legal doctrines from other areas of 
international law is dangerous and may further erode the legitimacy of 
an already fragile investor-state arbitral system. Whatever the treaty 
clause in question, even ad hoc tribunals must undertake the diligent 
process of treaty interpretation called for by the Vienna Convention and 
deserved by investors and states alike. 
 
